In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger asserted that “it wasnot German idealism that collapsed; rather, the age was no longer strong enough to sustain the greatness, breadth, and originality of that spiritual world, i.e., truly to realize it”. He was at this point launchinginto one of the major themes of his later work: the “darkening of the world” in the form of the materialism and “demonism” typified by the antitheses of the USSR and the USA, a polarity of seeming opposites (...) obscuring an underlying fundamental similarity. This was the modernist faith of both cultures in the power of science to solve all of the problems that have plagued humanity for untold centuries, a faith in the power of science to tell us the absolute truth about the nature of reality. In 1955 Heidegger also characterized science and technology in “The Question Concerning Technology” as an “enframing”, a particular dominant interpretation of reality dependent on the interest of control and which conceals far more than it reveals. For one thing, “the essence of technology isin a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth”. Although enframing “lets man endure,” only art as the successor of philosophy transcends techne by allowing us to see that “the essence of technologyis nothing technological”. Much earlier, in Being and Time, he gave his first sustained account of science as the interpretationof reality driven by technological interests, and spoke of Being as the “transcendens” lying beyond “every possible character which an entity can possess” [p. 38]. It remains debatable whether this characterization of Being survived into Heidegger's later period, but despite his nostalgia for the spirituality of the early nineteenth century, the role of Beingin these earlier works might best be explained as some kind of realism. (shrink)

Philosophers commonly distinguish emotions from other feelings. For example, Anthony Kenny distinguishes emotions from both sensations and perceptions. Perceptions are connected with a specific organ or part of the body and sensations such as hunger or thirst are sometimes characteristically located in parts of the body. Emotions, however, are neither connected with organs nor characteristically felt in specific parts of the body. Kenny rightly points out that emotions and sensations are alike in one important respect, namely they are both linked (...) to characteristic forms of expression. He then says “ … the existence of characteristic expre5sions of emotion itself provides a further link between emotion and sensations: for the expression characteristic of each emotion—e.g., weeping—is itself felt, and this feeling is a genuine sensation”. (shrink)

Discussion of recent analyses of Being and Time, concentrating on that of Hubert Dreyfus, in which Heidegger’s philosophy of science is claimed to be a form of realism. Surveying other views, those of William Blattner, Barry Allen, Charles Guignon, and Richard Rorty, I argue that Heidegger should not be anachronistically classified because, similar to Subject/Object, he considers the Realism/Idealism debate to belong to another era.

Hubert Dreyfus's commentary on Being and Time has been a long time in preparation but it has also been worth the wait. Dreyfus limits his account to the first division of Part I of Being and Time with some passages from Division II brought into the discussion. For Dreyfus, the first 230 pages of Being and Time comprise Heidegger's most important metaphysical innovations, while Division II, the “existentialist” side of Heidegger, contains discussions of death, guilt, resoluteness and Angst rarely, if (...) ever, mentioned in any other works. (shrink)

Wagner's epic Ring of the Niebelungs stands as a focal point of nineteenth-century German art. Redemption or Annihilation? discusses the unusual structure of The Ring and major critical viewpoints, such as those of Friedrich Nietzsche and Theodor Adorno. An interpretation is presented in which Nietzsche's criticisms form the basis of a positive reading of The Ring, whose significance, structure, and meaning are still enthusiastically debated today.

The book is divided into two parts: Pragmatism and Realism, with brief introductions to each. In the Pragmatism section, the authors include Hilary Putnam himself, who gave the conference keynote address, Ruth Ann Putnam, Richard Warner, Robert Brandom, and Nicholas Rescher. The Realism section includes John Haldane, Tadeusz Szubka, John Heil, Wolfgang Künne, Gary Ebbs, and Charles Travis. Putnam replies, sometimes at length, to each one, and this is one of the more valuable features of the collection. The paper by (...) Putnam summarizes his current views and his latest version of realism. Missing in action, but discussed briefly by Putnam and some contributors, Richard Rorty has written quite a bit about Putnam, Putnam not as much on Rorty, and as these two eminent philosophers approach the end of their extensive careers, this would have been an excellent occasion for them to comment on their similarities and differences. Is Rorty really “the Evil Putnam”? Further, because Putnam has always been interested in the history and philosophy of science, it is ironic and regrettable that Kuhn gets only one brief mention, by Putnam in his reply to Rescher. He believes that Kuhn misinterprets “the significance of paradigm-change in a relativistic way,” and of course such a comment deserves defense. Both Kuhn and Rorty are directly relevant to Putnam’s arguments about the disconnect between metaphysics and physical law and it would good to have a more detailed account of his views on their historicism and “relativism.”. (shrink)

In a blurb on the dust jacket, Hilary Putnam describes Barry Allen'sTruth in Philosophyas “a good, provocative, and important book” discussing issues of “common concern to both analytic and continental philosophers.” Yet Putnam admits that Allen's views “are ones that I myself am committed to combating and … I am certain most analytic philosophers will want to combat.” All the more reason to read this book, of course: know your enemy. Since Rorty clarified recent European philosophy for us in the (...) 1980s, we have seen the continuing political transformation of what used to be an abstract, purely academic domain. Indeed, in his last chapter, Allen connects truth with politics in his discussion of Foucault:The production and circulation of truth is as capable of complicity with tyranny, and all the more so with tutelage, as any instrument of government, and its products do not have tobe falseto have this effect.… Truth is inextricably situated amid all the major asymmetries of social power, (p. 173)Foucault challenges the assumption of many that in liberal democracies (of which Putnam, after his youthful excesses, must consider himself a defender) truth and freedom need each other. (shrink)