In this article, we re-examine the oft-assumed link between theories of modernity and the “death of fortune”. It is often argued that recourse to “fortune” as a legitimate cause of events had declined substantially by the end of the seventeenth century, replaced by aetiologies based on the calculation of probabilities inspired by the techniques of the new science. Focusing on the reception of the Greek historian of the Hellenistic period, Polybius, in whose Histories tyche appears in a notorious variety of (...) roles, we argue that fortune was subtly replaced, but not as drastically as assumed, as a cause of events by a number of influential figures in the development of modern historiography, in particular, Bossuet (1627–1704) and Hegel (1770–1831). We argue that, far from seeing a “death of fortune” in the works of these authors, the reader is met with a radical transformation of this ancient rhetorical and ethical trope, albeit subordinated to particular theological and philosophical preoccupations. (shrink)

Mindsets are shifting where the work areas of the students vary. The class furniture will vary from size and shape of tables, to couches, to a variety of chairs. Students must have the freedom to make choices to take ownership of their learning. This means that mistakes will happen. The classroom should be a comfortable learning environment.

Michael Wheeler, in his book Reconstructing the Cognitive World, analyses the development of embedded-embodied cognitive science in the light of underlying philosophical differences about the constitution of human agency. On one side he sees orthodox computational cognitive science as holding to Cartesian conceptions of an abstract, disembodied reason deliberating over de-contextualised representations of the world. On the other side, he sees modern-day embodied-embedded cognitive scientists going beyond such Cartesianism to embrace concepts of human agency more in keeping with Heidegger’s account (...) of Dasein in Being and Time. By bringing to light and criticising the Cartesian assumptions of the computationalists and by pointing out and clarifying the connections between embodied-embedded cognitive science and Heidegger’s philosophy, Wheeler aims to lay the “foundations of a genuinely non- Cartesian cognitive science.”. (shrink)