The Cybernetic State is about using what we know now about cybernetics to create a better society for all. It is about satisfying people’s needs from a platform of individual freedom and responsibility. It is also about using computers wisely. In order to do that, technology has to produce transparency so that as many people as possible contribute to the new social order. To create a transparent government implies making it easy to understand and very dependable.

Este libro es un estudio sobre las teor as del desarrollo social y un an lisis de las estrategias, instituciones y pol ticas econ micas de los ltimos tiempos en varios pa ses.

La condición distribuida en el espacio y en el tiempo del deseo de saber no implica universalidad, sino más bien pluralidad, e incluso pluriversalidad. La universalidad implica tender a “lo Uno”, que desde Platón ha sido concebido como una entidad trascendente. La pluralidad que se propugna en esta contribución, inspirada en Leibniz y en James, se a!rma adversus unum, no versus unum. En consecuencia, se propugna una!losofía pluriversal, que indaga y a!rma la pluralidad en cada uno de los ámbitos que (...) investiga. También se señala el sustrato monoteísta de la universalidad en la lógica escolástica. Frente al monismo lógico-deductivo, que a!rma la existencia de un único modo de racionalidad, esta contribución a!rma la racionalidad pluralista, por contraposición a la racionalidad monista. Finalmente, se sugiere que la propia idea de universidad podría ser reemplazada ventajosamente por instituciones basadas en la multidisciplinariedad y en la pluralidad de perspectivas de análisis: las pluriversidades. "e condition distributed in space and in time of the philosophy does not imply universality, but rather plurality, and even pluriversality. Universality implies a tendency to “the One”, which since Plato has been conceived as a transcendent entity. "e plurality advocated in this contribution, inspired by Leibniz and James, states adversus unum, not versus unum. Consequently, it advocates a pluriversal philosophy, which explores and a#rms the plurality in each of the areas investigated. "e monotheistic substrate of universality in the scholastic logic is also remarked. Facing the logical-deductive monism, which a#rms the existence of a single mode of rationality, this paper claims for a pluralistic rationality, in contrast to the monist rationality. Finally, it is suggested that the very idea of the university could be advantageously replaced by institutions based on multidisciplinary and plurality of perspectives of analysis: pluriversities. (shrink)

Traducción al español y edición del griego de los textos del orador y filósofo presocrático Gorgias de Leontini.

In this paper I critically examine the key normative claim of the so-called ‘new Natural Law ethics’, namely, the claim that being alive, in the biological sense of the word, has an intrinsically valuable standing. This claim is at the basis of the absolute condemnation of all acts aiming at destroying such a good. After explaining the meaning of this fundamental normative claim, I engage in a dialectical argument between the suicidal person and the new Natural Law ethicists in order (...) to show that, despite the reluctance of new Natural Law ethicists to argue in favour of the intrinsically valuable standing of life, such argument is absolutely necessary. Finally, I critically examine the arguments that have been adduced to support it and reject them. (shrink)

ÁNGEL GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA: Arte y Terror, Barcelona, Mudito & Co, 2008, 196 pp.

Starting from a definition of technology proposed by Quintanilla (1989), the author focuses on technologies of telecommunications and telematics, which transform not only objects, but also relations among agents, objects and instruments. As a result, this kind of technologies makes possible the construction of a new space for human interaction (the third environment), whose topological and metrical properties are analyzed. This paper proposes a more accurate definition of technology and it emphasizes the role played by several external values on technological (...) actions. (shrink)

Dos libros recientes de Olivé y Queraltó, ambos partiendo de concepciones filosóficas pluralistas, pragmáticas, axiológicas, contextuales y realistas, han reanimado la discusión entre filósofos morales y epistemólogos en torno a la ética y las nuevas tecnologías. Olivé propugna una ética intercultural, Queraltó propone un refuerzo mutuo entre los valores morales y tecnológicos. Esta nota compara ambas contribuciones y plantea de nuevo el problema de la ética en las sociedades tecnológicas contemporáneas.

Partiendo de una revisión del debate académico sobre la empatía o toma de perspectiva histórica, se ofrece una propuesta de currículo de historia para Secundaria centrado en esta dimensión del pensamiento histórico. Este segundo artículo de la serie “El valor de la historia” indaga cómo podría ser un currículo en el que los estudiantes se enfrenten al reto de explicar por qué los seres humanos actuaron como lo hicieron en determinadas circunstancias y en el que exploren lo que creían, pensaban (...) o sentían para hacer lo que hicieron. Se analizan algunas de las claves fundamentales que deberían tenerse en cuenta en el diseño y se argumenta el valor de dar esta orientación curricular a la asignatura partiendo de la importancia de desarrollar el sentido de alteridad y de expandir su comprensión de lo que significa ser humano. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of the thesis that metaphors are indispensable for grasping and expressing certain propositions. I defend this possibility against the objection that, if metaphors express propositions, once these propositions are identified they should be specifiable by non‐metaphorical means. I argue that this objection loses its strength if one adopts a Wittgensteinian, particularist view of thought, according to which grasping a propositional thought requires the ongoing exercise of a suitable skill often not characterizable by algorithmic rules. Within (...) this particularist framework, thus, it becomes possible that metaphorical skills have an indispensable role in cognition and communication. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of the thesis that metaphors are indispensable for grasping and expressing certain propositions. I defend this possibility against the objection that, if metaphors express propositions, once these propositions are identified they should be specifiable by non‐metaphorical means. I argue that this objection loses its strength if one adopts a Wittgensteinian, particularist view of thought, according to which grasping a propositional thought requires the ongoing exercise of a suitable skill often not characterizable by algorithmic rules. Within (...) this particularist framework, thus, it becomes possible that metaphorical skills have an indispensable role in cognition and communication. (shrink)

By themselves, mesencephalic subcortical mechanisms provide a preattentive kind of consciousness, related to stimulus-related, short-latency dopamine release triggered by collicular input. Elaborate forms of consciousness, containing identifiable objects (visual, auditory, tactile, or chemical), imply longer-lasting phenomena that depend on the activation of prosencephalic networks. Nevertheless, the maintenance of these higher-level networks strongly depends on long-lasting mesencephalic dopamine release. (Published Online May 1 2007).

In this paper I distinguish two ways of using the expression ‘epistemological naturalism’. In one sense, naturalism amounts to a denial that epistemology should be understood as a kind of first philosophy providing the foundations for science from outside. In a second sense, naturalism holds that human knowledge is a natural phenomenon and that epistemology should be seen as a chapter of natural science. Moreover, naturalism in this second sense usually incorporates some additional specifications that build up a very restrictive (...) concept of science. Two different projects for naturalizing epistemology lie behind these two meanings of ‘naturalism’, and the two projects, although sometimes seen as complementary or even equivalent, are not necessarily so. After drawing this distinction, I set out the difficulties faced by those naturalistic stances that do not discriminate sharply enough or do not establish the appropriate hierarchical relationship between both projects. Finally, I argue for a conception of epistemology which is best described as a radical antilfoundntionnlism. This conception sticks to the requirements that follow from naturalism when understood in the first sense above, and takes the cluster of theses that give birth to the second as subsidiary and revisable. (shrink)