When comparing aesthetic with moral values Ingarden does not define their mutual relation but tries to determine generic moments of various types. Neither aesthetic nor moral values can exist autonomously but require a vehicle. Aesthetic values appear as some qualifications of aesthetic objects, whereas moral values are some qualifications of conscious subjects and a proper structure both of subjects and of the world which must admit free actions is indispensable for the realisation of moral values. Ingarden admits the possibility of (...) a different mode at existence for moral values than for aesthetic ones, the former being more firmly rooted in their foundation. Values form hierarchies. Theory serve nothing but themselves and depend on no evaluation, Ingarden tries to demonstrate the objectivity of values, listing the conditions on which it depends, and postulates that a necessary correlation be sought between the properties of the vehicle and the values of determinate qualities. The main difference between aesthetic and moral values is that the latter are obligatory in character. This may be read from the content of their ideas. Values only partly go into the general ontology developed by Ingarden, but this ontology was no closed system even for himself and there is evidence that he may have expended his conception to embrace also the sphere of values. Ingarden described accurately neither the mode of existence nor the formal structure of va1ues. His closest interest belonged to their matter because in it he thought he might find the principle of grouping values into various genera. He regarded the study of the laws of co-existence of various value, as a major task of material ontology. Moral values may be credited with a higher dignitas than other values and their realisation is not without influence on the acting subject’s personality. In conclusion the authoress proposes to define value as a new qualitative dimension of the object serving as its vehicle. The value dimension of objects might go in various directions depending on the kind of value involved. (shrink)

Fidelity as a moral value which may qualify persons or determinate modes of behaviour is discussed. Some examples of fidelity are given to show that fidelity may have various forms depending on whom or what it concerns and how deeply one is engaged. Fidelity is determined as a personal value consisting in a persistent approval of some chosen ensembles of values, in connection with the willingness to serve them in the way required by them in various situations. If fidelity is (...) one of moral values there are applicable to it all the statements concerning moral values in general. The difference between fidelity and other moral values lies in the qualitative specificity which may be grasped intuitively. The realization of fidelity must be accomplished consciously and the corresponding acts must spring from the centre of our „ego”. The fidelity to the ensembles of values preferred to others should not violate the objective hierarchy of values, i.e., it should appear within orderly relations to the whole system of values. (shrink)