The Hanafi Sect was the first among the fiqh sects that completed its formation and codification. Abu Hanifa, the founding imam of the sect, raised many students. His most prominent students were Abu Yusuf, Muhammed al-Shaybani and Zufar. While teaching his students, Abu Hanifa created a free environment and was pleased that his students adopted opposing views to his. Accordingly, different views emerged among the imams in question for reasons such as interpreting the texts, taking into account the (...) changes in customs and time, and approaching the issues from different perspectives. After the death of Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf served as a kadi, i.e. a judge. Muhammad al-Shaybani played an important role in the formation of the sect. Zakat is one of the subjects where different opinions and disagreements occurred among the imams of the madhhab, or sect. Hanafi books exhibited different approaches in revealing these differences of opinion. For example, there were jurists who mentioned and discussed their differences of opinion in detail, as in Ka-sana’s work Bedai al-sanai fi tertib al-sharai, as well as in Mawsili’s work el-Ihtiyar li-talil al-Muhtar. There were also jurists who took a middle way on the subject. In this study, the differences of opinion of the sect imams Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, Muhammed al-Shaybani and Zufar on zakat will be explained based on the book al-Hidaye by Burhaneddin al-Merginani, which is one of the most popular books of the Hanafi sect. However, the commentaries of al-Hidaye and the books of the sect on fiqh will also be consulted occasionally. In this study, the subjects that are considered more important than the others in regard to the fiqh of zakat will be analyzed. (shrink)

In the formation of the acquis of the science of fiqh, many scientific figures have been associated with the methods of the Imams of the sect and their views, which are passed on to the next generations. In the history of the Ḥanafī mad̲h̲hab, there are many scholars whose works, views or just their names have survived. The views of the scholars who are at the forefront of this work can be accessed through their works. The opinions of some scholars (...) who did not have works, or whose works have not survived, can be found in the jurisprudential corpus of other scholars. Unfortunately, there are many scholars whose works and opinions have not survived, and only their names are mentioned. This study focuses on the Ḥanafī jurist al-Baqqālī (d. 452/1060), whose scholarly personality, position in jurisprudence and works have not survived to the present day, although his name is mentioned in fiqh literature. The article analyses various sources and evidence for the identification of al-Baqqālī. The main argument of the article was clarified by examining fiqh books, which are among the authoritative sources of the Ḥanafī fiqh corpus, rather than works of ṭabaḳat, and by scanning digital resources. The determination and presentation of the scholarly personality of al-Baqqālī and his jurisprudential views are the distinctive feature of this article. Baqqālī was recognised as an influential jurist within the Ḥanafī fiqh tradition and was considered one of the mashāʼịḵẖ (eminent jurists). However, detailed information about him could not be found. However, considering the available evidence, it is proven that al-Baqqālī, who stands out with the attribution of al-Baqqālī, is not al-Baqqālī whose views are consulted in the Ḥanafī mad̲h̲hab and among the possibilities that arise, the views that predominate in the identification of al-Baqqālī's identity are given. For this reason, it is emphasised that Baqqālī is a figure that requires further research and study. It is emphasised that this article can contribute to the understanding of the Ḥanafī fiqh tradition. Baqqālī's jurisprudential views on some matters of worship and transaction reflect important debates. Although al-Baqqālī adhered to the basic principles of the Ḥanafī mad̲h̲hab, he occasionally developed original ijtihād against the general views of the imams or the mad̲h̲hab. Baqqālī's original jurisprudence and jurisprudential views occupy an important place in the sect's literature. He was particularly influential in matters of fatwa and left his views to later jurists. Such a study aims to solve a scholarly problem in the fields of the history of science and the history of fiqh. Clarifying the identities and specialisms of those involved can help to ensure historical and scientific clarity. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the accumulation of historical and scientific knowledge by seeking to learn more about this issue and to reduce uncertainties. (shrink)

Since the spread of Islam in Transoxiana (Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr), religious understandings based on the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) have always been dominant in the region. Therefore, it was not possible for other understandings, which may seem to be opposite to Abū Ḥanīfa’s opinions, to be influential in the region. That Najjāriyya and Karrāmiyya could not be perennial in the region may be an example of this case. Similarly, Māturīdiyya, which benefited from Abū Ḥanīfa’s treatises of creed and his (...) rational method, could not adequately get the support of people at the time of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114) because the school was seen as an opposite approach to the prevailing imaginations about Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, the Ḥanafī jurists (Ḥanafī fuqahāʾ), who were influential in not only people but also bureaucracy, and the Ḥanafī theologians (Ḥanafī mutakallimūn), who followed al-Māturīdī’s theological method , did not come to terms on their interpretations of Abū Ḥanīfa. The Ḥanafī jurists who benefited mostly from juridical sources and manāqibworks were thinking different from the Ḥanafī theologians who relied on the treatises of Abū Ḥanīfa on such issues as the legitimacy of Kalām as a scholarly discipline, the responsibility of people of fatra(ahl al-fatra: people having no access to the message of Islam), and the creation of faith (īmān). The Ḥanafī jurists took different stance on various issues and argued that faith is not created; the informative (khabarī) attributes of God (ṣifāt Allāh) mentioned in the Qurʾān cannot be interpreted (taʾwīl); no one can be held accountable for faith only based on the intellect unless the message of the Prophet reaches to her or him; the people of fatracannot be responsible for faith. They also stated that Abū Ḥanīfa broke his relationship with the theological (kalāmī) issues in the last years of his life. Although these jurists accepted Abū Ḥanīfa’s distinction between faith and deeds and his view of the stability of one’s faith without increasing or decreasing they condemned theological discussions on these issues by going beyond the limits of the treatise of creed. While the Ḥanafī theologians known as the Ḥanafī scholars of Samarqand who adopted the religious views of Imām al-Māturīdī of Samarqand acknowledged the intellect and considered it as an independent source in religion, the Ḥanafī jurists known as the Ḥanafī scholars of Bukhārāauthorized the intellect only in understanding the transmission (naql) and its interpretation. The different opinions of the two groups can be seen clearly on the question of the religious responsibility of the people of fatra. When we look at the debates regarding Kalām and the Islamic law, we can see that the difference between these two cities (Samarqand and Bukhārā) stems from their methodological views on the epistemological values of the reason (ʿaql) and the transmission (tradition). Māturīdiyya is a school of theology established by the Ḥanafī theologians who upheld the necessity and significance of Kalām. It is possible to say that the Ḥanafī jurists did not contribute to the establishment and systematisation of this school; rather, they tried to prevent it. Our findings show that the Ḥanafī jurists who lived in Transoxiana differ from each other because of their different understandings of Abū Ḥanīfa. In the historical process extending today it is evident that the religious views of the Ḥanafī jurists and their interpretation of Abū Ḥanīfa have been prominent and effective, not that of Māturīdiyya, which is the understanding of the Ḥanafī theologians. (shrink)

The validity of the prayer which is accepted as the most basic worship of Islam has been tied to a set of rules. These rules which must be followed before and during the prayer are called conditions and pillars in the fiqh language. The recitation performed while standing during the prayer is one of the most significant of these rules and is accepted one of the pillars of the prayer. Therefore, in order for the prayer to be valid, it is (...) required to make enough recitations. If it is not done, the prayer is considered invalid. For this reason, the topic of recitation in prayer has been discussed in detail by the jurists, and different opinions have been submitted what, when and how much to recite. The jurists have suggested three basic views on this issue. Ḥanafīs have stated that a person who follows the imām in prayer should not recite, and they have accepted the recitation of ma’mūm as makruh regardless of whether the recitation is loud or silent. The Shāfiʿīs who uphold the opposite view of the Ḥanafīs have said that the ma’mūm have to recite in all the prayers in which the qirā'āt is loud and silent, and that it is obligatory for the ma’mūm to recite. According to Shāfiʿīs the prayer of a ma’mūm without recitation is not valid. Malikīs and Ḥanbalīs who have explained their opinions by taking into account that the recitation is loud and silent have stated that the ma’mūm should recite during prayers in which the recitation is silent. In the prayers where the recitation is loud the Ḥanbalīs have said that the ma’mūm should recite when the imām takes a break from recitation, while the Malikīs have said that the recitation is not required for the ma’mūm. However the jurists of both sects have not considered that the recitation is obligatory to ma’mūm. And they have acknowledged that the prayer of the ma’mūm was valid even if he has not recite. There is intra-sectarian disagreement in all of these three basic views which are presented as the general opinion of the sects. Although we are talking about the intra-sectarian disagreement, it is understood that the jurists except the Ḥanafīs have determined their views on the recitation of the ma’mūm within the context of whether the ma’mūm hear or do not hear the recitation of the imām. It can be said that this understanding is at the basis of the views put forward by the Shāfiʿīs who take into account that the recitation is loud and silent about the ma’mūm’s recitation of the sūrat after the Fātiḥa. Likewise it is possible to say that this understanding is at the basis of the perceptives brought forward by the Malikī and Ḥanbalī jurists about the prayers in which the recitation is sound. The jurists who expressed different opinions about the recitation of the ma’mūm similarly brought evidence from the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, opinions of the Companions and qiyās to justify their views. Although the jurists have grounded their views on similar evidence, they have reached different conclusions. The reason for this difference it can be shown that the direction of the verse (āyat) to be taken as evidence, their different approaches when evaluating the narrations transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) and the fact that the arguments of qiyās are different. (shrink)

Money, the most important element of economic life, has attracted the attention of many branches of science throughout history. As a result, various disciplines have examined the issue of money and made some determinations about it. One of the disciplines that deals with the money issue is jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has examined the position of money vis-à-vis commodities and other currencies and has tried to establish a fair and just relationship between them. Islamic jurists have also dealt with the legal status (...) of money and discussed the conceptual framework of money in legal terms. The monetary value of gold and silver is accepted in Islamic law and a verdict has been reached on this acceptance. However, there is divergence of opinion on the legal status of the counterfeit money that has been used by many societies and states in history. While Abū Ḥanīfa and, according to one opinion, Abū Yūsuf accepted that fals (coin) are not money, Muḥammad maintained that fals are money. As in many areas of law, sales and debt contracts are also judged according to this assumption. However, if we look at the details of Abū Yūsuf's opinion, we see that some of the contracts accept the monetary value of fals. So, if we assume that we lend 1000 Turkish Liras (TL) with today's coins - according to Abū Ḥanīfa - it means that in case the lent money is withdrawn from circulation, the money should be paid back according to the the weight of the coins that made 1000 TL. Regardless of the weight of the 1000 TL, Abū Yūsuf says that the value of 1000 TL should be repaid. In this case, Abū Yūsuf considers the monetary aspect of these coins. Therefore, it can be stated that there are some differences in the details of the view that counterfeits are accepted as absolute goods in the Hanafi school, and the monetary aspect of counterfeits is also present. Imam Muḥammad dealt with the trade of coins in a special section and examined the position of coins vis-à-vis various goods. He stated several times in this section that fals are in the position of dīnārs and dirhams (gold and silver coin). While Imam Muḥammad evaluated rock as money, he defended this view in practical terms. Namely, he accepted that one of the important features of coins, denomination by signs, is also present in coins and that one can pay with rocks (fals) other than the coin shown in the purchase. However, it should be noted that the coins to be paid must be in circulation. Likewise, the company, salam (forward sale), etc. assumes the monetary value of the rock (fals) and has decided accordingly. There is no complete consensus on this issue within the Ḥanafi tradition. Although in the early works the views of Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf dominate, one sees that in the later works the view of Imam Muḥammad is preferred. This view was also preferred in the recent Medjelle. In commercial life, goods are essential and money is used as a means of transportation for goods. Therefore, it should not be disregarded that money as a means of measuring value is based on the acceptance of people, regardless of what metal it is made of. Therefore, the monetary nature of the goods used as money by society should be accepted. In fact, the Medjelli-yi Aḥkām-i ʻAdliyye, which was established on the basis of the Ḥanafi school, accepted that fals are money and introduced laws in this direction in some areas of the Islamic law. Opinions in this direction have been expressed in some studies written in modern times. In this study, firstly, information about the structure of the fals and their use in Islamic history is given. Then, the Ḥanafi School founding scholars’ assessments of fals are discussed theoretically. In the following section, the disagreements of the Ḥanafi imams in some areas of law are practically examined. (shrink)

Among the Muslims the most common sect is Ḥanafī. It is mentioned in the Ḥanafī sect that there are a line of students who transfer the principles of the sect from generation to generation. In order for the Islamic conquests that started simultaneously in the Eastern and Western lands to be permanent, people were sent to teach Islamic morality, worship and fiqh that encompass daily life. From the 2nd century (A.H.) the sectarianization process that started in the centers such as (...) Kufa, Medina and Damascus has naturally spread to the geography of the West. Many jurists who were educated in the madrasas in the East transferred this education to the newly conquered lands in the West, thus contributing to the fact that sectarianization began in the East and West at the same time. During this period, the views of many mujtahids, including Abū Ḥanīfa and his students, began to enter this geography again through his students. In this article, the most important person who introduced the Ḥanafī sect in the Andalusian region and transferred Abu Ḥanifa's ijtihads, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Farrūkh's life, his scientific personality, his contributions to the spread of the sect and the reasons for the Ḥanafī sect to find supporters in the region will be followed by a short course and the history of the sect will be tried to uncover in the history of Andalusia.Summary: Among the Muslims the most common sect is Ḥanafī. It is not a coincidence that the Ḥanafī sect spread more than other sects and found supporters. Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) is the most senior among the imams of four leading sects. He experienced about commercial and everyday life, had loyal students. This is because he discussed with his students before deciding on a ruling.Islamic conquests in the east and west started at the same time. Experts teaching Islamic morality were sent to conquered places. In this way, both morality and Islamic law, which encompasses worship and daily life, were also taught. Since the implementation of justice was considered as the main duty of the state, legal affairs were dynamic and systematically organized. For this purpose, both in the Medina and the newly conquered lands, various issues such as, management, use, distribution, non-muslim marriage, trade and so on emerged. These issues were carried out with the "kadi" establishment, which is like today's ministry of justice.In the Hijri 2nd century, Fiqh schools produced practical solutions to matters of process and worship in centers such as, Iraq, Medina and Damascus. These schools completed the sectarianization process after a century. Many Islamic jurists who took madrasah education in the east taught these training in the west. They pioneered the development of this sectarianization process both in the east and the west at the same time.The Islamic jurisprudence solved the problems that emerged with the conquest process that began in Andalusia, primarily through the independent jurisprudence, kadi and muftis in the region. After 710 A.C., the Ḥanafī sect reached Andalusia. After the death of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abu Yusuf became the chief justice. Later, the views of Abū Ḥanīfa gained importance. Abu Yusuf appointed the judges who knew the Ḥanafī sect. Abū Ḥanīfa's students, like a gold mine, embraced the views of their teachers. These jurisprudences were adopted by the supporters. Imam Muhammad was the first to write the case law of Abū Ḥanīfa. The views and thoughts of Abū Ḥanīfa, which were published by Imam Muhammad, spread throughout Iraq, Damascus, Iran and Khorasan. Later these thoughts reached North Africa that was under the control of Aghlabid (A.C. 800-909).In the same era, ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh passed to the way 6500 km to learn western sciences. The purpose of Farrūkh is to write the views of his teacher, Abū Ḥanīfa. In this way, he returned to Andalusia by writing ten thousand subjects. Beginning from 767 A.C., Ḥanafī sect gradually began to form in this region. He served as a judge voluntarily, although he did not serve as the official judge. Therefore, it contributed greatly to the spread of this sect in the west. The Mālikī sect, which due to from the animosity of Umayyad (A.C. 661-750) and Abbasids (A.C. 750-1258), came to the forefront. Abdullah b. Ferrûh was not as famous as the other disciples of Abū Ḥanīfa.Although Ḥanafīism spread in the west, it was in the foreground in the eastern geographies. Scholars such as Qadi Ayyad (d. 544/1149), Ibn Farḥūn (d. 799/1397), Muhammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974) and Hintātī state that this sect was effective for a short time in the west. On the other hand, Maqdisī (d. 380/999) states that Ḥanafī existed in Andalusia until the second half of the third century A.C. and was at least as widespread as Mālikīism. Orientalist Lévi Provençal (d. 1956) says that Ḥanafī sect did not reach to Andalusia. However, it can be understood from the above statements that this view is not real. In addition, according to the student hierarchy described in the article, it is understood that the Ḥanafī sect maintained its existence in this region for a while. In Andalusia, the views of the sect from the 8th to the 13th centuries known, recognized and followed by experts and the public. Because this sect was not official, its books were not in demand. For this reason, the basic works belonging to the sect were not reproduced.It is not true that the Ḥanafī sect never came to Andalusia or did not stay for a long time. ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh, who studied at Abū Ḥanīfa for 5 years, introduced Ḥanafī sect in Andalusia. Then his students continued this teaching. In this study, the life, mastery and students of ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh, who made important contributions for the first time in teaching Ḥanafīsm's to Andalusia, have been brought together. This information is summarized in terms of Ḥanafīsm's entry into Andalusia, the reasons for acceptance in social life and the duration of the sect in the region. (shrink)

Over a century ago European explorers in Eastern Turkestan (southern Xinjiang) made a remarkable discovery: the Sunni inhabitants of Khotan were engaged in elaborate veneration of the Shiʿi twelve Imams, whom they believed to be buried at various holy sites in the Khotan region. This paper investigates Khotan’s net work of holy sites and the narratives that were attached to them, from the sixteenth century to the present. While the political landscape of the present may sometimes make the Sunni-Shiʿi divide (...) appear natural, the case of Eastern Turkestan, which had its own, idiosyncratic approach to sectarian identity, reminds us that the maintenance of such a Sunni-Shiʿi consensus on sectarian designation was dependent on networks of knowledge reproduction that did not embrace the entirety of the Muslim world. Pre-Islamic sacred geographies, the power of locally networked holy sites, the phenomenon of textual appropriation, and a popular and eclectic manuscript tradition overwhelmed weak sectarian distinctions, bringing Muslim followers of the Hanafi legal tradition to pray at the purported tombs of Twelver Imams. (shrink)

Bayʿ al-wafā is a fatwa issue (waqıʿat/nawazil) in the form of a legal solu-tion (hīla al sharʿiyyah), the legal nature of which was intensely debated by Central Asian Hanafi jurists. This contract appears to be a practice by which Muslim communities living in Central Asia, particularly in Bukhara and Samarkand, were able to conduct their debt relations without involving interest. The initial assessments regarding the legal nature of bayʿ al-wafā, for which there is no transmission from the founding imams, (...) emerged in the fatwas of Central Asian Hanafi scholars in the 4th/10th century. Subsequently, from this century, when the first examples of fatwa literature were penned, to the 6th/12th century, when the most advanced and influential examples were produced, there were many different opinions on the legal nature of this contract according to the Hanafī doctrine. In this study, based on the fatwa literature that emerged between these centuries, the chronological development of opinions on the legal nature of the bayʿ al-wafâ contract has been examined. Furthermore, this study also addresses the fundamental trends that have led to different assessments on the subject and identifies the subordinate and opposing views concerning it. (shrink)

One of the problems regarding one of the breaking points in the history of Islamic thought is the presidency. Muslims did not only fall into a theoretical conflict on this issue, but unfortunately, they also engaged in actual battles. The disagreement among Muslims has retained its influence to the present day and has shaped both the religious and worldly views of Muslims. The debate on the identity of the candidate who will assume the role of Muhammad and organize the religious (...) and worldly affairs of Muslims has set the scene of historical conflicts that manifest themselves in the theoretical and practical fields. The religious references made in order to legitimize the political theses caused the said theses to be institutionalized, and matters basically of a political character were associated with religion. Among the Islamic sects, especially Shia, attributed an existential meaning to the problem of the presidency and shaped all their religious and worldly views on this axis. The Shia, who considered the presidency almost a basis of faith, assigned a rank close to prophethood to the heads of state. Zaydiyya stands out as the closest branch of the Shia to the Ahl al-Sunnah in terms of politics. They think more moderately about the characteristics of the head of state, heads of state other than Ali, and the Companions. Ahl as-Sunnah considers the presidency essentially as a juristically -political issue. Bringing this discussion into the field of belief, even with the aim of objecting to Shia, who sees the presidency as a problem of faith and systematizes this problem, shows the first effects of Shia on Sunni political thought. In order to defend Ali's presidency and to question the legitimacy of others, Shia brought the issue into the field of belief, and sought to prove that Ali was superior in the sight of Allah, and therefore, more worthy of the presidency, by referring to various religious texts. Shia examined the issue in a dogmatic way in order to prove his political theses strongly and establish absolute authority. As an inevitable consequence of this method, the institution of the presidency is endowed with divine powers. The theses that the heads of state are appointed with religious references and have the quality of ismah (infallibility) are the most concrete reflections of this approach. Ahl as-Sunnah tried to justify Abu Bakr's legitimacy by defending his superiority against Shia, who defended Ali's superiority. This approach reveals the methodical interaction as well as taking on the mission of responding to Shia effectively in its own way. Shamsaddin as-Samarqandī, whose political imagination we have examined, is a Sunni scholar belonging to the Hanafi - Maturidite kalam tradition. Due to his political views and style, he is also described as a Shiite by some. By examining Samarqandī's concept of politics in the context of his ideas on the general philosophy of theology, we can have clearer information about his sectarian belonging and political stance. He adopted the analytical method in politics, as in other issues, and revealed his own unique style and views, while adhering to the main vein of Ahl as-Sunnah. He adopted the analytical method in politics, as in other issues, and revealed his own unique style and views, while adhering to the main street of Ahl al-Sunnah. (shrink)

Unlike Hanafī jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiyās is permissible (jāʿiz) for the origins (aṣl) in which the qiyās rule is invalid, including ruhsat (permission); kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalties). Shāfiʿī jurists, Imam al-Shāfiʿī and his followers like al-Juwaynī, argue that Hanafī jurists are contradictory since they apply qiyās in many cases despite their judgment that qiyās is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiyās format. (...) Nevertheless, Shāfiʿī jurists persist that they rule on the qiyās applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinbāt) such as Islamic juristic preference (istiḥsān), even beyond qiyās. In his sense of search effective cause: ʿilla (taʿlil), al-Juwaynī focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (munāsaba). He runs the mechanism of taʿlil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (munāsaba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the qiyās’ rule is invalid. Kaffarah and ḥadd consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiyās. Al-Juwaynī’s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for qiyās. In this paper, the aim of study is to identify the borders and limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī’s thought with discussions about the disagreements between the jurists in the specified areas.Summary: As a general principle, devoting (taʿabbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and reasoning (taʿaqqul/taʿlīl) for Abu Hanīfa. Despite this, Abu Hanīfa and Hanafī jurists consider non-qiyās foundations (ma’dul bih ‘anil-qiyās) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddarāt/taqdīrat) and ruhsat (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiyās) and profess that qiyās cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is taʿaqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiyās. On the contrary to their general approach, Shāfiʿī jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to qiyās. Al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and one of his followers, al-Juwaynī, describe that Hanafī jurists’ applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinbāt) (e.g. juristic preference: istiḥsān), furthering qiyās although they take qiyās as illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd. However, Hanafī jurists defend that they are not in a contradiction, and indeed they do not apply qiyās in kaffarah and ḥadd and derive their illations mostly from textual implications (dalālah) that are mostly out of qiyās format such as tanqīh al-maʿnā (isolating ʿilla), istidlāl, and dalālah al-naṣṣ (inferred meaning). As understood from the relevant arguments, applying qiyās in these areas is directly associated with the issue of potentiality for “the analogy in reason.” The type of qiyās that Hanafī jurists consider illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd is the analogical actions made for the reasons. One of the most rationalist representatives of Shāfiʿī uṣūl, al-Juwaynī pronounces that the method to determine ʿilla (cause) is fundamentally the suitability (munāsaba) that can be defined as “rational compatibility.” In his opinion, the ratiocination (taʿlīl) is based on this suitability. According to him, the indications of qiyās will be clear or it becomes practicable even in the presence of low-level, implicit suitability. Al-Juwaynī considers that it is licit to apply the analogy for the kaffarah and ḥadd as well as the non-qiyās foundations, including ruhsat and muqaddarāt or taqdīrat, whether direct or explicit (i.e. the meaning of analogy: qiyās al-maʿnā) or indirect or implicit (i.e. the commonality of analogy: qiyās al-shabah). In this context, one of Juwayni’s concern is “the matter of inherence in textual sources such as naṣṣ or the Qur’ān and the Sunna),” corresponding to the area where the judgment is based on a specific reason by naṣṣ. For him, a number of reasonable meanings can be inferred in these areas when it is critiqued independent of the uttered words. But the inherence mentioned in the texts of naṣṣ, indicates to avoid the use of analogy for making a judgment. Al-Juwaynī asserts that some fractional elaborate or detailed meanings cannot be obtained for physical prayers and only a set of universal meanings can be imagined. He defines that it is permissible to compare the reasons of physical worshipping with each other when any suitable meaning is present. He considers that for the permissibility of qiyās in ruhsat, it is adequate to find a meaning suitable for the judgment, and besides, the commonality of analogy (qiyās al-shabah) is applicable in the area of muqaddarāt or taqdīrat. Nevertheless, a patient’s condition is similar to that of a traveller in terms of ruhsat for not fasting (ṣavm). In al-Juwaynī’s way of thinking, patients should act like travellers for ruhsat to shorten (qaṣr) the prayers (ṣalāh) due to “requiring” as a proper meaning. However, as mentioned by al-Juwaynī, there is a consensus (ʿijmā or ittifāq) on the fact that a patient cannot shorten his or her prayers. Due to this impediment, it is understood that the rule of shortening their prayers (ṣalāh) is permissible for travellers but not for patients (manʿ al-ʿijmā’).In criminal cases, the right of oath before the court is belonging to the defendant, whereas to the claimant in kasāme, an oath method in unidentified murders. Taking an oath from the claimant is merely inherent to the kasāme application. Al-Juwaynī states that this inherence is known by the principle of being inherent to each circumstance (iḥtisās bi-l hāl), and with this aspect, kasāme is a closed area for qiyās. According to al-Juwaynī, contracts are suitable for qiyās because they have conditions such as offers and agreements explicitly stating the quality and quantity, and mutual assent. He describes that these are the reasons unavailable for qiyās with respect to their characteristics. With this, the contracts are among the reasonable sources in one respect and the unreasonable in another respect. Consequently, al-Juwaynī suggests that the analogy loses its functionality or validity in a limited number of the closed areas for qiyās, which are the static devotional judgments (taʿabbud) having no proper meaning, direct or indirect, or explicit or implicit; the areas where the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the naṣṣ (ihtisās bi-l-nass) (as in the example that sacrificing a female goat at the age of less than one year is a specific judgment for Burde b. Niyār). The point leads to the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the principle of ihtisās bi-hāl; and banned ʿijmā issues (as in the example of ʿijmā that it is agreed on the fact that patients cannot shorten (qaṣr) their prayers (ṣalāh), unlike travellers. Al-Juwaynī sees the application of qiyās as licit based on the availability of suitable meaning in all areas except for the above-mentioned issues. That he minimizes the closed areas for qiyās and widely expands the functionality of analogy is the reflections of the value that he gives to qiyās. (shrink)

In legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), the problem of the defining istiḥsān and the legitimacy of its definition is among the critical discussion topics. To overcome the rigorism of law, istiḥsān was used by the founder scholars of Ḥanafī school of law and Malik b. Anas - however this use received various objections. Although the Mālikī scholars also used istiḥsān strong criticisms of istiḥsān have been directed on the Ḥanafīs. After the severe criticism of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the Ḥanafī scholars (...) carried out various intellectual activities to define istiḥsān and to prove that it is legitimate. This process -which started especially with Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, revealed a rich accumulation with the contribution of the legal theorists in other school of laws. It is known that al-Karkhī's definition of istiḥsān has become widespread among the legal theorists, and the legitimacy of istiḥsān in the works of legal theory was based on his definition. Al-Karkhī's considerations on the legaliticamy of using istiḥsān can be traced in his student al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in the following centuries, Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, Abū l-‘Usr al-Bazdawī and al-Sarakhsī’s works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ' explanations on the legitimacy of istiḥsān begin with the criticism of Imam al-Shāfiʿī's against istiḥsān. He provides the proof of legitimacy for istiḥsān in divided two sub-headings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who deals with istiḥsān in two parts as word and meaning, argues that there is no disagreement about the use of istiḥsān and that all mujtahids accept istiḥsān, and even al-Shāfiʿī, who opposes to the use of istiḥsān, employs istiḥsān in this sense. The type of istiḥsān on which there is a deabte is the istiḥsān used in relation to its meaning. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that this use is a qiyas operation; he justifies his point of view by referring to the works of Muḥammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī. Indeed, when we look at how al-Shaybānī explained the istiḥsān’s examples in his works, it is seen that there are two conflicting juristic analogy (qiyas) made in many examples. Moreover, al-Shaybānī openly considered some types of istiḥsān part of qiyas by stating that some examples “can be included in this type of istiḥsān” Ḥanafī scholars wanted to break the hostile atmosphere toward istiḥsān by defining and evaluating the istiḥsān in a way that their opponents could accept. The definition of Istiḥsān “to abandon the judgment given to similar ones due to stronger evidence.” has been generally accepted. In this definition, istiḥsān is defined by associating with qiyas, and referred to an istihsan that is presented as the more substantial evidence, and qiyas is the weaker evidence. Although it is appropriate to define istiḥsān in relation to qiyas, the claim that in the definition istiḥsān is put in stronger place than qiyas might casuse to some the contradictions- in particular when the example’s of al-Shaybānī are taken into consideration. Because in most cases, when qiyas conflicts with istiḥsān, istiḥsān is taken. But in an opposite case, qiyas might be taken. Apart from these, there are examples of the types of istiḥsān that al-Karkhī has classified in the works of al-Shaybānī, but sometimes there are also strange situations such as taking the qiyas by istiḥsān. This also means that the term is not sufficiently defined. The negative attitude towards istiḥsān in some Shāfiʿī circles and the criticisms against the legitimacy of istiḥsān continued in the works of the fiqh method. Istiḥsān is defined as making a judgment without evidence by Shāfiʿī circles. Therefore, they did not accept the abandonment of qiyas, which is a sharī proof, because of istiḥsān, which is a non-sharī notable proof. Based on the examples given by the users of istiḥsān, Ibn Ḥazm, one of the Ẓāhirītes, claims that istiḥsān opens the door to arbitrariness. According to him, a situation that is accepted as istiḥsān according to Ḥanafīs can be taken as istiḥsān according to Mālikīs. This creates an apparent contradiction. There are some valid points in the assessment of Ibn Ḥazm. Because while it is seen that the istiḥsān of Mālikīs is criticized in al-Shaybānī's book named al-Ḥujjah, it can be also found that the istiḥsān of Ḥanafīs is charged in the works of Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī, one of the Mālikīs. The criticism toward istiḥsān was continued by Shāfiʿīs such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. While al-Juwaynī sees istiḥsān as a method based on the lust of the soul, not istinbat/legal deduction, al-Ghazālī understands istiḥsān as a personal comment. The main reason for the negative attitude towards istiḥsān is that the content based on the definitions, has been neglected most of the time. However, when we look at the works of al-Shaybānī, it can be seen that there is a proof of istiḥsān contrary to what is believed-and that this can be sometimes a work, sometimes a necessity, sometimes another comparison, or sometimes a custom. (shrink)

This article aims at examining the limits of change in the field of worship through a study on the origins of the ḥukm[religious ruling] of Shawwāl fasting that is widely practiced in the different parts of Muslim world. The study, firstly, deals with the evolution of the ḥukm of Shawwāl fasting chronologically among four sunnī schools of law, then analyzes the solitary reports on the topic. It concludes that in Mālikīand Ḥanefīschools, the ḥukm of this specific worship changed within the (...) limits of karāha [reprehensibility], ibāha [permissibility], and nadb [recommendation]. This ḥukm was constructed based on solitary reports which later became a paradigmatic source of religious legitimacy in the Ḥanbalīschool beginning with the eponymous Imām and in the Shāfiʿīlong after the founding authorities. It also claims that it is strongly probable that the solitary reports on the topic go back to a deduced opinion in the age of companions, but then reached to a form of prophetic solitary report in the corpus of hadīth reports. Ultimately, this specific worship that has restricted number of fasting was established with the paradigmatic effect of the approach to solitary reports as the only authentic way of transmitting the sunna, even though it is at odds with the fact that this worship had not been implemented in the first two centuries after hijra, i.e. contrary to the established practice [ʿamal]. Summary: The issue of change of rulings in Islamic law comes up frequently on various occasions, and an increasing number of academic studies are trying to determine the characteristics and limits of this change in numerous books, articles and papers. These studies mostly seem to focus on bringing together the arguments that can be compiled under the title of ‘the flexibility of Islamic law in response to the challenges of modernity’. Although the change of rulings in Islamic law is an undeniable fact, reading it only from the lens of the change in Islamic law depending on the requirements of time is an inadequate reading. The change of rulings in Islamic law has different motives; and the change of time, more precisely the change of custom, is only one of them.On the other hand, another issue that comes up in relation to the change of rulings is the claim that this change can only take place in terms of the rulings regulating the interpersonal relations, i.e. muʿāmalāt. In fact, this claim relies on the abovementioned approach that limits the change in Islamic law with the change of custom. Hence, because other two main areas of Islamic law, worships (ʿibādāt) and punishments (ʿuqūbāt) are not open to change through custom, their rulings will not change at all. This article will try to reveal that the change in rulings might reside in a sort of another change emerged in relation to the sources of these rulings, which is a neglected point. Thus, by exposing that the field of worships which is mostly considered as a closed area for change in rulings is actually open to it, this article will examine the limits of this change.For this analysis, the article deals with the fasting of six days in the month of Shawwāl as an example, which is widely practiced in various parts of the Islamic world. The main evidence on which this fasting is based on is a report transmitted in the considerably authentic hadith sources of Ahl al-Sunnah, which reads as follows “Whoever fasts the Ramaḍān and adds six days from Shawwāl, will get reward of the entire year”. This fasting, which is the subject of a great agreement on its ruling as recommended (mustaḥāb) practice today, was actually regarded as reprehensible (makrūh) by the two great eponymous jurists of the first two schools of law in the second Hijrī century, namely Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa. In his al-Muwaṭṭaʾ,Mālik clearly expresses that he did not recognize any scholar who keeps this fast, and that no [authentic] report has reached him on this. The fact that both Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa declared an opinion on the subject shows that this practice started to appear in the first half of the second ḥijrī century as a practice or as a solitary report (khabar al-wāḥid). However, both imāms have stated that such a specific worship would be makrūh. In spite of these very sharp expressions, the schools of law, which were founded by the followers of these two eponymous scholars, abandoned their views and widely accepted Shawwāl fasting as mustaḥāb. This article examines why this sharp change occurred in a worship in the schools of law and in which way it took place.Accordingly, the fundamental motive in this change is a paradigmatic transformation in understanding and identifying the sunna as a source of normativity. Although an agreement was formed on the validity of solitary reports as a source of knowledge in the second ḥijrī century, it was not yet accepted that these narrations are identical to sunna as a source of normativity. For that reason, both Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik did not hesitate to reject any solitary report that contradicted a stronger evidence. However, as a result of the extraordinary efforts of Ahl al-Ḥadīth, the epistemic value of solitary reports has reached to an authority equating them to the sunna with a very rapid acceleration as of the end of the second century and throughout the third century. This situation led later scholars of schools to abandon the views of the eponymous scholars of these schools on certain topics in favor of certain solitary reports. This was also the process for the change in Shawwāl fasting.This thesis will be put under two headings, a section that tries to determine the periods and processes for the Sunnī schools of law in considering this fasting as mustaḥāb; and another section that provides an evaluation of transmitted reports in relation to the Shawwāl fasting. Accordingly, in the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools, due to the effect of the reports, the ruling of Shawwāl fasting has been transformed from makrūh into the mustaḥāb as a result of the interpretational activities that started in the fourth ḥijrī century. Shawwāl fasting was accepted as mustaḥāb in the Shāfiʿī school, although there was no transmitted opinion on the subject from the founding imāms, in the fifth ḥijrī century; and in the Ḥanbalī school directly by the founding imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, whose main aim was to follow a concept of religion that puts the transmitted reports at the center. When the reports on the subject are examined, it demonstrates that the mustaḥāb ruling is mainly rooted in a report by Saʿd b. Saʿīd transmitted in the famous hadīth compilations including Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ.Yet, this report was criticized in its both chain and text. Combining the facts that the same report with the same chain was also transmitted as the words of the companion in some sources and the verse that declares good deed will be rewarded ten times higher than what it deserves will make the following explanation a valid one: As Mālik put it such a fasting practice was commonly unknown to the Muslim society in the first two centuries after the ḥijra. Sometime after the death of the Prophet, an inference was made probably by a companion(s) as that it would be a good deed if someone who fasted an entire month already and got used to the fasting to fast six more days in order to get a reward of fasting for the entire year according to the verse that rewards good deeds with ten times higher. Since it is a recommended practice in essence, i.e. fasting for the sake of Allah, this inference transformed into a report and easily passed through the filters of hadīth scholars who are linked to a sort of piety promoting worships among people. After the solitary reports gained an authority to the extent that they can rarely be challenged, the followers of later schools of law preferred to get in a process of re-interpreting the opinions of their imāms in order either to reconcile them with the content of report, or at least to show why these imāms actually spoke against this fasting. Eventually, the later scholars of madhhab decided for the standard opinion of the madhhab depending on the reports in favor of the Shawwāl fasting rather than following their eponymous imāms. (shrink)

Murders that resulted in death were subjected to various divisions such as killing by intent, mistake or indirect. Various forms and different provisi-ons of each of these murders were found in itself. Indirect killing was deemed lighter than the others, and accordingly, the penalty was appreciated less, and it was even stated that the criminal responsibility fell completely, depending on the place. Because, while there is direct saving in other killing types, indirect killing has an indirect effect on the result. (...) In this article, we will examine to a death incident that occurred indi-rectly within the framework of the compensation law according to Hanafi Sect. For example, this study, in which we will deal with the issue of who should be blamed for this death in the event that a person who falls into a well dug in the road dies in that well for different reasons after a while, will also give general idea about the perspectives and methods of imams in murders that occurred indirectly. The different ideas and justifications of Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad on this issue are discussed together with the reports and evaluations of the later Hanafi jurists. (shrink)

Throughout the history of Islam, mosques and masjids have been in a position where Muslims both perform their prayers and perform their scientific activities. In this sense, in the history of Islamic culture, Muslims mostly learned and taught sciences such as the Qur'an, tafsir, hadith and fiqh in these places until the spread of madrasahs. Especially the al-Masjid al-Nabawi, which the Muslims built here with their migration from Mecca to Medina, has become a full center of science. People called Companions (...) of Suffa have a great share in this situation. Because they used this place both as a housing and a school. This function of al-Masjid al-Nabawi affected the mosques of cities such as Kufa. With the foundation of Kufa in 17/638, mosques were built in the center and in the quarters of the city. The Companions who came here for different reasons conveyed their knowledge to the public in these mosques. Thus, in the first period the masjids in Kufa became the centers where the Companions conveyed their knowledge of Islamic sciences. Over time, various scientific circles were established in these mosques, and scholars transferred their knowledge of tafser, hadith and fiqh to the next generations. Especially many important jurists were trained in these places. Some of them are ’Alqamah b. Qays, Masruq b. Abdurrahman, Aswad b. Yazīd, Ibrāhīm al-Naḥa’ī, Ḥammād b. Abū Suleimān, Abū Ḥanīfah, Sufyan al-Thawri, Abū Yūsuf and Imam Muhammad. That these important jurists mostly acquired their knowledge of fiqh in the mosques in Kūfa and that some of them had important effects on the formation of the Hanafi sect made important the quantity and quality of the fiqh education in these places. As a result, it has been seen that the masjids in Kūfa have an important role in the raising of many jurists and the function of these places in this regard has been studied. Thus, this study aims to reveal the function of mosques and masjids in the historical process, albeit limited. (shrink)

This research aims, first of all, to establish that Abû Hanîfa's (d. 150/767) positive view on the issue of performing wudû’ with nabîdh of date is correct, and then to reveal Abû Hanîfa's dalîls on this subject. The issue of wudû’ with nabîdh of date is controversial among early Hanafî jurists, and the jurist who expressed a positive opinion on this issue is Abû Hanîfa, the founding imam of the madhhab. The opinion that wudû’ can be performed with nabîdh (...) of date is the strong opinion of Abû Hanîfa mentioned in zâhir al-riwâya. The riwâya reported by Nûh bin Abi Maryam (d. 173/789) stating that Abû Hanîfa reneged on this view is not strong enough to oppose the view in zâhir al-riwâya. For this reason, it is not a correct approach to ignore the view in zâhir al-riwâya based on this riwâya. As a matter of fact, Abû Hanîfa's view of zâhir al-riwâya is conveyed in many of the classical Hanafî texts such as Mukhtasar al-Karkhi and Mukhtasar al-Tahâwî. Although the majority of Hanafî jurists preferred the view of Abû Yûsuf (d. 182/798), a significant group of Hanafî jurists such as Jassâs (d. 370/981), Kâshânî (d. 587/1191) and ‘Aynî (d. 855/1451) He supports Abû Hanîfa's view. Therefore, there are two views on the issue in Hanafî fıqh. In the literature, the dalîls of Abû Hanîfa's view is not available as a whole in a single source, but is scattered in many Hanafî fiqh sources. The Hanafî jurist Jassâs is the one who deals with the mentioned dalîls in the most comprehensive way in his many works. For this reason, the subject was examined by focusing on Jassâs's dalîls. Jassâs' istidlâls regarding the issue of wudû’ with nabîdh of date also mean defending Abû Hanîfa against other Hanafî jurists such as Abu Yusuf and Imâm Muhammad (d. 189/805). Jassâs' insistent attitude on this issue and his passionate counter-answers prove how much he deserves the title of defense. For the relevant determination, Hanafî fiqh classics are centered. Because the jurists who argue that wudû’ can be made with the nabîdh of date are among the Hanafî jurists. Then, the positive and negative approaches of the jurists about the nabîdh of date are given. Starting from the early Hanafî jurists, the views of the sahâbîs, the tâbi'ûn and many later jurists on the subject are included. The approach of the four madhhabs of fiqh is also examined in this section. Then, the istidlâls of Jassâs, which is the main subject of the research, were emphasized. It is seen that Jassâs' istidlâls have three main pillars: âya, hadîth and idjma. As a âya, the 6th âya of the sûra of Mâida, as a hadîth, the hadîth of ‘Abd Allâh bin Mas'ûd (r.a.) and as a idjma, the the sahâbîs idjma tries to showas references. The most controversial dalîl is undoubtedly the hadiths of Ibn Mas'ud (r.a.). Jassâs opposes those who claim that the hadîth is da‘îf and discusses the hadîth with its detailed tarîks and argues that this hadîth is sahîh. (shrink)

The Prophet, whom Allah sent the whole universe and humanity as mercy, produced not only many judicial rules and practices regarding the relations of a person with Allah and other people in Islam but also uttered sentences about the explanation of holy book, Qur’an, and about how this book can be put into practice. The issue whether and how much these sentences of the prophet (hadith) and acts of the prophet (Sunnah) are binding have been discussed by both hadith methodologists (...) and fiqh methodologists; accordingly, a great many studies were produced. In hadith methodology, the discussions about Sunnah of the Prophet had their reflections in the studies of fiqh methodology; and especially Hanafi jurists propounded considerations about this issue. Hussein b. Ali al-Saymerî (d. 436/1045) one of these jurists, is the student of Muhammad b. Mûsa al-Khwârizmî (d. 403/1012), who is the student of Abû Bakr al-Jassâs (d. 370/980), who is an authority in Hanafi methodology. al-Saymerî, who adopted the method of al-Jassâs in fiqh methodology, systematically categorized several fundamental issues which were discussed and were related to fiqh methodology during his time; and he defended the views of Hanafi scholars about these issues primarily against Shâfiʿîs and several fiqh and kalam schools. While presenting the views and evidences of Hanafis, al-Saymerî initially applied for the views of founder imams of Hanafi sect such as Abû Hanîfa, Abû Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybânî; following these scholars, he greatly benefited from Hanafi scholars from Iraq region, such as Abu’l-Hasan al-Karkhî (d. 340/952) and his student, Abu Bakr al-Râzî al-Jassâs. When the relevant parts of his study is analysed, it is seen that the effect of al-Jassâs is especially noticeable. In this article, we will study the binding issue of the Sunnah of the Prophet within the context of al-Saymerî’s study, which has extant and is called Mesâilu’l-hilâf fi usûli’l-fiqh. We consider that the different attitude of al-Saymerî about the Sunnah of the Prophet from the other methodologists and hadith scholars and the underlying reasons of these differences are worth to be investigated and emphasized. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

Sunnah is the second main source for Islamic law following the Qur’ān. Sunnah in the books on the Methodology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) is examined in two main parts, one of which is as the source for religious commands and the other is being as religious/taklīfī commands. Sunnah is divided into three categories in terms of being the source for Islamic commands: qawlī (verbal), fi‘ilī (behavioral) and taqrīrī (approval). In the Islamic literature, when the word “sunnah” is mentioned, first (...) of all, it is understood as a verbal appeal, which is qawlī sunnah (hadith). Verbal sunnah has a rhetoric/wording that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). And ultimately to the wording of this verbal address, some religious commands, such as farḍ/wājib, sunnah/mandūb, and permissible/mubāḥ are attributed. The behavioral sunnah (the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other hand, does not have a rhetoric that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). The command/judgment is based on rhetoric. In other words, if there is an address, there is a command; if there is no address, there is no command/judgment. Therefore, it is problematic that the acts of the Prophet are decreed in the form of farḍ/ wājib, sun-nah/mandūb and mubāḥ. For this reason, the acts of the Prophet in the books on the Method-ology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) have been particularly examined under the title of Afʿāl al-Rasūl. While some of the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad have a religious character, some of them are the acts that he performed completely in accordance with the customs and traditions in the society he lived in. Therefore, not all of the Prophet’s deeds/acts (behavioral sunnah) are at the same level in terms of obligation. Therefore, while some of the acts/deeds of the Prophet express wucūb, some other mandūb (sunnah-mustaḥab) and still some other ibāhā/mubāḥ. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad, in terms of being the source of religious commands, are divided into two categories: the tashrīī (religiously) qualified and non tashrīī (religiously) qualified. What is meant by a religious act is the actions of the Prophet, which he performed as being a prophet, for the purpose of worshiping and that he wanted his followers act accordingly. What is meant by a non-religious act is the behavior of the Prophet as a human being or as a requirement of the society he lived in. Sunnah, in terms of being a religious com-mand, refers to commands other than fard and wājib. Ḥanafī scholars are of the opinion that sunnah as a religious decree is divided into two parts as sunnah-i hudā and sunnah-i zawāid. The acts of the Prophet, in accordance with his being a human or the custom of the society he lived in, are included in the scope of sunnah zawāid. In other words, sunnah zawāid generally means the actions of the Prophet that he did not do with the intention of worship. In this con-text, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad are important. Because, the acts of the Prophet are not the same in terms of qualification (command), nor are they the same in terms of their nature (being religious or humanly natural). The acts of the Prophet Muḥammad with a religious nature are divided into two as known qualities and unknown qualifications. In principle, the religious acts of the Prophet, whose qualities are known, are also obligation for the ummah (Muslims). Therefore, when it is known for what purpose the Prophet Muḥammad made a deed/behavior, that act is accordingly is binding for the ummah (Muslims). Accordingly, if the attribute of a deed/behavior made by the Prophet is wājib/farḍ, it is also wājib for the ummah and permissible (ibāḥā) for the ummah if it is permissible. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet in the Qur’ān as a mujmal (ambiguous nass /verse) are also subject to the command of mujmal. There is a dispute regarding the verdict of the Prophet’s acts of religious nature whose qualifications are unknown. According to the majority of Hanafī scholars, what is essential in the actions of the Prophet whose qualifications are unknown and that contain the characteris-tics of worship, is that it is mustahab/mandūb. According to Kerkhī (d. 340/952), what is es-sential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. Jassās (d.370 / 980) expresses the same opinion with Kerkhī. Opinions on this issue are conveyed from Imām Mālik and Imām Shafiī that he declared permissibility. The preferred opinion in Hanbalis is to declare permissibility. Non-religious acts of the Prophet Muḥammad as a human being or as per the custom of the society he lives in are not obligation for the ummah. Therefore, what is essential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. (shrink)

The law of responsibility (compensation), which was formed around the concept of the ḍamān and was developed by the scholars within the system of furû‘ al-fiqh (substantive law) over time, constitutes one of the important parts of Islamic law. Although compensation law (ḍamān) was not addressed as a private subject in the first period fiqh literature, it is seen that the literature on this specific area started to emerge after the early period. It is the Hanafi jurists who first (...) brought together these issues that are scattered in the classical books of fiqh that are related to the law of responsibility. Compensation law took its classical form in the texts of the early periods and was shaped around the views of the founding imams of the Ḥanafī school (madhab). It has later been expanded with the fatwā and interpretations of the Sheikhs (mesāikh) of Hanafi in the type of waqi'at works. These works were a product of the need for the law to adapt to the new conditions. These issues, which are related to the compensation law in the Hanafi school have been covered as a special section (chapter) in the studies that are classified as waqi'at, such as Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat (Fuṣūl al-Usrūshanī), ʿImād al-Dīn al-Marginānī’s Fuṣūl al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿal-Fuṣūlāyn. Later, the topics discussed in these works were developed and continued, and ultimately separate works related to this field have been copyrighted. In this study, the kinds of development and expansion which are in the literature and related subjects will be discussed by examining the above-mentioned works. Therefore; first of all, the first examples of Hanafi jurists related the compensation will be analysed comparatively. Afterwards, the place of ad-Ḍamānāt fī al-furūʻ al-Ḥanafīyyah of Fuḍayl Chalābī (d. 991/1583), one of the Zenbillizade’s, will be addressed.Summary: The core idea of the law of responsibility, which constitutes one of the important parts of Islamic law, was stated in the Qur'an and Hadith, and then have accumulated by the contributions of the jurists (fuqaha), as they developed the idea of the law of responsibility within the furû‘ al-fiqh in relation to the systematic of the legal school (madhab) that they belonged to.These issues, which constitute one of the important parts of the law, were addressed by sprinkling among the topics in almost every part of classical fiqh books. In other words, the subject of ḍamān (responsibility) was not considered as a separate subject in the fiqh works of the first period. In this way, it is seen that the literature on compensation law started to emerge in the following periods, and at first several independent sections on this subject, and then separate works specific to this field, albeit limited in number, were written.It is the Ḥanafī jurists who first brought together these issues that are scattered in the classical fiqh books related to the law of responsibility. Compensation law, which took its classical form in the texts from early periods, shaped around the views of the pioneering imams of the Ḥanafī school, has been expanded with the fatwā and interpretations of the Sheikhs (mesāikh) of Ḥanafī in the waqi'at works, which is a product of the need for the law to adapt to new conditions. Firstly, one of the Ḥanafī jurists, Majd al-Dīn al-Usrūshanī (d. 637/1240) dealt with the responsibilities arising from the contract and unfair acts in the 29th section of his book named al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat under the title “Types of Compensation Required to be Paid and Their Situation”. The method and system that Usrūshanī started in this work, the Ḥanafī jurisits ʿImād al-Dīn al-Marginānī in the Fuṣūl al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā in the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn continued to develop the compensation section in their books. Afterwards Fuḍayl Chalābī (d. 991/1583), one of the members of Zenbillizade’s family, enriched these issues and made it an individual work, named ad-Ḍamānāt fī al-furūʻ al-Ḥanafīyyah. Marginānī titled the issues that Usrūshanī had handled in the compensation section and systemised it even more by gathering the fatwās on the related issues under one heading. It is noteworthy to mention that when the compensation sections of both works are compared, the way the subjects handled are exactly the same. But unlike Usrūshanī, Marginānī added the compensation for damages to the fetus in the womb and the responsibility of the person who brought back the fleeing slave at the end of the chapter. On the other hand, unlike them, Shaykh Badr al-Dīn added only the responsibility of the person who found the lost item. Considering that almost all of the topics in the compensation section of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn existed exactly in the compensation section of Marginānī, and that most of them were stated in Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl, it is necessary to say that all of these discussions are based on Usrūshanī as the main backbone of this particular subject and that his work has a unique place in the Islamic legal literature. Chalābī’s ad-Ḍamānāt, is the first work that was written as a separate book in the field of compensation law. Even though in some modern works claim that the work Ghānim al-Baghdādī’s (d. 1030/1620) book named Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt fī madhhab al-Imām al-A'zam Abī Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān was the first written book in this field; it is known that Chalābī's ad-Ḍamānāt had been written before Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt. As a matter of fact, the work of Chalābī had been completed in 984 Hijra, and the Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt was completed in 1027 Hijra. Although the subject sequence in Baghdādī’s work is different; this work is regarded as a continuation of the same tradition.An examination of the systematic and the content of the work reveals that Chalabi’s ad-Ḍamānāt is the continuation of the type of writing that Usrūshanī started and developed by Marginānī and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn. When compared with the compensation sections of these works before him, Chalābī has added new compensation issues to his book that are not addressed in these three works; such as partnership, mudaraba, suretyship (kafāla) transfer (ḥawāla), peace, legal disability (hajr), freedom of trade (idhn) and testament. Among the works mentioned above, works out of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn and Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt are available as manuscripts in the libraries. Therefore, these works have not been used much in modern studies on compensation. In addition, the Chalābī's ad-Ḍamānāt is almost unknown. Although there is little information about this work in some bibliographic studies, it is noteworthy to state that this work is not used as a source in contemporary studies written in Arabic on compensation law. The fact that this work is available as manuscripts in Istanbul libraries is probably the reason for this outcome. It is also very difficult to say that this work is known and used sufficiently in studies written in Turkish.Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat and Marginānī’s Fuṣūl al-iḥkām are currently in the form of manuscripts, so there is no comprehensive study on the whole work and the compensation section. It is possible to see the compensation issues discussed in the work, since Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn, which has been published as printed, was translated into Turkish by an editorial group under the presidency of H. Yunus Apaydın. In addition, Kemal Yıldız, who translated the compensation section in this translation, published this section in Jāmiʿal-Fuṣūlāyn as a separate book with the name of “Sources of the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn and Compensation in the Practice of Ḥanafī School”. Yıldız, first introduced the sources of the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn in the first part of this work and then translated the compensation section from beginning to end by adding his own explanations and evaluations around the subject during the second part. Even though some introductory information about the books of Usrūshanī and Marginānī is presented in Yıldız’s study, the absence of information on the contents of the compensation sections of these books does not allow the opportunity for the researchers to evaluate on the subject wholly. (shrink)

The early period Ismaili jurist Al-Qādî al-Nu'mān appears as an important figure in the formation of Ismaili jurisprudence. There is very little information about Kadı Nu'mân's family, childhood, education and intellectual environment. His full name is Abû Hanîfah Nu'man b. Muhammad b. Mansûr al-Qādî at-Tamîmî Al Qayrawānî. He was born around 290/903 (late 3rd (9th) century) into an educated family in Qayravan in North Africa. There are different opinions about the sect he belonged to when he was growing up. On (...) the other hand, it is difficult to say for certain whether Nu’mān received education in the Ismaili sect due to the understanding of taqiyya in the madhhab. However, it is understood from the basic jurisprudence texts Nu’mān wrote that he most likely did not receive a Sunni education. Historians refer to him as 'Qadi Nu’mān or Abu Hanifah al-Shi'i' in order not to confuse him with the imam of the Hanafi school. Qādî Nu’mān served at different levels of the Fatimid State. Around 313/925, he entered the service of the first Fatimid caliph, Mahdi (r. 909-934 CE/297-322 AH), as a copyist and secretary. During the reigns of the third caliph Mansur and the fourth Fatimid caliph Mu’izz (d. 365/975), Qādî Nu’mān first served as a judge in Tripoli and then in Mansouriya, the Fatimid capital. After the Fatimids conquered Egypt and the center of government was moved to Cairo, Qādî Nu’mān was appointed by the fourth caliph Mu’izz as the head of the appellate courts (maẓālim). Qadi Numans career was at the peak in the period of Caliph Muiz. Qādî Nu’mān worked as a judge in the Fatimid State for about twenty-six years and continued this duty until his death in 363 (973). After the fall of the Fatimid caliphate, there haven’t been any other Fatimid or Ismaili jurists. Qādî Nu’mān is considered by contemporary Ismaili writers as a figure who systematically transformed Ismaili fiqh into an independent sect of fiqh. It can be said that Ismaili fiqh was developed through his works in the Fatimid period. His works continued as the main references in the fiqh studies and after the Fatimid period. With the death of Qādî Nu’mān, the period of ijtihad in Ismaili fiqh and its the establishment phase of Ismaili fiqh came to an end; The sect, in which esoteric interpretations were at the forefront, emerged as a distinctive school of fiqh by discarding ambiguity. Qādî Nu’mān was a very productive writer. He wrote important works related to the field of furu al-fiqh and usûl al-fiqh. Among his works, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib is undoubtedly one of the most important works in the early history of fiqh methodology. The work in question, which was originally written with the aim of rejecting the Sunni fiqh method, discusses the approaches of the Sunni schools of fiqh on ikhtilāf, taqlid, ijma, nazar, qiyas, istihsan, ijtihad and ra’y in a polemical manner. It reveals the differences of the Ismaili method from the Sunni method in terms of the sources on which the fiqh is based, the authority to make ijtihad and the theory of interpretation of the texts. Qādî Nu’mān examined the relationship between reason and revelation in general and the role of religious authority in comprehending and interpreting the texts while criticizing Sunni methods. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has the characteristics of the works of development period as a form. It is possible to observe the question-answer and dialectic form which can be seen in the works of the development period throughout the work in question. Qādî Nu’mān endeavoured to persuade his opponents with a dialectical and argumentative style. Again, he replied to the Sunnis, who were his interlocutors, with their own proofs. In addition to these, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has a unique feature in the matter of content. Because it is not very familiar to any Sunni handbook of usûl al-fiqh. It does not mention the hâss, âmm, ijma, qiyas, amir, nahy, alfaz bets, etc. The text is very similar to the Ahbari movement of the Jafari sect for it rejects all forms of ijtihad. It was written at a time when fiqh was not yet stable. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib gives us crucial information about the development of different usûl and fiqh sources in the middle of the fourth century. However, what is interesting here is that the information he gives about Ismaili method and fiqh is very little compared to the one about Sunni method and fiqh. Much of it centered on Sunni thought and its rejection. However, his ultimate goal was to defend the Ismaili doctrine. (shrink)

Research exploring how students develop their perspectives on religious moderation through reading and understanding the Qur’an is underexplored. This study aims to investigate students’ religious literacy tenet as a process of constructing meaning about religious moderation from the verses of the Qur’an. The participants involved were three students with an excellent ability to read the Qur’an and who had a great interest in the study of the Qur’an. The data were collected through the process of reading the verses of the (...) Qur’an and its textual and contextual translation. The results of this study indicate that students with high translation amendments tend to have more ability to interpret the verses of the Qur’an widely as a form of verbalisation of thoughts.Contribution: This study provides clarification on student interactions, the interpretation process and the construction of the meaning of the verses of the Qur’an. Furthermore, the results of this study encourage lecturers to reconstruct the process of learning to read the Qur’an at the university level. (shrink)

Radicalism and Islamic phobia have the potential to cause conflict amongst religious communities so that it needs social movements in building religious moderation. This study aims to understand and analyse the Ahlussunnah Waljamaah theology in the six largest Islamic community organisations in Indonesia in implementing religious moderation. This study uses a qualitative method with a phenomenological approach. Data obtained from interviews, observations and in-depth interviews regarding the process of externalising, objectifying and internalising the theology of Ahlusunnah Waljamaah in Nahdlatul Ulama, (...) Rifa’iyah, Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia and Front Pembela Islam organisations. Then, the data were analysed through social construction theory of Peter L. Berger and T. Luckman. The results show that the six largest Islamic community organisations in Indonesia apply Ahlussunnah Waljamaahs theology. Those Islamic community organisations differently understand the externalisation of Ahlussunnah Waljamaah theology based on its teaching. Thus, it has implications for Aswaja’s model of application in the fields of state, preaching, social and cultural life. Aswaja’s internalisation is reflected in the moderate character of the figures and followers of mass organisations in Indonesia. The Islamic community organisations contribute to build Islamic moderation character by applying an established and consistent theology of Ahlussunnah Waljamaah in various fields.Contribution: This article provides insight into the contribution of Ahlussunnah Waljamaah’s theology in establishing moderate Islam in Indonesia. It contributes to build Islamic moderation’s character by applying an established and consistent theology of Ahlussunnah Waljamaah in various fields. (shrink)

This paper seeks to retrace human nature and transcending the vision of humanity, by identifying, describing and analyzing the Hahnemannian principles and their relevance to anthropology of transcendent philosophy. Using the qualitative data from Hahnemann’s works with special reference to his Organon we found that Hahnemann’s principles are, unquestionably, a philosophical system in its own right. The primary goal of his philosophy, however is not solely speculative, indeed it is a medical philosophy written in brief aphoristic style, aimed more of (...) guidelines at curing suffering human beings, rather than winning adherents to its speculative creed. The main concern of Hahnemann with regard to his medical philosophy is actually the question of suffering human well-being. The answer to this question will provide an indication of the relevant of Hahnemannian principles to anthropology of transcendent philosophy. Thus Hahnemann’s principles cannot be properly understood apart from some grasp of his conception of human nature and philosophy as a whole. Nonetheless his ideas are against the new emergence mainstream thought pattern of modern Europe which in turn spread all over the globe. (shrink)

Some clerics (ulama) in the Islamic world are of the view that practical politics is closely related to Islam, which regulates how an order of state is run. This view historically departs from Islamic constitutional jurisprudence texts that justify political Islam. Likewise, some Islamic boarding schools’ (pesantren) clerics, better known as kyai in Indonesia, are of the view that practical politics is not only a world affair but also an activity based on the application of Islamic legal principles in achieving (...) public welfare. This study aims to determine the academic basis of pesantren ulama in making decisions to be active in practical politics in Indonesia. Using a qualitative approach through interviews, the results of this study indicate that the political decisions of pesantren ulama are strictly based on the perspective of political Islam and fiqh principles that justify the involvement of ulama in politics. Furthermore, the conclusion leads to three perspectives in political motivations for pesantren’s ulama: to gain power, to preach Islamic values, and to demonstrate the existence of ulama in modern state administration.Contribution: The contribution of the study is to describe the permissibility of politics as an alternative to preaching and to show the existence and ability of ulama in state administration. (shrink)

Hadrami-Arabs have played essential roles in Islamisation process across Southeast Asian region. This article diachronically examines the history of Hadrami community and their roles in islamisation. It looks at the dynamics, adaptation, and contestation of Islamisation in the region. This article offers actors-centered accounts of how the Hadrami community contributes to Islamic proselitisation activism, politics, and contestation within the community. It further argues that, throughout the history of Hadrami in Southeast Asia, political adaptation and contestation have been essential elements that (...) shape the current Islamic-scape in contemporary Southeast Asia. (shrink)

The Arab community has an important role in the process of Islamization in Southeast Asian. One of the Arab community that played an important role in the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia was merchant who came from the south of the Arab lands. This paper examines the development of the Hadrami Arab community in Southeast Asia. Using authoritative studies of literature, this paper discusses the development and revival, and the roleplayed by the Hadrami Arab community in several fields such (...) as economics, education, Islamic da’wah and politics in the 18th to 20th centuries. The method used by the Hadrami Arab community in the process of Islamization is by peaceful means, respect for locality, thus facilitating the process of adaptation and reciprocity of the local population in the Southeast Asian. (shrink)

Les études sur le corps du siècle des Lumières se sont longtemps appuyées sur les traités de médecine, reprenant ainsi les représentations médicales plutôt que celles des malades. Les écrits ordinaires, parmi lesquels on peut compter les consultations épistolaires, permettent toutefois d’appréhender les perceptions corporelles des femmes du xviiie siècle. Ces lettres, envoyées par les malades à leur médecin, forment de véritables biographies médicales et constituent des sources d’une grande richesse pour explorer les écritures féminines du corps. On peut ainsi (...) mettre en évidence des manières spécifiques d’écrire le corps au féminin tout en soulignant les points communs avec les écritures masculines. (shrink)

Les études sur le corps du siècle des Lumières se sont longtemps appuyées sur les traités de médecine, reprenant ainsi les représentations médicales plutôt que celles des malades. Les écrits ordinaires, parmi lesquels on peut compter les consultations épistolaires, permettent toutefois d’appréhender les perceptions corporelles des femmes du xviiie siècle. Ces lettres, envoyées par les malades à leur médecin, forment de véritables biographies médicales et constituent des sources d’une grande richesse pour explorer les écritures féminines du corps. On peut ainsi (...) mettre en évidence des manières spécifiques d’écrire le corps au féminin tout en soulignant les points communs avec les écritures masculines. (shrink)

One of the influential contributions to criminalisation theories is Duff’s work on public wrongs, which offers a thin master principle of criminalisation, proposing that we have a reason to criminalise a type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong; one that violates a polity’s civil order and forms part of that polity’s proper business. The nature of the civil order, the scope of its proper business, and the distinction between the public and private realms of wrongs are context-relative to (...) each polity, structured by their legal, institutional, and informal values and ways of life. Such a context-relative view led to problematic criminalisation examples raised by Duff and his critics. This article engages more fully with the relativism of the civil order and public wrongs in non-democratic and illiberal contexts. It draws on examples such as Saudi Arabi and Iran, and Beetham’s work on the legitimation of power to argue that conceptualising the civil order as an undifferentiated whole that represents a polity’s chosen way of life overlooks the ways in which the civil order’s values and practices are shaped by relations of power and exclusion rules and processes. This, in turn, exposes the theory to the risk of mirroring and legitimising unequal relations of power and impeding efforts to change them. This is also due to the theory’s lack of proper normative guidance on the legitimacy of criminalisation. The potential commitment to – instead of a preference for – democracy and guarantees of equality and freedoms might help strengthen the theory normatively, but it is insufficient to guard against the raised problems. (shrink)

In this article, Roberto Esposito lays out the genealogical pathways linking the three major concepts around which his most recent work has wound its way: community, immunity, and biopolitics. Although immunity is necessary to the preservation of our life, when driven beyond a certain threshold it forces life into a sort of cage where not only our freedom gets lost but also the very meaning of our existence – that opening of existence outside itself that takes the name of communitas. (...) A hermeneutics informed by immunity can allow the category of community to regain a new political significance, without ending up in a substantialist metaphysics. This task is dictated by the urgent need for an affirmative biopolitics – a horizon of meaning – in which life would no longer be the object but somehow the subject of politics. But what sort of shape would this take? Where would we trace its symptoms? And with what objectives? A preliminary answer focuses on breaking the vise grip between public and private that threatens to crush the common, by seeking instead to expand the space of the common, in the fight, for example, against the planned privatization of water and the battle over energy sources. (shrink)

On actualization of Islam based on thoughts of A. Mustofa Bisri, a prominent ulama and muslim scholar In Indonesia; collected articles.

Religion and culture play a central role in building harmonious relations between followers of different religions, both within the nuclear family and in the extended family. This study examines the revitalisation of religious moderation with a cultural approach in strengthening tolerance. Data was obtained qualitatively from in-depth interviews and observations of families of different religions, religious leaders, traditional leaders, and other relevant informants. The research findings show that the family institution is the most crucial place in carrying out moderate religious (...) culturalisation through the local wisdom values of kasiuluran [kinship], tengko situru [togetherness], and karapasan [tenacity]. Institutionally, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and clans in Tongkonan encourage peace in society, both in traditional and religious activities. Meanwhile, religious celebrations, traditional ceremonies, and community activities are occasions to socialise and interact by placing a firm tolerance for religious differences. CONTRIBUTION: This study contributes to the realisation of tolerance through the application of moderate religious values and local wisdom that the world needs today. Strengthening inter-religious relations is very important because the position of religion is complex and sensitive. This contribution is crucial in the midst of the rampant issue of radicalism in Indonesia lately. (shrink)

What and how to teach religious moderation at the undergraduate level still concerns academics. This study aims to explore the perceptions of lecturers and students about the objectives, content, and strategies used in learning religious moderation. This study uses a multiple-case exploratory design with a qualitative approach. Data were collected through interviews with eight lecturers and 15 students from public and Islamic universities in Indonesia. Data analysis in this study used conventional content analysis methods with an inductive coding process. The (...) first two authors analysed data, and their agreement was calculated using Cohen’s kappa of 0.90. As a result, participants said that the ultimate goal of learning moderation in religion is to teach students about aligning views on religion and non-religion. The content that needs to be taught early and as a firm root of religious moderation is the internal harmony of religious communities. Finally, the development of campus culture can be an alternative model to internalise the values of religious moderation. Contribution: Overall, this research helps us to understand what kind of religious moderation learning we want to introduce in Indonesian universities. (shrink)

The work of contemporary Italian thinkers, what Roberto Esposito refers to as Italian Theory, is attracting increasing attention around the world. This book explores the reasons for its growing popularity, its distinguishing traits, and why people are turning to these authors for answers to real-world issues and problems. The approach he takes, in line with the keen historical consciousness of Italian thinkers themselves, is a historical one. He offers insights into the great "unphilosophical" philosophers of life—poets, painters, politicians and revolutionaries, (...) film-makers and literary critics—who have made Italian thought, from its beginnings, an "impure" thought. People like Machiavelli, Croce, Gentile, and Gramsci were all compelled to fulfill important political roles in the societies of their times. No wonder they felt that the abstract vocabulary and concepts of pure philosophy were inadequate to express themselves. Similarly, artists such as Dante, Leonardo Da Vinci, Leopardi, or Pasolini all had to turn to other disciplines outside philosophy in order to discuss and grapple with the messy, constantly changing realities of their lives. For this very reason, says Esposito, because Italian thinkers have always been deeply engaged with the concrete reality of life and because they have looked for the answers of today in the origins of their own historical roots, Italian theory is a "living thought." Hence the relevance or actuality that it holds for us today. Continuing in this tradition, the work of Roberto Esposito is distinguished by its interdisciplinary breadth. In this book, he passes effortlessly from literary criticism to art history, through political history and philosophy, in an expository style that welcomes non-philosophers to engage in the most pressing problems of our times. As in all his works, Esposito is inclusive rather than exclusive; in being so, he celebrates the affirmative potency of life. (shrink)