Este artículo fue publicado originalmente como Jean Héring. De Max Scheler à Hans Reiner. Remarques sur la théorie des valeurs morales dans le mouvement phénoménologique. Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 40, 152-164. Agradecemos a Matthieu Arnold, directeur Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, por la autorización para la publicación de esta traducción. La presente traducción toma como fuente original francesa citada en el párrafo anterior. Las notas del traductor se introducen con un *. Las notas del autor —Jean Héring— (...) siguen el orden de numeración del texto original en numeración arábica. Un agradecimiento especial a Paloma Vicente por las correcciones y sugerencias de traducción. (shrink)

The document presented below stems from the Jean Hering Nachlass in the Médiathèque protestante of Strasbourg and was originally preserved in the Archive of the Collegium Wilhelmitanum Argentinense of the same city. It concerns a typescript of 7 folios, which was unknown up until now, dealing with the idealism-realism controversy and presenting original views on the consequences of this controversy regarding the issue of metaphysics.

Die Arbeit mit psychotischen Patienten in deren akuten Krisen – im vorliegenden Aufsatz mit Menschen, die unter schizophrenen und schizoaffektiven Psychosen leiden – erfordert spezifische Techniken. Deren Darstellung wird hier mit skizzierten Betrachtungen zu Krisen, im engeren Sinn zu psychotischen Ausnahmezuständen und zur Psychogenese und Psychodynamik der Psychosen ergänzt. In vier ausführlichen Vignetten wird der modifiziert psychoanalytische Umgang mit psychotischen Patienten in deren Krisen im Detail gezeigt. In einer Schlussbetrachtung wird die unterschiedliche Behandlung der vier Personen in deren Krisen diskutiert.

The Studies in Religious History and Philosophy cover the entire field of theology, especially the history of Christianity and the philosophy of religion.

We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given (...) power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power.We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core.We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTU-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera. (shrink)

We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given (...) power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power.We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core.We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTU-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera. (shrink)