Part of the basis of the theory and practice of peace policy is the acknowledgment of the ambivalence ofhuman nature and history, the reality ofthe capacity for both war and peace. This insight Ieads to the setting of comparative aims for peace policy, to a reform-based implementation of more peace in the face of an unpeaceful world. A world peace order cannot disregard the existence of sovereign states and their interests. Combining international cooperation and communication with a residual policy of (...) nuclear deterrence could minimize military conflicts. At national Ievel this orientation towards peace requires a legal system along the lines of a social constitutional state. (shrink)

This article features the contributions of Fichte and Schopenhauer to a philosophical account of action against the background of Kant's earlier and influential treatment of the topic. The article first presents Kant's pertinent contributions in the areas of general epistemology and metaphysics, general practical philosophy, the philosophy of law and ethic. Then the focus is on Fichte's further original work on the issue of action in those same areas. Finally, the article turns to Schopenhauer's radical revision of the Kantian and (...) Fichtean affirmative accounts of acting and willing through the correlated introduction of the irrational will, the self-negated will and ethical inaction. (shrink)

Expecting the imminent triumph of religious and political absolutism Locke tries, in »A Letter concerning Toleration«, to define the true Christian and the true church. He invites his readers to differentiale between civil goverment and religious communities. A church is a voluntary association, the members of which are hold together by the common hope of salvation. In this association there is no need for power and force, which are necessary in civil government. Pursuing this theme in a subtile way Locke (...) develops the reformatorical doctrine of the two kingdoms. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 56 Heft: 2 Seiten: 234-252.

The paper assesses Martin’s recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian’s “Allegory of Prudence”, the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin’s views on Kant’s logic in general and his theory of singular existential (...) judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin’s key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject. (shrink)

Der Beitrag erörtert das diffizile Verhältnis von Staat und Religion in Hegels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. Systematischer Ausgangspunkt ist die alternative Zuordnung des Themas zur Sphäre des absoluten und der des objektiven Geistes in der ersten bzw. zweiten Fassung der Berliner Enzyklopädie. Der Beitrag will zeigen, daß die doppelte systematische Verortung der Verhältnisbestimmung von Staat und Religion in der Berliner Enzyklopädie Hegels komplexe Einschätzung des modernen Staates als von der modernen Religion sowohl getrennt als auch ihr systematisch zugehörig wiederspiegelt. Zu (...) diesem Zweck behandelt der Beitrag zunächst den systemarchitektonischen Grundcharakter von Hegels enzyklopädischem Projekt, sodann die sukzessive Entwicklung einer im spezifischen Sinne modernen Konzeption von Sittlichkeit in den Nürnberger, Heidelberger und Berliner Fassungen der Enzyklopädie und schließlich die systematische Annäherung der Sittlichkeit des modernen Staates an die Geistigkeit der modernen Religion in den beiden Berliner Fassungen der Enzyklopädie. (shrink)

U članku se ispituje Kantova prosvjetiteljska koncepcija metafizike kao znanosti koju valja držati slobodnom od ideoloških predrasuda i izvanracionalnih kognitivnih resursa te je ustanoviti pod uvjetima javnog, intersubjektivno važećeg diskursa. Analiziram Kantovu vlastitu interpretaciju njegove transcendentalne filozofije kao “metafizike metafizike” i zastupam ekstenzionalni djelomični identitet kritike metafizike i metafizike koja je tako učinjena mogućom. Posebice identificiram “buduću metafiziku”, koju je Kant zamislio kao “metafiziku prirode općenito” ili “fiziologiju čistog uma”, koju je Kant bio zacrtao, ali je sam nikada nije proveo (...) i koju ne treba brkati s “metafizikom materijalne prirode” koju je Kant izložio u svojim Metafizičkim načelima prirodne znanosti . Nadalje pokazujem kako je kod Kanta “ograničenje” razuma i njegovih čistih pojmova na osjetilno zrenje kompenzirano “ograničavanjem” osjetilnosti i njenih formalnih uvjeta na pojave, uz isključenje “praznog prostora” onog neosjetilnog. Oslanjajući se na Kantovo razlikovanje “ograničenja” i “granice” , utvrđujem točnu poziciju kritičke metafizike “na granici” osjetilnog svijeta i razumskog svijeta. Zaključno tvrdim da je “buduća metafizika koja će biti moguća kao znanost” za Kanta ograničena na transcendentalnu filozofiju, uz isključenje teoretske spoznaje nadosjetilnoga, koja je time zauvijek predana predmetnom području praktički zasnovanoga racionalnog, ali ne-znanstvenog vjerovanja ili vjere .The essay examines Kant’s Enlightenment conception of metaphysics as a science to be kept free of ideological prejudice and extrarational cognitive resources and to be established under the conditions of public, intersubjectively valid discourse. I analyze Kant’s self-interpretation of his transcendental philosophy as “metaphysics of metaphysics” and argue for the extensional partial identity of the critique of metaphysics and the metaphysics so rendered possible. In particular, I identify the “future metaphysics” envisioned by Kant as the “metaphysics of nature in general” or the “physiology of pure reason,” which was projected by Kant but never carried out by himself and is not to be confused with the “metaphysics of material nature” presented by Kant in his Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science . I further show how in Kant the “restriction” of the understanding and its pure concepts to sensible intuition is counterbalanced by the “bounding” of sensibility and its formal conditions to the appearances, at the exclusion of the “empty space” of the non-sensory. In drawing on Kant’s distinction between “limit” and “boundary” , I establish the precise position of critical metaphysics “on the boundary” of the world of sense and the world of the understanding. In concluding, I argue that for Kant a “future metaphysics that will be possible as science” is restricted to transcendental philosophy, at the exclusion of the theoretical cognition of the supersensible, which is thereby delegated forever to the object domain of practically based rational but non-scientific belief or faith. (shrink)

Fichte hat nur eine, die allererste und nicht einmal förmlich zum Abschluß gebrachte, Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre publiziert, doch in den nächsten knapp zwei Jahrzehnten bis zu seinem Tod im Januar 1814 die Wissenschaftslehre noch insgesamt fünfzehn Mal öffentlich vorgetragen und dabei dreizehn Mal neu oder verändert dargestellt. Hinzukommen noch drei umfangreiche Ausarbeitungen, die den öffentlichen Vortrag der Wissenschaftslehre vorbereiten bzw. begleiten: »Eigne Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie« aus den Jahren 1793-94, die Aufzeichnungen betitelt »Seit d. 1.April 1808. nach den Reden an die (...) deutsche Nation« aus dem Jahre 1808 und wesentliche Teile der als Diarium geführten Notate aus den Jahren 1813 und 1814. Nur wenige von Fichtes Zeitgenossen - praktisch nur die Zuhörer seiner fortgesetzten Vorlesungen über die Wissenschaftslehre in Berlin, Erlangen und Königsberg - haben diese öffentlichen, aber unveröffentlichten Arbeiten zur Kenntnis nehmen können. (shrink)

Fichte hat nur eine, die allererste und nicht einmal förmlich zum Abschluß gebrachte, Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre publiziert, doch in den nächsten knapp zwei Jahrzehnten bis zu seinem Tod im Januar 1814 die Wissenschaftslehre noch insgesamt fünfzehn Mal öffentlich vorgetragen und dabei dreizehn Mal neu oder verändert dargestellt. Hinzukommen noch drei umfangreiche Ausarbeitungen, die den öffentlichen Vortrag der Wissenschaftslehre vorbereiten bzw. begleiten: »Eigne Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie« aus den Jahren 1793-94, die Aufzeichnungen betitelt »Seit d. 1.April 1808. nach den Reden an die (...) deutsche Nation« aus dem Jahre 1808 und wesentliche Teile der als Diarium geführten Notate aus den Jahren 1813 und 1814. Nur wenige von Fichtes Zeitgenossen - praktisch nur die Zuhörer seiner fortgesetzten Vorlesungen über die Wissenschaftslehre in Berlin, Erlangen und Königsberg - haben diese öffentlichen, aber unveröffentlichten Arbeiten zur Kenntnis nehmen können. (shrink)

The author informs us that he would have preferred to title his book Time, the Forgotten Dimension. It is not, he cautions, that scientists fail to consider time or forget to include the term "t" in their equations. But, he insists, from Thales to Einstein and even to Planck and Schroedinger, Western thought has been dominated by the tendency to treat time as a kind of illusion or appearance cloaking a timeless reality. This tendency, taken at the extreme, would treat (...) past, present, and future as if they coexisted and deny to irreversibility, indeterminacy, and creativity the slightest shred of reality. The author, an important contributor to recent "nonequilibrium" thermodynamics, believes that this age-old tendency has finally run its course and needs to be supplemented by a newer and potentially more fruitful tendency to "take time seriously": that is, to study irreversibility and indeterminacy on their own terms, as fundamental features of the real world. The result, he argues, may be the resolution of many heretofore unresolvable problems. (shrink)