The spectral fluctuations of quantum (or wave) systems with a chaotic classical (or ray) limit are mostly universal and faithful to random-matrix theory. Taking up ideas of Pechukas and Yukawa we show that equilibrium statistical mechanics for the fictitious gas of particles associated with the parametric motion of levels yields spectral fluctuations of the random-matrix type. Previously known clues to that goal are an appropriate equilibrium ensemble and a certain ergodicity of level dynamics. We here complete the reasoning by establishing (...) a power law for the ħ dependence of the mean parametric separation of avoided level crossings. Due to that law universal spectral fluctuations emerge as average behavior of a family of quantum dynamics drawn from a control parameter interval which becomes vanishingly small in the classical limit; the family thus corresponds to a single classical system. We also argue that classically integrable dynamics cannot produce universal spectral fluctuations since their level dynamics resembles a nearly ideal Pechukas–Yukawa gas. (shrink)
This volume contains invited and contributed papers delivered at a symposium on the occasion of Professor Glauber's 60th birthday. The papers, many of which are authored by world leaders in their fields, contain recent research work in quantum optics, statistical mechanics and high energy physics related to the pioneering work of Professor Roy Glauber; most contain original research material that is previously unpublished. The concepts of coherence, cooperativity and fluctuations in systems with many degrees of freedom are a common base (...) for all of Professor Glauber's research initiatives and, in fact, for much of contemporary physics. His role in shaping these cconcepts is reflected and honoured in the papers contained in this book. (shrink)
The book includes all 15 long forgotten articles on bioethics and ethics written by Jahr from 1927 to 1947 in English translation. (Series: Practical Ethics / Ethik in der Praxis - Studies / Studien - Vol. 37).
The article analyzes the Swedish writer Pär Lagerkvist’s last volume of poems, Aftonland, and the metaphor of the “book of nature”, which the poet uses extensively and which forms the volume’s compositional axis. The starting point is to present the theological concepts of liber naturae and to indicate the functions of this metaphor in old literature. Lagerkvist’s take on this metaphor points to the fundamental change that occurred in the religious situation of man between the time of the metaphor’s peak (...) popularity and the middle of the twentieth century in a completely altered historical context. Lagerkvist’s return to this metaphor involves its radical transformation in the spirit of a modern transformation of spirituality. Rather than revealing theological truths, the “book of nature” in Lagerkvist’s poetry is akin to the “codes of transcendence” by Jaspers, which bring man, living in a disenchanted modern world, closer to a transcendental dimension of existence. The transformations of the “book of nature” theme in Lagerkvist’s poetic volume are also analyzed against the background of the transformations of modern and contemporary astronomy, as well as in the perspective of the theory of the “logic of writing’ and, also, the relationship between writing and religion. The use of the old metaphor allows Lagerkvist to express the affirmation of spiritual longings and the search for meaning in the world as unfulfilled but inalienable human qualities. The conclusion also points to the presence of the “book of nature” motif in other works of the Swedish writer, which is a manifestation of his metaphysical interests. (shrink)
This paper investigates the justification of the concept of a balance of nature in population ecology as a case of model based reasoning. The ecologist A.J. Nicholson understood balance as an outcome of intraspecific competition in populations. His models implied density dependent growth of populations oscillating around an equilibrium state. Today the assumption of density dependence is tested statistically by using models that represent certain data dynamics. This however, does not test for density dependence in the sense suggested by Nicholson. (...) From a suggested mechanism in nature equilibrium has become a property of a data set. I call this a change of reference of the term equilibrium . The new equilibrium is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the old equilibrium. However, some ecologists suggest using the new definition instead of the old one. I argue that the new definition of equilibrium points to a change in justification of the assumption of a balance in nature. This change has to be seen in relation to modeling strategies pursued by the scientific community. I argue that there is an interdependence between models, data, values, and evidence. Model based reasoning, though abstract and idealizing, has to be considered in a historical, philosophical, and social context. (shrink)
An argument going back to Russell shows that the view that propositions are structured is inconsistent in standard type theories. Here, it is shown that such type theories may nevertheless provide entities which can serve as proxies for structured propositions. As an illustration, such proxies are applied to the case of grounding, as standard views of grounding require a degree of propositional structure which suffices for a version of Russell’s argument. While this application solves some of the problems grounding faces, (...) it introduces problematic limitations: it becomes impossible to quantify unrestrictedly over the relata of ground. The proposed proxies may thus not save grounding, but they shed light on what exactly Russell’s argument does and does not show. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue for the permissibility of torture in idealized cases by application of separation of cases: if torture is permissible given any of the dominant moral theories (and if one of those is correct), then torture is permissible simpliciter and I can discharge the tricky business of trying to adjudicate among conflicting moral views. To be sure, torture is not permissible on all the dominant moral theories as at least Kantianism will prove especially recalcitrant to granting moral (...) license of torture, even in idealized cases. Rather than let the Kantian derail my central argument, I directly argue against Kantianism (and other views with similar commitments) on the grounds that, if they cannot accommodate the intuitions in ticking time-bomb cases, they simply cannot be plausible moral views—these arguments come in both foundationalist and coherentist strains. Finally, I postulate that, even if this paper has dealt with idealized cases, it paves the way for the justification of torture in the real world by removing some candidate theories (e.g., Kantianism) and allowing others that both could and are likely to justify real-world torture. (shrink)
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (J Econ Theory 21: 75–106, 2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market, there always exists a “double stable” matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets, the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns (...) all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. (shrink)
The aim of the current investigation is to analyze the writings On Kingship in the context of sole rulership in Antiquity. Writings On Kingship first appeared in the time of Alexander the Great and flourished during the Hellenistic period, but there are although some treatises written under Roman rule during the Imperial period and in Late Antiquity. Starting point of the analysis is to understand the treatises On Kingship as a literary genre. By taking into account the authors, the addressees, (...) the implicit readers, and the content as well as the literary form it can be shown that the writings On Kingship played an important role in the always difficult communication between kings and Greek cities during the Hellenistic period. As the communicative contexts changed during the Roman Imperial period and in Late Antiquity, the treatises On Kingship lost their original social function. Therefore, the sporadic writings originating from post-Hellenistic times can be understood as a case of failed literary reception. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue for the permissibility of torture in idealized cases by application of separation of cases: if torture is permissible given any of the dominant moral theories, then torture is permissible simpliciter and I can discharge the tricky business of trying to adjudicate among conflicting moral views. To be sure, torture is not permissible on all the dominant moral theories as at least Kantianism will prove especially recalcitrant to granting moral license of torture, even in idealized cases. (...) Rather than let the Kantian derail my central argument, I directly argue against Kantianism on the grounds that, if they cannot accommodate the intuitions in ticking time-bomb cases, they simply cannot be plausible moral views—these arguments come in both foundationalist and coherentist strains. Finally, I postulate that, even if this paper has dealt with idealized cases, it paves the way for the justification of torture in the real world by removing some candidate theories and allowing others that both could and are likely to justify real-world torture. (shrink)
This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions (...) about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents’ moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement’s epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs. (shrink)
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent (...) with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism. (shrink)
Computer simulation is shown to be philosophically interesting because it introduces a qualitatively new methodology for theory construction in science different from the conventional two components of "theory" and "experiment and/or observation". This component is "experimentation with theoretical models." Two examples from the physical sciences are presented for the purpose of demonstration but it is claimed that the biological and social sciences permit similar theoretical model experiments. Furthermore, computer simulation permits theoretical models for the evolution of physical systems which use (...) cellular automata rather than differential equations as their syntax. The great advantages of the former are indicated. (shrink)
: In 1927, Fritz Jahr, a Protestant pastor, philosopher, and educator in Halle an der Saale, published an article entitled "Bio-Ethics: A Review of the Ethical Relationships of Humans to Animals and Plants" and proposed a "Bioethical Imperative," extending Kant's moral imperative to all forms of life. Reviewing new physiological knowledge of his times and moral challenges associated with the development of secular and pluralistic societies, Jahr redefines moral obligations towards human and nonhuman forms of life, outlining the concept (...) of bioethics as an academic discipline, principle, and virtue. Although he had no immediate long-lasting influence during politically and morally turbulent times, his argument that new science and technology requires new ethical and philosophical reflection and resolve may contribute toward clarification of terminology and of normative and practical visions of bioethics, including understanding of the geoethical dimensions of bioethics. (shrink)
In Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture, Fritz Allhoff demonstrates the weakness of the case against torture; while allowing that torture constitutes a moral wrong, he nevertheless argues that, in exceptional cases, it represents the ...
Nanotechnology & Society is the second anthology published by The Nanoethics Group and is a welcome addition to the emerging field of nanoethics. Editors Fritz Allhoff and Patrick Lin are among the leading philosophers in nanoethics and founders of The Nanoethics Group. While their first anthology, Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Nanotechnology, presented a general introduction to critical issues in nanoethics, in this new book Allhoff and Lin recognize nanotechnology’s “strange schizophrenia”—as a brave new science filled with (...) unlimited futuristic vision contrasted with the exaggerated hype of research progress—and strive to foster a solid foundation for nanoethics. (shrink)
A collection of essays discussing a wide range of sciences and the central philosophical issues associated with them, presenting the sciences collectively to encourage a greater understanding of their associative theoretical foundations, as well as their relationships to each other. Offers a new and unique approach to studying and comparing the philosophies of a variety of scientific disciplines -/- *Explores a wide variety of individual sciences, including mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and economics -/- *The essays are written by (...) leading scholars in a highly accessible style for the student audience -/- *Complements more traditional studies of philosophy of science. (shrink)
Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads to ontological levels and cumulativity of knowledge. It is applied to a defense of realism (...) against recent attacks by Laudan. (shrink)
The reduction from Einstein's to Newton's gravitation theories (and intermediate steps) is used to exemplify reduction in physical theories. Both dimensionless and dimensional reduction are presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are pointed out. It is concluded that neither a completely reductionist nor a completely antireductionist view can be maintained. Only the mathematical structure is strictly reducible. The interpretation (the model, the central concepts) of the superseded theory T′ can at best only partially be derived directly from the (...) superseding theory T; it is severely constrained by the mathematical structure, and it can involve qualitatively different central terms that cannot be logically related between T and T′. (shrink)
Allhoff, Fritz, Patrick Lin, and Daniel Moore. 2010. What is nanotechnology and why does it matter? From science to ethics Content Type Journal Article Pages 209-211 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9289-z Authors Jennifer Kuzma, University of Minnesota, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, 301 19th Ave So, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 2.
Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and (...) thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others. (shrink)