The globalization in business and tourism becomes crucial more and more for the economical sustainability of local communities. In the presence of an epidemic outbreak, there must be such a decision on the policy by the host community as whether to accept visitors or not, the number of acceptable visitors, or the condition for acceptable visitors. Making use of an SIRI type of mathematical model, we consider the influence of visitors on the spread of a reinfectious disease in a community, (...) especially assuming that a certain proportion of accepted visitors are immune. The reinfectivity of disease here means that the immunity gained by either vaccination or recovery is imperfect. With the mathematical results obtained by our analysis on the model for such an epidemic dynamics of resident and visitor populations, we find that the acceptance of visitors could have a significant influence on the disease’s endemicity in the community, either suppressive or supportive. (shrink)

In my Steinberger 2009 I argued that Neil Tennant’s Harmony requirement is untenable because of its failure to account for the standard quantifier rules.1 Instead of justifying the customary rules for the existential and universal quantifiers, Tennant’s account appears to sanction only wholly unrestricted – and so patently disharmonious – quantifier rules. In his characteristically thoughtful response Tennant 2010, Tennant offers a sequent calculus version of his Harmony requirement that rules out such pathological would-be quantifiers. While I agree with Tennant (...) that recasting his Harmony requirement in the sequent format as he proposes blocks the said disharmonious quantifier rules, I submit that Tennant’s revamped Harmony requirement nevertheless misses the mark. I present two objections to substantiate my claim. First, I show that the crucial additional assumption underlying Tennant’s sequent calculus-based account – what I call the admissibility assumption – is excessively strong: so strong, in fact, that it renders otiose the core of Tennant’s original account. Second, I argue that the admissibility assumption, as a global requirement on deductive systems, is ill-suited for the purposes of codifying the intuitive notion of harmony. Fortunately, though, as I will demonstrate, we can dispense with the admissibility assumption altogether. (shrink)

Ethics for Enemies comprises three original philosophical essays on torture, terrorism, and war. F. M. Kamm deploys ethical theory in her challenging new treatments of these most controversial practical issues. First she considers the nature of torture and the various occasions on which it could occur, in order to determine why it might be wrong to torture a wrongdoer held captive, even if this were necessary to save his victims. In the second essay she considers what makes terrorism wrong--whether it (...) is the intention to harm civilians, rather than harm to them being 'collateral damage,' or something else--and whether terrorism is always wrong. The third essay discusses whether having a right reason, in the sense of a right intention, is necessary in order for a war to be just. Kamm then examines ways in which the harms of war can be proportional to the achievement of the just cause and other goods that war can bring about, so as to make the declaration of war permissible. (shrink)

This book is the 1906 second edition of the Hulsean Lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge between 1901 and 1902. In these four lectures, F. R. Tennant challenges conventional teachings on Original Sin and the story of the Fall, arguing that his contemporaries had misinterpreted the biblical presentation of sin and its manifestations. Tennant aims to redefine the sin of both the race and the individual, and in doing so engages with traducianism and the philosophies of Malebranche, Kant and (...) Hegel. He argues that action predates modern conceptions of right and wrong, and that transgression is only sin if the actor is aware of what is morally right. Of course, these theories were met with great opposition, an opposition which Tennant uses the preface of this second edition to confront. These fascinating lectures and their appendages will be of great interest to scholars of Christian theology and the fin de siècle alike. (shrink)

Christology seems to fall fairly clearly into two divisions. The first is concerned with the truth of the two propositions: ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’. The second is concerned with the mutual compatibility of these propositions. The first part of Christology tends to confine itself to what is sometimes called ‘positive theology’: that is to say, it is largely given over to examining the Jons revelationis —let us not prejudge currently burning issues by asking what this is—to (...) see what evidence can be found for the truth of these propositions. Clearly, the methods used will be above all those of New Testament exegesis. The second part of Christology will necessarily consist entirely of that speculative theology which is contrasted with positive theology. Even if the earliest speculation on this topic is to be found in the New Testament itself and thus becomes fair game for the exegetes, any attempt to relate the primary truths, ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’, to eachother is a work of reflection, and in the terminology I am using speculative. (shrink)

There is an interesting controversy in recent literature over the nature of Reid's theory of perception. Interpreters are divided over whether Reid's theory of perception is compatible with an acquaintance model of perception. This article discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff's objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I argue that these objections are inadequate insofar as they do not account for the possibility that Reid offers a ‘state conceptual’ – rather than a ‘state nonconceptual’ – acquaintance theory of perception. I provide textual (...) support for thinking that a state conceptual acquaintance interpretation of Reid is a live possibility, and show how such an interpretation is immune to Wolterstorff's criticisms. (shrink)

This book traces the history of philosophy in Great Britain from the time when it began to be written until the end of the Victorian era. A valuable feature is the extensive bibliography, which was revised especially for the first printing of this 1965 back edition.