Arguments, at least the best of them, should be based upon principles of logic, and therefore be beyond dispute. But unfortunately many philosophical arguments are based upon principles which, though claimed by some to be principles of logic, or at least to be true, are disputed or rejected by others. This difficult position arises, no doubt, because it is the philosopher more than anyone else who is entitled to delve into questions of the validity of first principles. In a philosophical (...) undertaking of any magnitude it is therefore imperative for the author to state as clearly as possible the principles which seem to him certain, and which constitute the guiding lines of his method. Any criticism could then take only one of two forms: it could allege that the argument under criticism does not conform to the principles laid down, though these principles are themselves accepted. it could allege that the argument is mistaken because something is wrong with the principles, in which case the object of criticism is properly the principles and not the argument. But a valid criticism could not take the form of condemning a certain argument in the light of a principle which, while appearing to the critic to be true and undisputed, is in fact inconsistent with the principles which the author has laid down. (shrink)

If we pay careful attention to our experience, the presence of awareness running through it all is so evident, that it seems nothing short of insanity to deny it. The forms taken by this awareness seem to be many and various: seeing, hearing, feeling, remembering, imagining, dreaming, deciding. Awareness is what we truly are. Without it, all would be utter blackness, total death, nothing. Awareness is what makes the difference between a dead, behaving body and a living human being, albeit (...) the behaviour is exactly the same. Anyone who pretends that we only seem to be aware, overlooks the fact that he can easily enough discover that he himself is aware, in the very act of pretending that he only seems to be so. (shrink)

It is my purpose to examine this law in those cases in which it is generally held to be untrue. I inquire what can be meant, in each case of a statement p considered, by denying the law, that is, by saying ‘Neither p nor —p‘. After separating the possible meanings of this declared indeterminacy, I go on to inquire, taking each possibility in turn, whether the law does in fact fail.