The aim of the study presented in this paper was to understand the lifeworlds of children who experience immigration and whose lives are marked by dramatic changes in their being-in-the-world. More specifically, the study proceeded from the question: What does it mean for an immigrant child to enter school in a new country? Two methodological questions were also explored, namely How does one conduct a phenomenological investigation of a childhood phenomenon when the researchers and the participants do not share a (...) common language? and How does one engage children in the research process so that they provide not only "thick" descriptions of their experiences using alternative, non-linguistic means, but also make meaning of these experiences? In the current study, still photography was used to help the immigrant children recall and make meaning of what they experienced on their first day of school in a new country. In the process, they were enabled to become conscious photographers who came to see the world in such a way that photographic seeing became phenomenological seeing. Two examples of the children's visual narratives in the form of fotonovelas are presented to illustrate a methodology that involves fusion of the horizons surrounding the children, captured images of situations they encountered as they entered the classroom, and how the viewer saw the created image. The expanded notion of text and the use of digital technology in developing the text opened a space not only for visual representation of the children's lived experiences, but also for phenomenological analysis of these experiences. It is suggested that, although the written and visual texts produced as a result of the study differ, they are similar in the way in which they allow for phenomenological reflection and in their ability to show the phenomenon so as to evoke the reader's "phenomenological nod". (shrink)

The aim of the study presented in this paper was to understand the lifeworlds of children who experience immigration and whose lives are marked by dramatic changes in their being-in-the-world. More specifically, the study proceeded from the question: What does it mean for an immigrant child to enter school in a new country? Two methodological questions were also explored, namely How does one conduct a phenomenological investigation of a childhood phenomenon when the researchers and the participants do not share a (...) common language? and How does one engage children in the research process so that they provide not only “thick” descriptions of their experiences using alternative, non-linguistic means, but also make meaning of these experiences? In the current study, still photography was used to help the immigrant children recall and make meaning of what they experienced on their first day of school in a new country. In the process, they were enabled to become conscious photographers who came to see the world in such a way that photographic seeing became phenomenological seeing. Two examples of the children’s visual narratives in the form of fotonovelas are presented to illustrate a methodology that involves fusion of the horizons surrounding the children, captured images of situations they encountered as they entered the classroom, and how the viewer saw the created image. The expanded notion of text and the use of digital technology in developing the text opened a space not only for visual representation of the children’s lived experiences, but also for phenomenological analysis of these experiences. It is suggested that, although the written and visual texts produced as a result of the study differ, they are similar in the way in which they allow for phenomenological reflection and in their ability to show the phenomenon so as to evoke the reader’s “phenomenological nod”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 100 Heft: 2 Seiten: 533-539.

Jotta olisimme moraalisesti vastuussa teoistamme, meidän on kyettävä muodostamaan käsityksiä oikeasta ja väärästä ja toimimaan ainakin jossain määrin niiden mukaisesti. Jos olemme täysivaltaisia moraalitoimijoita, myös ymmärrämme miksi jotkin teot ovat väärin, ja kykenemme siten joustavasti mukauttamaan toimintaamme eri tilanteisiin. Esitän, ettei näköpiirissä ole tekoälyjärjestelmiä, jotka kykenisivät aidosti välittämään oikein tekemisestä tai ymmärtämään moraalin vaatimuksia, koska nämä kyvyt vaativat kokemustietoisuutta ja kokonaisvaltaista arvostelukykyä. Emme siten voi sysätä koneille vastuuta teoistaan. Meidän on sen sijaan pyrittävä rakentamaan keinotekoisia oikeintekijöitä - järjestelmiä, jotka eivät (...) ole moraalitoimijoita, mutta kuitenkin toimivat likipitäen siten kuin me itse parhaimmillamme tekisimme. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a game-theoretic examination of indirect utilitarianism by comparing the expected payoffs of attempts to apply a deontological principle and a utilitarian principle within the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Although many of the best-known utilitarians and consequentialists have accepted some indirect form of their respective views, the results in this paper suggest that they have been overly quick to dismiss altogether the benefits of directly enacting utilitarian principles. We show that for infallible moral agents, (...) what we call ‘non-autonomous agents’, direct utilitarianism dominates indirect utilitarianism via deontology in terms of achieving the maximized utilitarian outcome, but only in underlying games where the maximized utilitarian outcome involves unequal payoffs. In other situations, indirect utilitarianism implemented through Kantian deontology either ties or dominates direct utilitarianism in terms of achieving the maximized utilitarian outcome. We also examine the two different moralities on the assumption that fallibility, which is a form of autonomy, is an aspect of moral agency by introducing Endogenized Morality Models (EMM’s). We believe that just as indirect utilitarians worry about the cost of applying moral principles, so too they should worry about the fact that humans have both pro-social and materialistically selfish motivations and hence are fallible moral agents. We show that there are conditions under which fallible autonomous utilitarians achieve higher expected material and psychic payoffs than fallible autonomous deontologists and conditions under which they do not. (shrink)

Keskustelu tekoälyn soveltamiseen liittyvistä eettisistä ja poliittisista kysymyksistä käy juuri nyt kuumana. Emme halua tässä puheenvuorossa osallistua keskusteluun tarttumalla johonkin tiettyyn eettiseen ongelmaan. Sen sijaan pyrimme sanomaan jotain itsekeskustelusta ja sen vaikeudesta. Haluamme kiinnittää huomiota siihen, kuinka erilaiset ihmismielen ajattelutaipumukset ja virhepäätelmät voivat huomaamattamme vaikuttaa tapaamme hahmottaa ja ymmärtää tekoälyä ja siihen liittyviä eettisiä kysymyksiä. Kun ymmärrämme paremmin sen, kuinka hankalaa näiden kysymysten hahmottaminen arkisen mielemme kategorioilla oikein on, ja kun tunnistamme tästä syntyvät virhepäätelmät ja ajattelun vääristymät, kykenemme entistä korkeatasoisempaan (...) eettiseen arviointiin tekoälyyn liittyvissä kysymyksissä. Tarkoituksemme ei ole tarkastella loogisiavirhepäätelmiä, jotka rikkovat formaalin modus tollensin tai modus ponensin sääntöjä. Sen sijaan esittelemme empiirisiä tutkimustuloksia, jotka havainnollistavat ihmismielen taipumustatehdä systemaattisia virhearviointeja erilaisissa tilanteissa. (shrink)

In his erudite and detailed study, now made available in Nils Schott’s commendable translation a decade after the initial publication of the German version, Emm.

Lectio praecursoria 16.12.2017: Väitöskirjani tarkastelee yksilövastuun ja kollektiivisen vastuun suhdetta ja kysyy, mitä voimme oppia niistä tarkastelemalla ilmastonmuutosta. Käsittelen ilmastonmuutosta esimerkkitapauksena systemaattisesta vahingosta, joka on syntynyt kollektiivisen toiminnan tahattomana sivuvaikutuksena. Tällaisten vahinkojen ja haittojen kohdalla kausaalinen yhteys yksittäisen toimijan ja lopputuloksen välillä on usein epäselvä tai mahdoton osoittaa tarkasti. Osallisuusvastuu on osallistumista, osallisuutta tai yhteyttä väärään tekoon tai kollektiivisesti aiheutettuun haittaan. Ilmastonmuutos ei ole ongelma vain kollektiivisille toimijoille, vaan myös yksilöille pääosin sen takia, että olemme erilaisten kollektiivien jäseniä ja osia. (...) Esitän, että yksilöiden moraaliselle vastuulle ilmastonmuutoksesta on kolme mahdollista lähdettä: suora vastuu, osallisuusvastuu kollektiivisten toimijoiden jäseninä ja osallisuusvastuu järjestymättömien kollektiivien osana. Kukaan yksilö ei ole vastuussa ilmastonmuutoksesta sinänsä, mutta yksilö voi olla vastuussa esimerkiksi vakavan haitan riskin kasvattamisesta. Mitä siis voimme oppia yksilöiden ja kollektiivien vastuusta tarkastelemalla ilmastonmuutosta? Voimme nähdä, että yksilöiden ja kollektiivien vastuut kietoutuvat yhteen, ja että nykymaailmassa emme voi päästä pakottavien ja ajankohtaisten ongelmien ytimeen keskustelematta niistä yhdessä. Olemme yhä riippuvaisempia toisistamme ja etiikan teorioiden tulisi kuvastaa tätä tilannetta. Kirjoitus on käytännöllisen filosofian väitöskirjani lectio praecursoria, joka esitettiin Helsingin yliopistossa 16. joulukuuta 2017. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une invitation à penser avec plutôt que sur Miguel Abensour, parce que le meilleur hommage que l'on puisse rendre à un maître n'est pas d'arpenter en long et en large le chemin qu'il a déjà parcouru, mais de reprendre le flambeau pour l'amener plus loin. La pensée de Miguel Abensour n'est pas un objet d'étude. Elle est une force vive, une source d'interrogations continûment renouvelées, une puissance intempestive inquiète de l'ordre des choses et qui pourtant ne s'en (...) accommode jamais. Composer avec elle, c'est recomposer notre façon d'envisager le monde. Parce qu'il a été leur professeur, leur éditeur, leur directeur de thèse ou simplement un inspirateur, tous les contributeurs et toutes les contributrices de cet ouvrage ont une dette envers Miguel Abensour. La meilleure façon d'honorer cette dette n'est pas de rendre au créancier - et que lui rendrait-on, d'ailleurs? - mais de préserver le souffle de ce qu'il a transmis. Le souffle insurgeant de la démocratie, le souffle imaginatif de l'utopie, le souffle révolutionnaire de l'émancipation, le souffle vivant de la philosophie. Des souffles qui se mêlent, s'emmêlent et se démêlent. Des souffles désordonnés qui ont la vertu de nous désarçonner. Nous n'avons ni voulu domestiquer ces souffles, ni les mettre à l'unisson, mais avons, chacun et chacune à notre manière, choisi de nous laisser porter, et emporter, tout simplement, par le souffle d'une pensée."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This case illustrates the dilemma facing a medium-sized family business, EMME Logistics and Security Agency that wanted to do more for the victims of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan. About a third of the company’s personnel had family in the hardest hit areas and were anxious to go to find out if their relatives had survived the wreckage caused by the strongest typhoon ever to hit landfall in the Phillipines. Committing the company’s resources to the relief operation would behampered by a (...) damaged infrastructure and the breakdown of civil order. There would also be significant costs associated with disrupting normal business operations and diverting resources. How much humanitarian assistance should businesses shoulder in response to such events? How should businesses better plan for such disasters? (shrink)

This paper argues that Moore’s compelling reading of Nietzsche as a metaphysician in The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (EMM) largely ignores Nietzsche’s philosopher-psychologist approach to metaphysical, general sense-making. Nietzsche’s metaphysical sense-making is often psychologically framed, i.e. sense is made of sense-making as the expression of specific psychological perspectives and types. Nietzsche’s own most general “acts of sense-making,” such as the will to power, nihilism, and eternal return, often need to be interpreted as targeting specific perspectives and (...) types with the goal of affecting their values. Section 2 considers Moore’s definition of metaphysics and asks what evidence there is that Nietzsche is a metaphysician in his inclusivistic sense. Section 3 provides evidence that Nietzsche pursues also a psychological project and introduces the idea of “psychological framing.” Sections 4–6 argue that Moore takes will to power (4), nihilism as suffering (5), and eternal return (6) as Nietzsche’s own, most general “metaphysical” sense-making, thereby neglecting the philosopher-psychologist who may elude Moore’s inclusivist conception of metaphysics. (shrink)

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem‐solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert‐novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and (...) how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem‐solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically. (shrink)

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem‐solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert‐novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and (...) how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem‐solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically. (shrink)