Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory. Chapter 1, p. 1.

Fogelin expresses the aim of his book in this way.

Many different writers have employed what might be termed the ‘existence criterion’ when offering realist analyses of perception. In all these realist accounts, a basic argument may be detected. If any experience—e.g. the having of either a sensory or a mental image—is to be a form of perceiving, then the statement reporting that experience must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form ‘S perceives x’ must entail a statement to the effect that (...) x, or some y, does exist as a public perceptual object in S’s perceptual range. For example, my statement ‘I see Peter’ will be a proper perceptual statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or only if I take some other public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our having images of things, this basic argument continues, cannot satisfy this condition. The object imaged —e.g. Peter—is not always present in the subject’s perceptual range at the time of the imaging, and the subject does not necessarily take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object. Hence, any statement reporting our imaging something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving. (shrink)

The purpose and conclusions of Sartre’s analysis of imagination are remarkably similar to Ryle’s. Like Ryle, Sartre is intent on rebutting image-theories of imagination—those theories which claim that to imagine anything is to be aware of a private mental image, which exists in its own right, has its own properties and relations and which can, as a result, be distinguished as a separate entity from the things of which it is an image. Sartre’s argument against image-theories of imagination leads him (...) to a conclusion very similar to Ryle’s. Sartre concludes that imagining and perceiving are not to be distinguished by reference to the objects which these activities take. We cannot say, Sartre maintains, that imagining and perceiving are similar activities which differ only by virtue of the fact that imagining takes an object different in kind from the object of perception. For Sartre, just as for Ryle, there are no objects other than the objects of perception. Thus he concludes, like Ryle, that imagining and perceiving can only be distinguished by reference to these activities themselves. Imagining and perceiving, Sartre contends, are two mutually exclusive activities, directed at the same objects—viz. at the objects of perception. (shrink)

Dr Todd claims to be presenting, in this book, the position of the solipsist in its most modern and plausible form. The rise of analytical philosophy has, he asserts, brought into being a new sort of solipsist. ‘He no longer holds any of these older doubts, of either things or reasons. He does not deny that there are reasons for believing in the existence of the external world and the existence of other persons. In fact, he admits the truth of (...) statements asserting the existence of these things. Rather he is saying that one can admit all this and still not commit oneself ontologically beyond the occurrence of one’s sensations and certain principles governing them’. (shrink)

This book is, Mr Maslow informs us, substantially as it was written in 1933. His excuse for publishing it nearly thirty years later lies, he says, in the recent upsurge in interest in the Tractatus, and in the possibility of it being of some interest to contemporary philosophers.

This book contains thirty essays, most of which relate directly to problems arising from the Tractatus Its chief merit is that of having conveniently placed in one volume, together with a comprehensive bibliography, most of the important papers which any student of the Tractatus must consult. This, as far as I can see, is its only merit.

The author of this work has attempted a detailed analysis of those aspects of visual perception which he takes to be of vital importance to the epistemologist. The epistemological problems which form the background of his work are primarily those raised by Realist theories of perception. By tackling the problems raised by Realist theories, and at the same time rejecting Phenomenalism, Professor Dretske has made a useful contribution to philosophical analyses of perception. He has, I believe, been partly successful in (...) showing that the dichotomy ‘either Realist or Phenomenalist’ need not be a real one; that rigid Realist theories such as those of Ryle, Chisholm, and Armstrong need not be the only viable alternatives to Phenomenalism. (shrink)

This book is typical of those which philosophers in the British tradition produce when they wish to take a ‘bird’s-eye view’ of philosophy. But like so many others in the same mould, ‘philosophy’ here must be taken to mean ‘British Philosophy’. Mr Newell calls his book The Concept of Philosophy but regrettably considers as examples only philosophers whose writings are in the British tradition. Continental philosophers, past and present, are ignored. This is the main thing which I find unsatisfactory about (...) this book. (shrink)

This volume consists of fifteen papers written by Professor Ducasse over a period of forty years. All appeared originally in a number of Philosophical journals, chiefly Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and The Journal of Philosophy, and cover a wide range of topics. Four are on topics associated with causality, four on problems associated with truth, and the remainder cover such diverse topics as problems in explanation, in meaning, in philosophy of science. The author says that the main aim behind this (...) volume is that of illustrating ‘the particular form of genuinely scientific method appropriate to the solving of philosophical problems’. The adoption of this method will, he claims, show that philosophy need not yield only diverse opinions. (shrink)

The title of this book is, as Ayers himself admits, slightly misleading. It tends to stress the critical aspect of the book which is, he declares, only one of its aims. The primary aim of this work ‘is constructive. It is to offer a reasonable and explanatory account of potentiality and its related concepts’.

This anthology is another in the excellent Oxford Readings in Philosophy series. The general aim of these anthologies, the publishers say, is that ‘of bringing together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the student or the general reader’. This volume satisfies this aim, and has the virtue of being, unlike many other anthologies, reasonably priced.