We regularly intentionally expose ourselves to fictions we take to be likely to elicit in us emotions we generally find unpleasant when prompted by actual states of affairs. This is the so-called “paradox of tragedy”. We contribute to solving the paradox of tragedy by denying that, when fiction-directed, most of these emotions are in themselves unpleasant. We first provide strong evidence that these emotions, such as fear, sadness, or pity, are often enjoyed when fiction-directed. We then advance an explanation of (...) what makes these fiction-directed emotions often not unpleasant, while their reality-directed counterparts are generally so. In the last section, we advance an explanation of what makes fiction-directed emotions often enjoyable, and argue that a complete solution to the paradox of tragedy should be pluralist. (shrink)

Theories of knowledge as credit for true belief, or as cognitive achievement, have to face the following objection: in the famous Barn façades case, it seems that the truth of Barney's belief that he is in front of a barn is to be explained by the correct functioning of his cognitive capacities, although we are reluctant to say that he knows he is in front of a barn. Duncan Pritchard concludes from this that a safety clause, irreducible to the conditions (...) a true belief must satisfy in order to be credited to the believer, constitutes a necessary condition of knowledge. Because those who define knowledge as a cognitive achievement have not convincingly answered this objection, I intend, in the first section of this paper, to refute it by showing how practical and doxastic achievements differ. Then I defend the idea that we should also distinguish two kinds of environmental epistemic luck, and, correlatively, two kinds of safety, that are not equally incompatible with knowledge. Finally, I argue that this distinction is inevitably vague and I indicate some consequences of this vagueness for our knowledge‐intuitions. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of non-religious faith. I start by summarising several well-known arguments that belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. I then try to identify the nature of the positive cognitive attitude towards p that is involved in having faith that p. After dismissing some candidates for the role, I explore the idea that faith and hope are similar attitudes. On this basis, I then advance a (...) new characterisation of faith. Finally, I turn to the question of the rationality of faith. I argue that faith is intrinsically irrational because it is an intrinsically incoherent propositional attitude, but that there is nonetheless a sense in which faith is neither intrinsically epistemically irrational nor intrinsically practically irrational. (shrink)

We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard's answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. I (...) do so by showing that mere true beliefs have no epistemic value at all. I sketch the consequences of this point concerning the epistemic value of knowledge, and answer some objections to the thesis that mere true beliefs do not possess epistemic value. (shrink)

My main intention in this article is to settle the question whether having the ability to \ is, as Ryleans think, necessary for knowing how to \, and to determine the kind of role played by procedural knowledge in knowing how to \ and in acquiring and possessing the ability to \. I shall argue, in a seemingly anti-Rylean fashion, that when it comes to know-hows that are ordinarily categorised as physical skills, or—to be, for the moment, philosophically neutral—as enabling (...) one to possess such skills, it is necessary to have procedural knowledge of how to \ in order to possess those know-hows. However, I shall contend that this knowledge cannot be acquired without acquiring the kind of ability to \ in which having the skill to \ consists. And that having acquired the ability to \ is not only necessary but also sufficient for having acquired procedural knowledge of how to succeed in \-ing. (shrink)

When one tries to determine what the iconic dimension of thought consists in for Peirce and what its range is, one might have the impression that his remarks on this matter are inconsistent. For instance, on the one hand he writes the following: Remember it is by icons only that we really reason, and abstract statements are valueless in reasoning except so far as they aid us to construct diagrams. The sectaries of the opinion I am combating seem, on the (...) contrary, to suppose that reasoning is performed with abstract "judgments," and that an icon is of use only as enabling me to frame abstract statements as premisses. In an apparently similar fashion, Peirce argues that the predicate of a... (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce holds some views about science and inquiry whose exact significance and ratio essendi are notoriously hard to grasp. One of these is particularly intriguing, namely, his frequently inferring from the intuitive ideas that science consists “in diligent inquiry into truth for truth’s sake”, and that the greatest threat to science is to “block the way of inquiry”, the conclusions that “belief […] has no place in science” and that the “scientific man”, when inquiring, has only “provisional” opinions. (...) In this article, I examine the ground and validity of the infamous and, arguably, strongly counterintuitive thesis that “belief has... (shrink)

For F. P. Ramsey, “there is no separate problem of truth,” but, rather, substantive problems about the nature of belief and judgment and the place and function of truth in these propositional attitudes. In this paper, I expound and defend an important but largely overlooked aspect of Ramsey’s view of belief and inquiry: his thesis that truth does not intervene at all in one’s ordinary beliefs, nor in one’s ordinarily inquiring into—in the sense of wondering, or reflecting on—whether or not (...) something obtains. More specifically, I show that this thesis can solve a particularly perplexing problem that Davidson helped to bring into focus: that of explaining how it is possible for one to inquire into any empirical issue, and to form any empirical beliefs, if one takes truth to be objective. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

Uniformism is the view that one and the same epistemology should apply for all modal knowledge. I argue that, whether or not all modal knowledge can be accounted for in terms of knowledge of essences, uniformism about knowledge of essences is untenable. I do this by showing that, while some essences are empirically discoverable, others are not. I then argue that the uniquely realisable–non-uniquely realisable distinction is a better metaphysical candidate for grounding this epistemic difference than the concrete–abstract distinction. I (...) conclude by suggesting that the task of philosophy is to identify non-empirically discoverable essences. (shrink)

Répondre à la question de savoir comment comprendre un être dépourvu de langage implique de savoir quels types d’attitudes intentionnelles, et avec quels contenus, il est possible de lui attribuer. On examinera ici trois réponses « différentialistes » à cette dernière question, d’après lesquelles une différence de catégorie ou de nature sépare, s’agissant de ces attitudes et de leurs contenus, les êtres pourvus de langage, tels les humains, et ceux qui en sont dépourvus, tels les animaux. On discutera en particulier (...) du plus solide des arguments de Donald Davidson en faveur d’un différentialisme fort : l’argument de l’indétermination, d’après lequel de notre incapacité à attribuer un contenu déterminé à toute croyance animale supposée il suit qu’il ne faudrait pas attribuer aux animaux la moindre croyance. En s’appuyant sur les analyses wittgensteiniennes de Peter Hacker, on rejettera l’une des trois prémisses de cet argument tout en défendant les deux autres, ce qui conduira à avancer un différentialisme modéré. (shrink)

There clearly seems to be something problematic with certain forms of epistemic dependence. However, it has proved surprisingly difficult to articulate what this problem is exactly. My aim in this paper is to make clear when it is problematic to rely on others or on artefacts and technologies that are external to us for the acquisition and maintenance of our beliefs, and why. In order to do so, I focus on the neuromedia thought experiment. After having rejected different ways in (...) which one might want to capture the intuition in question, I argue that this device deprives us of understanding and therefore of the most valuable epistemic good. I then address the question of whether the moral of the story is that we should not develop, be equipped with, or use devices such as the neuromedia. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la connaissance? Que pouvons-nous connaître? Et comment connaissons-nous? Ces questions philosophiques classiques relèvent de l'épistémologie, qui excède largement l'histoire philosophique des sciences à laquelle elle se trouve trop souvent réduite. Attentif aux enseignements des sciences de la cognition comme aux exigences normatives de la connaissance, le présent volume introduit aux questions les plus débattues de l'épistémologie contemporaine de façon nouvelle et accessible. Ses chapitres ont été rédigés par une nouvelle génération de philosophes francophones dont les recherches s'inscrivent résolument (...) dans les débats internationaux les plus vifs. Que connaissons-nous grâce à nos sens? Quelle confiance accorder à la perception? A la mémoire? Au témoignage? Raisonner nous permet-il d'élargir le domaine de nos connaissances? Est-il possible d'étendre nos capacités cognitives? L'art et les émotions sont-ils des outils de connaissance à part entière? La connaissance de soi est-elle d'un genre particulier? Que pourrions-nous savoir de Dieu? Qu'est-il possible de connaître a priori? A quelles conditions nos jugements sont-ils justifiés? Y a-t-il des normes de la croyance et de l'enquête? Telles sont les questions épistémologiques fondamentales auxquelles ce livre est consacré. (shrink)

Les textes réunis dans ce volume traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi que de la justification et des modalités de la croyance. Une clarification des notions de raison et de justification permet notamment d’affronter de manière renouvelée les défis du scepticisme. L’épistémologie y est ainsi présentée dans toute son extension, de l’analyse du concept de connaissance aux conditions sociales de la (...) mise en œuvre et du progrès de la connaissance, en passant par l’examen de sa signification en esthétique, métaphysique et anthropologie, comme de ses rapports avec l’action et la communication. (shrink)

I outline and criticise the received interpretation of the controversy between Clifford and James over the ethics of belief. I defend Clifford’s view by arguing that his maxim ‘that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’ should be understood as stating that any belief that results from the corruption of one’s judgement by one’s desires is wrong. I indicate what follows about religious beliefs in particular.

The pragmatist epistemologist is supposed to defend the idea that there is no pure epistemic activity and, thereby, that the way we form our beliefs does not have to be assessed according to aims, or norms that rest on the illusory denial of the pragmatic encroachment of any inquiry. According to the pragmatist, the kind of epistemic purism that is widely endorsed in contemporary epistemology has in fact no other raison d’être than the doxastic puritanism that appears in W. K. (...) Clifford’s ethical principle. But a belief being defective has in fact nothing to do neither with the kind of practical factors that pragmatism so conceived, considers as relevant nor with the rules or values that epistemic puritanism reveres. Between believing that P and believing that E establishes that P, there is no such thing as the distance there is between practical reasons to φ and φ-ing. The position I defend is closer to Peirce’s pragmatism than to any other pragmatist approach. Among other things, it explains why C. S. Peirce’s thesis that: 1) The “real man of science” does not give any weight to practical stakes in his inquiries not only goes hand in hand with the thesis that 2) He never believes of any hypothesis that it is true, but also with the thesis that 3) The inquiry to which such a man devotes is infinite. Peirce is right from an epistemic point of view to praise men, whose life is devoted to the disinterested search for truth. (shrink)

Imagine you are an agnostic who wants to maximise your chances of getting the right answer to the question whether God exists. I show that theism and atheism are not on an epistemic par with one another because, under certain possible epistemically neutral conditions, the rational thing for you to do from a purely epistemic point of view would be to bet on the atheist’s judgement that God doesn’t exist rather than on the theist’s judgement that God does exist.

It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct‐making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is (...) believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p. (shrink)

Grâce à une célèbre expérience de pensée impliquant un choix à effectuer entre deux paquets de cartes, Peirce estime avoir avancé un argument concluant en faveur de la thèse de l’enracinement social de la logique. Puisque cet argument repose sur une conception fréquentiste des probabilités, il va s’agir d’interroger cette conception et de se demander s’il est possible de défendre l’idée qu’il est rationnel pour un individu de fonder ses actions sur des estimations de probabilités sans avoir à endosser la (...) thèse peircienne de l’enracinement social de la logique. Après avoir souligné la réalité du problème soulevé par Peirce grâce à cette expérience de pensée et montré que le fréquentisme ne peut le résoudre, on se demandera si une conception propensionniste des probabilités pourrait y parvenir. (shrink)

Le pragmatisme semble etre devenu la chose du monde la mieux partagee. A la fois revolution philosophique et rehabilitation du sens commun, il est en tout cas difficile aujourd'hui de se declarer anti-pragmatiste sans apparaitre vouloir defendre une forme depassee de ratiocination scolastique. Cet etat de fait necessite qu'une reponse claire soit apportee a la question Qu'est-ce que le pragmatisme?. La these qui se trouve defendue dans cet ouvrage est que le coeur, a la fois historique et conceptuel, du pragmatisme (...) consiste dans une theorie de la rationalite epistemique dont suit une theorie de la verite et, plus particulierement, de son role dans la croyance et l'enquete. Le commentaire du texte de Peirce permet d'aborder la question de la nature du faillibilisme et de la maniere dont l'enquete scientifique doit etre regulee. (shrink)

How is it possible for deontic evaluations of beliefs to be appropriate if we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs? Gaultier argues that we should reject the claim that we can have indirect control over beliefs in virtue of the basic voluntary control we have over our actions. We have another kind of indirect control over beliefs: we can demonstrate doxastic strength or, on the contrary, doxastic weakness when forming our beliefs. That is, we can resist or, on (...) the contrary, fail to resist the influence of some of our conative attitudes. And in the same way that we take our actions to be open to blame when they result from having demonstrated weakness of will even though this does not consist in doing something at will, we take our beliefs to be open to blame and hence subject to deontic evaluation, when they result from having demonstrated doxastic weakness even though this does not consist in doing something at will. (shrink)

According to Timothy Williamson, philosophy is not a mere conceptual investigation and does not involve a specific cognitive ability, different in nature from those involved in acquiring scientific or ordinary knowledge of the world. The author holds that Williamson does not succeed in explaining how it is possible for us to acquire, through thought experiments, the type of knowledge that, according to him, philosophy predominantly aims to acquire—namely, knowledge of metaphysical modality. More specifically, the author considers in detail Russell’s stopped (...) clock and Locke’s prince and the cobbler thought experiments, and argues that Williamson has not shown how the kind of thought experiment of which they are instances, and which is typically encountered in philosophy, can be the instrument of knowledge of metaphysical modality that he takes this kind of thought experiment to be. More positively, the author advances that the modal conclusions of such thought experiments are drawn through conceptual investigation. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain tendencies that are part of the dispositional profile of the doxastic state one is in on a given issue. I conclude by saying a few words about (...) the reasons for which this effort can be made, and by answering in the negative the question of whether all the attitudes that can be characterized as attitudes of committed neutrality are of the same type. (shrink)