What I call in this paper “the sociality of subjectivity thesis” lies at the very center of what is now called “Continental philosophy”. According to this thesis, the subject is necessarily socially constituted. In other words, it is not the case that there are first some isolated subjects, who then get into relation with each other; rather, the subjects from the beginning are formed through their interrelation. The first philosopher who systematically argued for this thesis is Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In (...) this paper, I reconstruct Fichte’s argument, as it appears in his 1796 Foundations of Natural Right. The central idea of this reconstruction is the following: for Fichte, the subject can regard herself as the genuine author of her actions, only when she presupposes that there are other subjects who can ascribe those actions to her. That is, the activity of self-ascription, which constitutes the subject, is only possible with the presupposition that there are other subjects. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Marx was not primarily concerned with the question of poverty. Rather, Marx’s main object of critique is the relations of power inherent in capitalism. According to Marx, poverty is the end result of the structural processes that are constituted by relations of power. After explicating the coercion, domination, and exploitation inherent in capitalism, the chapter discusses the status and the different layers of the non-working poor in Marx’s theory, what he calls “the industrial reserve army”. The (...) chapter concludes by comparing Marx’s conception of poverty with that of liberal political philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

Recent attempts to revitalize Hegel's social and political philosophy have tended to be doubly constrained: firstly, by their focus on Hegel's Philosophy of Right; and secondly, by their broadly liberal interpretive framework. Challenging that trend, Arash Abazari shows that the locus of Hegel's genuine critical social theory is to be sought in his ontology – specifically in the 'logic of essence' of the Science of Logic. Mobilizing ideas from Marx and Adorno, Abazari unveils the hidden critical import of Hegel's logic. (...) He argues that social domination in capitalism obtains by virtue of the illusion of equality and freedom; shows how relations of opposition underlie the seeming pluralism in capitalism; and elaborates on the deepest ground of domination, i.e. the totality of capitalist social relations. Overall, his book demonstrates that Hegel's logic can and should be read politically. (shrink)

Axel Honneth reconstructs Hegel’s social and political philosophy on the basis of the concept of recognition. For Honneth, recognition is a constitutive relation between individuals that is in principle symmetrical. By conceiving recognition through symmetry, Honneth effectively bans the inclusion of power within recognitive relation. He thus regards the relations of power as cases of non-recognition or misrecognition. In this paper, I develop an alternative theory of the constitutive relation between individuals for Hegel, one that is based on the asymmetrical (...) relation of power. To this aim, I focus on the chapter of “determinations of reflection” in the Science of Logic. Through a close analysis of Hegel’s Logic, I argue that the most fundamental form of relation between individuals is the relation of opposition, that individuals are solely constituted in and through the relation of opposition, and that the relation of opposition is essentially asymmetrical. Together, these claims establish... (shrink)

Broadly speaking, two views of modernity are prevalent in contemporary debates. According to the first view, i.e. “modernization theory,” there is one single form of modernity, which is tantamount to liberal, capitalist modernity. The West has already and fully achieved modernity; non-Western societies have lagged behind and must simply catch up with the West. In contrast, according to the second view, “post-colonial theory,” there is no such thing as modernity. What the West erroneously calls “modernity” is nothing but a highly (...) parochial way of thought, and of economic and political organization, that developed by accident first in the West and then by the exercise of military violence or economic power was subsequently “universalized.” In this chapter, I argue that Hegel, read properly, provides a third conception of modernity, one which, contrary to the modernization theory, respects differences between societies, and yet, contrary to post-colonial theory, does not engage in dividing the human species into fundamentally different or incommensurate groups. I argue that Hegel’s theory of modernity must be sought at the conjunction of the Science of Logic (specifically the logic of the Concept) and the Philosophy of Right. I then elaborate on Hegel’s theory of modernity, thus construed. (shrink)

I am much indebted to Jacob McNulty, Allegra de Laurentiis and Tony Smith for their generous attention to my book and their insightful remarks. Since I could not possibly do justice to all their concerns, I have unfortunately had to be selective. The issues discussed in this response are organized thematically. In the first section, I discuss why Hegel's logic of essence has to be understood historically; which is to say that the logic of essence provides an ontology that is (...) specific to capitalism. Then, in the second section, I discuss the nature of holism in the logic of essence, and correspondingly, the nature of social holism specific to capitalism. Finally, in the third section, I answer the question: if both Marx's critique of political economy and Hegel's own economic theory in the Philosophy of Right are based on the same logic of essence, why they are so divergent from, and indeed incompatible with, each other. (shrink)

While the relation between embodiment and intersubjectivity is often remarked upon in the literature on Fichte, it is not sufficiently acknowledged that for Fichte the two are strongly interdependent. In this paper, by elaborating on his account of the fine structure of the embodied agency, I argue that for Fichte one's relation to one's own body is socially constituted. Further, I show that the usual stricture in the literature, according to which Fichte does not allow for bodily passivity, is misleading. (...) Indeed, as I argue, Fichte's account of embodied agency is sufficiently nuanced as to be able to explain “passive bodily expressions,” that is, those bodily expressions that are not under direct control of the agent. And related to that, contrary to the commonly held view, Fichte does offer a satisfactory account of the more sentient bodily phenomena, such as pain, hunger, and fatigue, which happen to the agent without her being capable of controlling their happening. Indeed, as I will show, for Fichte, these latter phenomena, rather than being simply restrictive of agency, may positively contribute to the exercise of agency. (shrink)

In this paper, I demonstrate that the category of Schein in Hegel’s Science of Logic expresses the structure of ideology in general, and specifically the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. To this aim, I motivate Marx’s mature critique of political economy in Capital and the Grundrisse. I argue that while the semblance of equality is false and misleading, it is constitutive of the essence of capitalism. This implies that domination in capitalism does not exclude equality, but requires it. (...) In particular, I argue that the structure of domination generates equality as its own necessary moment. The paper shows, on the one hand, how a close study of Hegel’s Logic is helpful for understanding the structure of capitalism, and on the other hand, how reading Hegel’s Logic through Marx can help in unveiling its social import. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 2, March 2020, Page 415-417.

Volume 28, Issue 2, March 2020, Page 415-417.