We will focus on the theory of complete concept in the philosophy of Leib-niz. We will not emphasise the epistemological aspects, but rather will concentrate on the metaphysical implications of this theory. Some questions requiring an answer will be: are there two individual substances of the same kind? What is the nature of a substance that is only possible? What kind of notion has the unactualised possible? What is the nature of the relationship between individual substance and the complete no-tion? (...) In order to answer these questions, we will present in the first part of the paper the concept of individual substance, in the second part, we will focus on the problem whether the possible objects have or have not a complete concept, and in the third part we will give some additional arguments to support our answer. (shrink)

Leibniz sustains three arguments for spontaneity: the argument from the complete notion, the argument from substantial forms and the argument from monadicspontaneity. In order to see the nature of spontaneity and whether the spontaneity is an inferior value with respect to freedom, as it appears in the Theodicy, inthe first part of the paper I will present spontaneity in connection with the theory of complete notion; in the second part, spontaneity and substantial forms; in the third part, spontaneity of monads; (...) then I will finish with a more general view about spontaneity and freedom. (shrink)

L’une de très importants idées sur l’idéalisme transcendantale kantien vise les notions qui sont impliquées dans cette démarche philosophique: l’espace, le temps et la réalité. On a ici le motive pour lequel nous nous proposons de presenter les relations entre l’existence et la réalité, d’une partie, et l’actualité et la réalité, d’autre partie, dans le conditions que la plupart des traductions de Kant usent dans un mode indistincte les termes “réalité ” et “actualité”.