Though largely neglected by philosophers, the concept of ineffability is integral to the Christian mystical tradition, and has been part of almost every philosophical discussion of religious experience since the early twentieth century. After a brief introduction, this article surveys the most important discussions of divine ineffability, observing that the literature presents two mutually reinforcing obstacles to a coherent account of the concept, creating the impression that philosophical reflection on the subject had reached an impasse. The article (...) goes on to survey some more recent work, which draws on the conceptual resources of existential phenomenology, pragmatism, and the later Wittgenstein. It shows that this work has made possible a new philosophical account of divine ineffability that surmounts the obstacles, overcomes the impasse and makes divine ineffability, once again, a live option in philosophy of religion. The article concludes with some brief remarks on how this alternative approach reflects recent trends in the discipline as a whole and has the potential to make a valuable contribution to live research questions in epistemology of religion. (shrink)

Abstract.A type of subtlety for Pκλ called “strongly subtle” is introduced to show almost ineffability is consistencywise stronger than Shelah property. The following are also shown: is strongly subtle” has rather strong consequences. (ii) The ideal is not strongly subtle} is not λ-saturated, and completely ineffable ideal is not precipitous. (iii) In case that λ<κ=2λ, almost λ-ineffability coincides with λ-ineffability. (iv) It is not provable that κ is λ<κ-ineffable whenever κ is λ-ineffable.

The subtle, almost ineffable, and ineffable cardinals were introduced in an unpublished 1971 manuscript of R. Jensen and K. Kunen. The concepts were extended to that of k-subtle, k-almost ineffable, and k-ineffable cardinals in 1975 by J. Baumgartner. In this paper we give a self contained treatment of the basic facts about this level of the large cardinal hierarchy, which were established by J. Baumgartner. In particular, we give a proof that the k-subtle, k-almost ineffable, and k-ineffable (...) cardinals define three properly intertwined hierarchies with the same limit, lying strictly above “total indescribability” and strictly below “arrowing ω”. The innovation here is presented in Section 2, where we take a distinctly minimalist approach. Here the subtle cardinal hierarchy is characterized by very elementary properties that do not mention closed unbounded or stationary sets. This development culminates in a characterization of the hierarchy by means of a striking universal second-order property of linear orderings. (shrink)

This paper develops the idea, articulated by Martin Buber among others, that a religious sense cannot be identified independently of sensory and practical engagement with the world of ordinary experience. It begins by rejecting the ‘doxastic’ model’ on which religiousness is equated with propositional belief. Criticisms, however, are made of some attempts to soften the contrast between belief and practice. The religious sense, which need not be a theistic one, is understood in terms of a sense of the mystery or (...) ineffability of things – one that has become occluded in modernity. This sense, in turn, is understood in terms of how it may be cultivated and exemplified in and through practices. This claim is elaborated by considering the East Asian notion of ‘Ways’ – practices, like ‘The Way of Tea’, that aim at self-cultivation and spiritual enlightenment. Gardening, in particular, has been regarded as an exemplary Way through which a sense of mystery is cultivated and shaped. The paper concludes by proposing that, when engaged in appropriately and mindfully, almost any ordinary practice may both reflect and confirm an attunement to a mystery that is diffused over the world at large. (shrink)

Imagine coming across an alternative community such that, while they have normative terms like 'ought' with the same action-guiding roles and relationships to each other, their normative terms come to pick out different properties. When we come across such a community, or even just imagine it, those of us who strive to be moral and rational want to ask something like the following: Further Question: Which set of concepts ought we use—theirs or ours? The problem, first raised by Eklund, is (...) that on almost any metasemantic theory, Further Question cannot be stated in a way that captures the spirit of what we want to ask. This is because any way of asking the question makes use of our own normative concepts, and thus their reference is already fixed on the properties that our current normative concepts refer to. Any purported solution to this problem must meet two conditions. First, it must capture the spirit of what Further Question is intuitively attempting to ask. Second, it must reframe the inquiry in a way that makes the answer neither trivial nor ineffable. In this paper, I propose a solution to this problem by appeal to edenic representation, inspired by, but not identical to, Chalmers’ notion of edenic content. The rough idea here is that representation is edenic to the extent that the representational vehicle mirrors, in quality and structure, the represented property. I argue that a reframing of Further Question in terms of edenic representation can capture the spirit of the question, without collapsing it into a question with a trivial or ineffable answer. Thus, the realist about normative properties can face the problem of the alternative normative community head on, without collapsing into incoherence or triviality. If correct, this solution is of further interest to any metanormative realist concerned with metasemantic questions, because it can tell us more about how the proper representation of the robustly normative would look. (shrink)

The question how to turn the principles implicitly governing the concept of truth into an explicit definition of the concept hence coalesced with the question how to get a finite grip on the infinity of T-sentences. Tarski's famous and ingenious move was to introduce a new concept, satisfaction, which could be, on the one hand, recursively defined, and which, on the other hand, straightforwardly yielded an explication of truth. A surprising 'by-product' of Tarski's effort to bring truth under control was (...) the breathtaking finding that truth is in a precisely defined sense ineffable, that no non trivial language can contain a truth-predicate which would be adequate for the very 4 language. This implied that truth proved itself to be strangely 'language-dependent': we can have a concept of truth-in-L for any language L, but we cannot have a concept of truth applicable to every language. In a sense, this means, as Quine put it, that truth belongs to "transcendental metaphysics", and Tarski's 'scientific' investigations seem to lead us back towards a surprising proximity of some more traditional philosophical views on truth. 3. TARSKI'S THEORY AS A PARADIGM So far Tarski himself. Subsequent philosophers then had to find out what his considerations of the concept of truth really mean and what are their consequences; and this now seems to be an almost interminable task. (shrink)

¿Cómo conceptualizar la temporalidad? ¿Qué analítica puede inteligir su carácter inefable? ¿Dónde reside la potencia heurística capaz de dar cuenta de la experimentación de su multiplicidad? Este artículo intentará poner en valor las herramientas elaboradas por la filosofía modal de V. Jankélévitch, a fines de contribuir a la tarea de arquitecturar una "episteme de la intuición" del tiempo presente. Si antes de Bergson la experiencia del tiempo había quedado ligada a la fijación de un concepto, Jankélévitch, proseguirá el trabajo de (...) su maestro, poniendo en foco el dominio disímil de "las maneras" en las que el tiempo se vivencia subjetivamente y se experimenta con-otros. Para ello, creará nociones capaces de indagar cualitativamente un dominio complejo, fugaz e irreversible, surcado por experiencias diversas, singulares, intransferibles. Así, la sutil elaboración efectuada por Jankélévitch en las nociones del "Yo-no-sé-qué" y el "Casi-nada", devendrá aquí la puerta de entrada a este mundo en movimiento, constituido por saberes que se producen siempre de modo fragmentario, "semi-gnosis" como caracterizará Jankélévitch, visto que atienden a una intelección "intuitiva" de la temporalidad, cuya capacidad heurística sobre nuestros modos de producción de la subjetividad sin duda puede sumar un aporte a las perspectivas de la filosofía contemporánea. How to conceptualize temporality? Which analytics can understand its ineffable character? Where does the heuristic strength capable of accounting an experimentation of its multiplicity lie? The aim of this article is to bring in value the tools developed by the modal philosophy of V. Jankélévitch, in order to contribute to the task of building an architecture for an "episteme of intuition" of present time. If before Bergson the experience of time had been linked to the setting of a concept, Jankélévitch will continue the work of his master, putting in focus the dissimilar domain of "ways" in which the time is subjectively lived and experienced with-others. To affront this challenge, he will propose notions capable to qualitatively inquire a complex domain, fugacious and irreversible, marked by diverse experiences, unique, non-transferable ones. Thus, the subtle elaboration made by Jankélévitch on the notions of "I-don't-know-what" and the "Almost-nothing", will become here the entrance gate to this moving world, constituted by a production of knowledge that always occurs in a fragmentary way, "semi-gnosis" as Jankélévitch's would characterize, as it serves to an "intuitive" intellection of temporality, whose heuristic capability on our modes of production of subjectivity can definitely contribute to the perspectives of the contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Rightly or, wrongly I am going to take it that the doctrine of simple qualities says three things. First, that yellow, for example, is a simple unanalyzable quality. I don’t really believe this to be true, except in what it denies, but I have no immediate quarrel with it. Second, a simple quality, such as yellow, is what it is quite independently of its pattern of exemplification. Third, yellow is somehow ineffable, the sheer dazzling yellowishness of yellow things cannot be (...) conveyed in words. In the third case, I do not mean the commonplace that words are different from things, that the word ‘yellow’ is not itself yellow. I mean the view that there is something about color qualities as immediately apprehended by us that eludes description. Now all these views are somewhat old-fashioned. The third is hardly mentioned nowadays. Yet I am not so sure that we are not still very much in their grip. In any case, philosophical hemlil)eS oscillate almost as frequently as do those of high fashion so it should not surprise anyone if these views were to come back into vogue, especially if phenomenology becomes important in this country. Now it may be more a matter of convenience than of historical accuracy that I am lumping these three doctrines together as “the doctrine of simple qualities”. Perhaps “doctrine of atomistic qualities” would be better. I am reasonably certain that the second and third doctrines mutually entail each other, although it has to be conceded that the situation is fairly complicated. I shall have something to say about the third doctrine–the doctrine of ineffability, but I shall be mostly concerned to refute the second doctrine–the doctrine that the identity of a quality is independent of its extension–and to put something else in its place. I shall be concerned incidentally to examine certain puzzling statements like ‘Red is a color’, ‘Red is between orange and purple’ and ‘Whatever is green is extended’, which seem to be necessary but don’t seem to be analytic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cogito Interruptus:The Epistolary Body in the Elisabeth-Descartes Correspondence, June 22, 1645-November 3, 1645Kyoo LeeCogito interruptus is typical of those who see the world inhabited by symbols and symptoms. Like someone who, for example, points to the little box of matches, stares hard into your eyes, and says, "You see, there are seven...," then gives you a meaningful look, waiting for you to perceive the meaning concealed in that unmistakable (...) sign.Cogito interruptus is also typical of those who see the world inhabited not by symbols but by symptoms: indubitable signs of something that is neither here below nor up above, but that sooner or later will happen....Cogito interruptus is not a great prophetic, poetic, psychological technique. Only that it is ineffable. And it takes real faith in cogito interruptus—and a wish that readers understand me—for me to venture to speak of it, no matter what.—Umberto Eco, "Cogito Interruptus," Travels in HyperrealityIntroduction: Back to the Letters ThemselvesWhile looking through the private letters that the philosopher M. René Descartes (1596-1650) exchanged with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) for the last seven years (1643-1650) of his life, I was fascinated [End Page 173] by the discussion of experiences of inconveniences, just small everyday interruptions that get in the way of the life of the so-called mind. They conversed and debated on matters ranging from metaphysical conundrums to psychosomatic troubles, on issues both extremely metaphysical and physical, ultimately impersonal and personal, all at once, such as pain; including other people's pain and especially other people as a pain. We are hardly short of such troubles in our own lives. The philosophical genius of Elisabeth, called by some "the first Cartesian" (Zedler 1989, 41), a title Descartes himself would not have deserved as he confesses but would have given her unreservedly (AT VI 325/CSM I 190-2), detects a fatal irony of an insulated and disciplined subjectivity.My concern in this paper is to keep alive Descartes's "mind-body problem" especially as a feminist issue. I am interested in reanimating that classical problem somehow otherwise. Here, I am hearing the voice of an unhappy and restless character, Elisabeth "la Grècque" (Nye 1999, 8), the autodidact who, embarrassed and curious, always has a question for the knowledgeable one, especially on that problem that mattered to her most. For some reason that becomes vitally important as we will see, the lady philosopher keeps reporting to the bearded one, without being asked to, how and how many times her act of letter writing has been interrupted by those around her who want every piece of her: "more than seven" at one point (Elisabeth to Descartes, Sept. 30, 1645, AT IV 303; Nye 1999, 64).From the early stage of correspondence that began in May 1643 and ended in December 1649 with Descartes's death, and specifically between June 22, 1645, and November 3, 1645, on which my analysis focuses, Elisabeth highlights, over and over again, this particular issue of sociomaterial obstacles and somatic disruptions in life. The young princess is constantly drawing and keeping the old philosopher's attention to the lived and living body; Descartes is relentlessly reminded of the blind spot in his carefully constructed house of the cogito, the mental foundation of selfhood. Consequently, almost precisely on November 3, 1645, just a year after publishing Principles of Philosophy (1644) where the key idea, floated between the two letter writers, on the obscure but "substantial" union of the mind and the body had already begun to surface, Descartes set out to pen the Passions of the Soul (1649) as a way of explicating answers to and for Elisabeth; she had been forcing him to think seriously and serially about the role of passions in the complementarily interactive relation between the mind and the body and, more significantly, the debilitating disrelations or dissonances between the two at times of psychosomatic troubles.What engages my attention here is the contextual porosity of epistolary cogitation: the bidirectional, transferential dance of the textured soul, in search of its truth. Call it an aesthetic phenomenology of correspondence; a [End Page 174] co... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Contrasting Images of the BuddhaTaitetsu UnnoAll the Christian writers express a deep and sympathetic appreciation for the historical Sakyamuni Buddha, demonstrating some of the positive fruits of interreligious dialogue. But—speaking as a practicing Buddhist—their views appear to be focused on the human face of the Buddha and scant attention is paid to what might be called the numinous. It is this dimension of his enlightenment experience that constitutes his (...) very being and the reason for his appeal far beyond the borders of India. This sense of the sacred, the transhistorical, inspired the great civilizations of Asia and today attracts worldwide attention to the Buddhist path of liberation and freedom.Terry Muck makes an ironic allusion to the respective lives of the Buddha and of the Christ. He states that “Official Christian dogma teaches that Jesus was divine, a part of the Trinity, three gods in one: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Buddhist teachings dogmatize a different understanding of the Buddha—that he was human through and through,” but a reversal occurs in later history: “The popular Buddhist [End Page 133] approach to the Buddha tends to produce a ‘godlike’ Buddha in a religious tradition that insists on his humanity, and the popular Christian approach to Jesus tends to produce a very human Jesus in a religious tradition that insists on Jesus’ divinity. It is almost as if the populace has decided to emphasize what the buddhologians and theologians have decreed secondary. The evidence for this reversal is everywhere” (Muck, p. 107).This may be a valid observation, but the truth of the matter might not be so simple. That is, both religious figures may combine the practical and the spiritual in different, complex ways and, depending on the historical lens, a person may see one aspect and not the other. At any rate, in this paper I wish to note that Sakyamuni Buddha is more than simply “human, through and through.”Rudolph Otto was the first to use “numinous” as a religious category to describe Christian and Hindu experience, but it also can be applied to the Buddhist case. This is so if we subscribe to one of its basic characteristics: the quality of the inexpressible—“in the sense that it completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts.” 1 In Buddhist literature we have an abundance of words suggesting this fact: the unconditioned, formless, ineffable, inconceivable, unthinkable, unattainable, indefinable, immeasurable, and so on.In order to understand the numinous fully, Otto writes that a person “must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his own mind, until he reaches the point at which ‘the numinous’ in him perforce begins to stir, to start into life and into consciousness.” 2 He continues: “The arising of the numinous from beyond discursive consciousness is central to the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. This point has been overlooked and has caused misunderstanding, as noted by John Ross Carter: ‘One is told repeatedly that one has to work out one’s own salvation—this is treated as a corollary to there being no savior or savior god. This has been pounded into the English-reading audience to such an extent that one has failed to discern what Theravada Buddhism has long known—one does not work out one’s own salvation or liberation or release.’” 3In the Theravada classic, Visudhimagga, the ultimate awakening does not result from human calculation. According to Mahinda Palihawadana, it comes from the “arising of magga.” Magga is the “path” in the eightfold scheme (ariya attahangika magga), but it has a further connotation: “the moment of spiritual change as well as the event and the content of the mind at the moment.” 4 He sums up this process by enumerating the fourfold goal of Theravada life. The first three are well known—sila, samadhi, and lokiya panna. There is also the fourth, which is crucial but often overlooked: supramundane or lokuttara panna. The first three are preliminaries to the fourth realization: “Personal effort is only the ‘setting’ for the realization of the highest religious truth, that the highest realization can take place only when effort ceases to be... (shrink)

Although Aristotle attributes to metaphor - as an instrument that makes poetic imitation possible to the highest degree - an important function, he does not arrive at the conclusion that the essence of poetics is the metaphor. This is due, on the one hand, to the almost total identification of the poem with the tragedy, showing little interest in what we consider lyric poetry; on the other hand, for the little attention given to religious poetry. If the Stagirite had (...) analyzed these genres, he would have discovered that both have in common the attempt to express the ineffable. Metaphor is the privileged tool to talk about something that we can not conceptualize, because it is partially unknown to us - subjectivity - or because this reality (the divine) transcends all kinds of sensible experience. Hence, the metaphor becomes not only an analogical knowledge of sensible reality, but also communication of ineffable realities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Pluralism ConferenceJohn HickIn September 2003 a conference was held at Birmingham University, UK, of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs who all hold the "pluralist" view that no one religion is the one and only true or uniquely salvific faith, but that, in the words of the thirteenth-century Sufi thinker Rumi, "The lamps are different but the Light is the same: it comes from beyond." The conveners were (...) Professors Perry Schmidt-Leukel of Glasgow University, Paul Knitter of Xavier University (Cincinnati), Leonard Swidler of Temple University (Philadelphia), and John Hick of Birmingham University. My own account of the purpose of the conference is that we are academics who are committed and practicing believers within but not official representatives of (in rough order of origin) the Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, Christian (both Catholic and Protestant), Muslim, and Sikh faiths.We are acutely aware that throughout history almost all human conflicts have been validated and intensified by a religious sanction. God has been claimed to be on both sides of every war. This has been possible because each of the great world faiths has either assumed or asserted its own unique superiority as the one and only true faith and path to the highest good—in familiar Christian terms, to salvation. These exclusive claims to absolute truth have exacerbated the division of the human community into rival groups, and have repeatedly been invoked in support of oppression, slavery, conquest, and exploitation.The second half of twentieth century saw both a worldwide development of interreligious dialogue, coinciding with considerable east-to-west migration, and also a strong contrary growth of aggressive fundamentalism in powerful elements within each tradition. But dialogue has led to a much greater mutual knowledge and appreciation between the world faiths, so that it is now possible for leaders of the religious institutions to meet in mutual amity and respect. However they still, for the most part, retain as their bottom line a conviction of the unique centrality and priority of their own tradition. Sharing in this way the same fundamental conviction as their militant fundamentalist elements, they lack any principled ground on which to oppose them.We offer for discussion, as the fruit of our deliberations, a step beyond this unstable situation. We note that the world religions share the basic belief in a higher reality, of limitless importance to us, that transcends the material universe and yet can [End Page 253] be encountered through the depth of our own being. They also share the basic belief that this present life is not the entirety of human existence but part of a much larger life. And they share the central values of love, compassion, and justice within the human community here on earth.We note that the deepest thinkers within each tradition express a profound sense of mystery, insisting that the ultimate reality to which their faith is oriented lies in its fullness beyond the range of our comprehension. We humans can describe it, not as it is in itself, but as great revelatory moments have caused it to be variously conceived and experienced within the different ways of being human that are the great cultures of the world. The religions, then, are different and unique totalities, each with its own founding events, paradigmatic figures, sacred writings, remembered history, spiritual practices, intellectual formulations, distinctive ethos, and institutional forms. We believe that they are different responses to the universal presence of the ineffable ultimate reality.Although individual conversions between the faiths have always occurred, in the vast majority of cases religious believers are born into and are formed by a particular tradition. It therefore fits them and they fit it, so that it is for them the right and true religion. We should therefore each normally stay within our inherited tradition, using its spiritual resources to the fullest. We must also, however, recognize that the same principle holds for the hundreds of millions who have been born into and formed by other traditions. We should see those religions as independently authentic and valid, of equal value with our own, welcoming mutual enrichment from one another's traditions and also allowing for the raising of critical questions about... (shrink)

Karl Jaspers explicitly claims the title of philosophy of ‘existence’, in the special sense of an illumination of the self-conscious being of a unique man facing the problem of transcending his individual, historic situation by real, personal choice even at the risk of teetering on the razor-edge of irrationality. With a wide range of medical and psychological knowledge and a deep philosophical interest he formulates the most systematic analysis of contemporary Existentialism, although paradoxically he denies the possibility of any universal (...) or objective science of being which is radically individual, contingent and ineffable in itself. Though individual human analysis has its limits, it is not a mere psychology but an active engagement of personal choice, which resists all attempt to absorb it in a complete rational scheme or science. The non-rational ‘encompasses’ every category of being, therefore, and philosophy must suffer light from the classic exceptions, particularly Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Of course classic intellectualism has always recognised that reality is never exhausted by any conceptual analysis, but Jaspers pushes this inadequacy almost into an opposition. Hence the methodological difficulty of exposition is multiplied in his case by a doctrinal impossibility of systematic science as opposed to developing self-consciousness. (shrink)