Herman Cappelen w książce Fixing language (2018) zaproponował projekt w ramach inżynierii pojęciowej, w myśl którego to, co rewidujemy w pojęciach, to ich intensja i ekstensja. Podjął on polemikę z koncepcjami w inżynierii pojęciowej, zgodnie z którymi przy rewizji odwołujemy się do funkcji i celów. W pierwszej części artykułu opisuję wspomnianą dyskusję. W realizacji tego zamiaru korzystam z odwołań do artykułu Amie Thomasson „A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work” (2020). Następnie podejmuję próbę obrony stanowisk odwołujących się przy rewizji pojęciowej (...) do funkcji i celów. W tym celu odnoszę się do artykułu Michaela Prinzinga „The Revisionist’s Rubic: Conceptual Engineering and Discontinuity Objection” (2018). W drugiej części artykułu opisuję metodę eksplikacji jako jedną z metod, za której pomocą dokonuje się rewizji pojęciowej. Zwracam uwagę na eksplikacje stosowaną przez Quine’a, który proponuje skupić się przy eksplikacji na funkcjach, jakie pełnią pojęcia. (shrink)

Jednym z podstawowych problemów występujących w badaniach świadomości ekologicznej młodzieży jest poznanie stopnia jej znajomości istotnych zagadnień związanych z tematyką ekologiczną, różnorodnych źródeł tej wiedzy oraz wiarygodności tych źródeł pozyskiwania wiedzy. Wiedza ekologiczna bywa utożsamiana z intelektualno-poznawczym parametrem kultury ekologicznej. Nie musi ona bezpośrednio odzwierciedlać się w zachowaniach ekologicznych młodzieży. Niewątpliwie jednak jest niezbędna do tego, by zmieniać jej postawy społeczne wobec środowiska. Młodzież stanowi ponad 1/3 ludności świata, lecz jej wiedza dotycząca związków między człowiekiem a środowiskiem jest (...) niedokładna lub niewystarczająca. Dlatego edukacja środowiska i jego racjonalne kształtowanie są ze sobą w ścisłej zależności. Bez wiedzy ekologicznej i nawyków trudno zrozumieć postawy młodzieży wobec środowiska. Proces wychowania i nauczania środowiskowego odnosić się musi jednak do diagnozy tych obszarów wiedzy i niewiedzy ekologicznej młodzieży, które należy kształtować w kierunku zmian określonych założeniami ekorozwoju. (shrink)

Vast transformations in the conditions of human life and the growth of scientific knowledge call for large-scale reconstruction in morality. This is the historical context for the contemporary problem of the relation between empirical knowledge and ethics. The present paper examines the metaethical aspects of this problem. It is argued that the sharp isolation of ethics from empirical science, representing a philosophical convergence of Kantian, phenomenological and positivist theses, should be seen as a distinctive intellectual program in the 20th century (...) ethics and not as an established theory; that this program has by now had its trial and failed, both on the conceptual and the empirical side; that the program rests on a psychology now abandoned in the progress of science. It is suggested that an opposing integrative program which relates empirical knowledge and ethics is more likely to succeed, that it is better grounded psychologically and stands a better chance of a helping deal with the practical problems of morality in the contemporary world. These several theses are explored in outline, with some indication of the way conceptual frameworks in ethics are to be justified in the long run. (shrink)

The article aims to present the results of empirical research and theoretical analyses concerning the transfer, co-creation, and utilization of scientific knowledge by various entities, emerging at the intersection of science and practice. The research was conducted using survey techniques and in-depth interviews among scientists engaged in research collaboration with entities outside the university, and through case studies of two institutions acting as external partners. Among them were the Lublin City Office and the Lublin Culture Workshops, a municipal cultural institution. (...) The work falls within the realm of social research, which directly (Zerubavel 1997) or indirectly (Sange 1990, Douglas 2011) addresses the functioning and adaptation of various social systems (in this case, institutions and organizations) from the perspective of the communicatively mediated cognitive processes occurring within them (Luhmann 2018, Weick 1995, Lenartowicz et al. 2016a, 2016b). In this context, the subject of cognition and the user of knowledge is not an individual human, but a social system/organization with the capacity to observe itself and its environment, to learn, and to anticipate its future (Hecker 2012; Walsh 1995, Luhmann 2018; Seidl 2006, Lant, Shapira 2001). It posits the existence of a kind of supra-individual rationality, which does not require something like a system's unique self-consciousness, akin to human consciousness, but operates on the principle of L. Fleck's thought collectives, which are emergent in nature with respect to individuals (Sady 2020, Luhmann 1990, Fleck 1986). The rationality of such collectives is defined by their belonging to a functional area of society, hence they differ in the case of entities belonging to the science, economy, politics systems, etc. The research focused on situations where, due to the need for knowledge, various organizations collaborate with scientific units. This research succeeded in characterizing the main stages of establishing and implementing such collaboration, and the main requirements associated with them. The study sought to determine the impact of the interaction of different rationalities on the nature of the co-created knowledge and to identify the conditions of its usefulness, both for external entities and for the scientific system. The adopted indicator of the usefulness of knowledge for the scientific system is the publication of results in scientific journals, while for external entities, its impact on the decision-making process, such as changing operational strategies. In this case, the mechanism of translating knowledge into changes in organizational practices was also examined, paying attention to the existing mechanisms of collective learning within the organization. (shrink)

Transfer Wiedzy W Ekonomii I Zarządzaniu Andrzej Klimczuk Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Morskiej W Gdyni (2011) .

How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge.

Is Divine Knowledge Incompatible with Human Freedom? An Analysis of Some Arguments The problem that divine omniscience or divine foreknowledge makes free will impossible belongs to notoriously difficult to solve. In XX century one of the most important interpretation of this difficulty was provided by Nelson Pike. If God believes infallibly and in advance how Smith will act, this fact about the past excludes out all alternatives for Smith. But libertarian account of free will requires alternatives possibilities, so, it could (...) be argue that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with our free will. This paper carefully criticizes Pike’s argumentation and suggests that because God’s foreknowledge doesn’t eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will and that Pike’s argument and two briefly analyzed standard arguments for fatalism presented by Zagzebski failed. (shrink)

The article is a critical comment on the contemporary condition of the university and the reform of higher education introduced in Poland in 2018. The management culture imposed by the reform, focused on “scientific productivity” and bibliometrics, is in conflict with the university’s ethos of striving for truth and open discussion, constitutive for the community of learners and scientists. The author argues that attachment to these values is not only a matter of tradition, but a special task of the university (...) within the contemporary public sphere, torn by axiological conflicts, and disintegrating into a number of digital “tribes”. The university as an institution developed along with the culture of axiological pluralism and rational doubt, which is supported itself. However, these values cannot be maintained if the academic doxa adopts the assumptions of radical cognitive relativism. “Anti-relativistic cognitive minimum” and the assumption of relative translatability of languages are necessary if the university is to continue to play the socially important function of supporting critical dispositions and intellectual independence. (shrink)

Polski biolog i epistemolog L. Fleck jest twórcą teorii nauki prekursorskiej względem koncepcji Th. Kuhna. Mimo że sam Fleck nie używał nazwy „hermeneutyka”, to jego rozważania noszą wybitnie hermeneutyczny charakter. Dominuje w nich bowiem myślenie w kategoriach rozumienia, akcentowanie interpretacyjnego charakteru ludzkiego odniesienia do rzeczywistości, podkreślanie znaczenia tego, co dany badacz zastaje, co we wspólnocie badaczy obowiązuje oraz samej wspólnoty myślowej, stanowiącej gremium oceniające jego poznawczy wkład. Choć lwowski filozof wyraża to przy pomocy kategorii takich jak styl myślowy oraz myślowy (...) kolektyw, implicite nasuwają się takie hermeneutyczne kategorie, jak przedwiedza, rozumienie i interpretacja, tradycja, przekaz kulturowy, wspólnota komunikacyjna. Odrzucając metafizyczne wypowiedzi o ukrytej istocie rzeczywistości samej w sobie, relatywizując rzeczywistość do różnorodnej wiedzy o niej, Fleck stara się, podobnie jak Heidegger, Gadamer czy Rorty, nie popaść w relatywizm i dowolność. (shrink)

This article is a polemic with the thesis held by J. Bobryk that we will never succeed in giving a unified description of human thinking and physiological processes taking place in human brain. The author rejects this view on the basis of the results achieved by modelling the brain's activities with the help of the theory of chaos. These models treat the brain as an incredibly complex dynamical system in which the order apprears as a result of mutual interactions of (...) big neuron collections. The significant empirical material was gathered, ilustrating chaotic dynamics of the sense of sight, muscles movements, concentration etc. There seems to be no unsurmountable obstacles on the way of creating the unified theory of the brain dynamics and the consciousness. (shrink)

The aim of the article is an analysis of the early works of Jarosław Ładosz, a Polish philosopher and mathematician, who in the 1960s conducted a thorough examination of the most important scientific accomplishments in the field of logic and mathematics from the perspective of Marxist philosophy. Being nowadays assessed as a symbol of dogmatism and orthodoxy in Polish Marxism, Ładosz revised most of the superstitions on the relationship between mathematical logic and dialectics, which have been legitimized in official Marxist (...) philosophy since the times of Marx and Engels, in his early works. Having rejected the claims of some Marxists for the formalization of dialectics, he presented the original concept of dialectics as a methodological tool for studying the sources of logical knowledge. Combining dialectical materialism with Jean Piaget’s epistemology, he formulated an elaborate, original hypothesis of the social construction of logico-mathematical knowledge, while at the same time transcending the subject-object division as-sumed in Marxist dogmatic epistemology. (shrink)

The paper is a part of my research on the history of a concept of intuition and a category of insight in writings of Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). The philosophical discussions make use of many partly or totally different concepts of intuition, and the variety of those concepts is related to many aspects of intuition: a type of “object” that intuition is; the way of grasping of its object by intuition; its epistemic functions, etc. From the metatheoretical (...) point of view I am looking the answer to the question: what type of “objects” (designatum) was denoted in the history by the term intuition and its foreign languages counterparts? When I employ the term designatum of “intuition” I am looking for more general categories for intuition. In classical terms, it is about finding genus proximus for intuition. I distinguish and characterize three basic types of denotation the term intuition: 1) (intuitive) knowing, understood as cognitive acts (for example insight), as something that is not an act, and as process; 2) (intuitive) knowledge, as propositional knowledge (propositions, beliefs) or non-propositional knowledge (knowledge-how or knowledge by acquaintance), and 3) faculty (for example intellect) or ability (disposition) of mind to produce intuitive knowledge. (shrink)

The article addresses the question whether cybernetic simulations of cognitive processes make the study of actual laws of human thinking possible. The article also draws a comparison between the area of social sciences and the area of formal and natural sciences. The Kaziemierz Twardowski's theory of intentionality and his theory of actions and products provide the conceptual framework of the undertaken analysis.