The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...) logically necessary and sufficient conditions for free will, but rather give us answers that agree with our intuitions regarding paradigms of free and unfree decisions. The Irrelevancy reply completed our reply to incompatibilists who continue to object that determinism per se destroys the R-S program. It may be debated whether my autonomy variable account is a satisfactory way to spell out the Irrelevancy reply, but I think that this type of approach suggests the way to vindicating the R-S view from an important type of objection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism and Adolf Meyer’s Functional Understanding of Mental IllnessD. B. Double (bio)KeywordsAdolf Meyer, eclecticism, functionalism, biopsychosocial modelGhaemi’s Commentary and Meyer’s ‘Eclecticism’I am not against humanism. How could anyone be against the humanistic wisdom rooted in the worthy writings of Socrates, Hippocrates, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Osler, and the others listed by Nassir Ghaemi? Psychiatry should recognize the dignity and value of all people. The problem is that it may not (...) always do so, coming from a reductionist paradigm as it so often does.Ghaemi appreciates that Meyer’s compromising attitude meant that he was “unable to inoculate psychiatry from biological dogmatism.” My emphasis is on the challenge of Meyer’s psychobiology to biomedicine. In the same way, Engel’s biopsychosocial model acknowledged the need to neutralize the power of an impersonal and mechanical medicine. Doctors tend to overemphasize physical abnormalities at the expense of dealing with difficult personal issues.At the risk of oversimplification, I am juxtaposing biopsychosocial and biomedical models in psychiatry. Or in other terms, for our modern understanding, I am asserting a neo-Meyerian approach in contrast to neo-Kraepelinianism. Merely restating the Meyerian perspective will not do, because of Meyer’s ‘give and take,’ and his consequent failure to follow through the implication of his position. At least the ethical ramifications of his conceptual framework need to be acknowledged.Neo-Meyerianism also needs to be realized in the context of the reaction to anti-psychiatry. After anti-psychiatry’s attack, our modern understanding of mental illness has tended to be been subsumed into the binary opposition of ‘pro-psychiatry’ and ‘anti-psychiatry.’ But neo-Meyerianism is as much pro-psychiatric as biomedical psychiatry. It is in this sense that biopsychological approaches have been undermined by the biomedical reaction to anti-psychiatry. [End Page 355]I also agree with Ghaemi that there is a way in which the failures of the biopsychosocial model allowed the development of anti-psychiatry. For example, even though Laing quoted favorably from psychologically minded psychiatrists such as Manfred Bleuler, as far as I know he never made any reference to Meyer. There was never a systematic Meyerian theory to which Laing could refer. In fact, Laing wished to move beyond an interpretative understanding to abandon the metaphor of pathology (Double 2006). Perhaps if the biopsychosocial model had been more clearly defined, Laing would not have felt he needed to take this step. Or, at least in doing so, he would have been clearer about where he stood on this issue. When labeling Laing’s views as ‘anti-psychiatry,’ biomedical psychiatry would have had to state more precisely how Laing’s position was anti- rather than pro-psychiatric.My main disagreement with Ghaemi is his view of Meyer as eclectic. Meyer’s willingness to allow ‘anything goes’ in psychiatry meant that he did not oppose or challenge too much the views of those with whom he disagreed. Nonetheless, he did not combine together different sources to create an unintegrated philosophical and conceptual understanding. His theoretical position is internally consistent.Modern American psychiatry studied by participant observation is “of two minds,” in that there is a divided consciousness created between the practices of drug therapy and psychotherapy (Luhrmann 2000). In this sense, it is eclectic because there is no consistent theory that combines the two practice modes. True, psychiatry often claims that the foundation for this mixture is the biopsychosocial model. It asserts that everyday psychiatry is not as purely biomedical as is often maintained because it takes into account psychosocial factors that may precipitate mental disorders. It, therefore, says that it bring together the biological and psychosocial. This compromise avoids the adoption of any one model and was proposed to neutralize the dogmatism engendered by the anti-psychiatry debate (Clare 1980). I agree with Ghaemi that such eclecticism has outlived its usefulness.Where I think Ghaemi is mistaken is that he sees Meyer and Engel as the originators of this eclecticism. I regard the Meyerian approach as more genuinely pragmatic than Ghaemi suggests. Meyer’s dynamic psychology sought an integration of mind and brain as a way of dealing with the philosophical dilemma of the mind–body... (shrink)

Historically, philosophers have tended to see moral responsibility as a matter of having a certain metaphysical status. Strawson shifted the debate by defining responsibility as part of an interpersonal practice, but he did not discuss the relationship between interpersonal relationships and the politics of oppression. His view, in other words, was an example of ideal theory. This article adopts a non‐ideal theoretic framework to explore how ordinary responsibility practices uphold intersecting logics of oppression. It argues that the reactive attitudes (...) class='Hi'>function to police double binds, creating situations of oppression for marginalized groups. (shrink)

In "Philosophical Functionalism" , Andrew Ward claims that my "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism" begs the question against philosophical functionalism by assuming that sensations possess nonrelational characteristics that cannot be explained in functional terms. In this reply I point out that my argument does not claim this, but only the much weaker premise that sensations appear to have such characteristics. I then show how the latter is strong enough to discredit philosophical functionalism.

In the last third of the twentieth century, humanists and social scientists argued that attention to genetics would heighten already‐existing genetic determinism, which in turn would intensify negative social outcomes, especially sexism, racism, ableism, and harshness to criminals. They assumed that laypeople are at risk of becoming genetic essentialists. I will call this the “laypeople are genetic essentialists model.” This model has not accurately predicted psychosocial impacts of findings from genetics research. I will be arguing that the failure of the (...) model can be traced to its inability to recognize the complexity of laypeople’s attitudes; its incorrect theory of how beliefs, attitudes, and discourse function; and its blindness to how academics’ own interests can override the available evidence. More specifically, I suggest that the substantial data about laypeople’s deployment of genetics supports what I will call the “laypeople are strategic essentialists model” better than the “laypeople are genetic essentialists model.” The strategic essentialists model holds that people tend to store multiple categories, including multiple causal forces, that they deploy “strategically” to serve context‐dependent goals. It will be difficult for academics to reorient ourselves to model laypeople as sophisticated strategic essentialists rather than as naïve genetic essentialists. Perhaps a little shift, however, will be of value. (shrink)

The ability to learn sequential contingencies of actions for predicting future outcomes is indispensable for flexible behavior in many daily decision-making contexts. It remains open whether such ability may be enhanced by transcranial direct current stimulation. The present study combined tDCS with functional near-infrared spectroscopy to investigate potential tDCS-induced effects on sequential decision-making and the neural mechanisms underlying such modulations. Offline tDCS and sham stimulation were applied over the left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in young male adults in a (...) double-blind between-subject design using a three-state Markov decision task. The results showed an enhanced dlPFC hemodynamic response during the acquisition of sequential state transitions that is consistent with the findings from a previous functional magnetic resonance imaging study; a tDCS-induced increase of the hemodynamic response in the dlPFC, but without accompanying performance-enhancing effects at the behavioral level; and a greater tDCS-induced upregulation of hemodynamic responses in the delayed reward condition that seems to be associated with faster decision speed. Taken together, these findings provide empirical evidence for fNIRS as a suitable method for investigating hemodynamic correlates of sequential decision-making as well as functional brain correlates underlying tDCS-induced modulation. Future research with larger sample sizes for carrying out subgroup analysis is necessary in order to decipher interindividual differences in tDCS-induced effects on sequential decision-making process at the behavioral and brain levels. (shrink)

We investigate the dynamics of a nonautonomous stochastic SIS epidemic model with nonlinear incidence rate and double epidemic hypothesis. By constructing suitable stochastic Lyapunov functions and using Has’minskii theory, we prove that there exists at least one nontrivial positive periodic solution of the system. Moreover, the sufficient conditions for extinction of the disease are obtained by using the theory of nonautonomous stochastic differential equations. Finally, numerical simulations are utilized to illustrate our theoretical analysis.

The separation-of-powers literature has entertained the possibility of differentiating governmental functions at a conceptual, pre-institutional level, as a way of defining the separation of powers. However, it can be objected that attempts at differentiating functions at this level cannot escape a problem of arbitrariness. In this article, I develop an account of the separation of powers which addresses this problem. On my account, the legislative function is defined by the creation of validity claims, understood as claims making it a (...) matter of normative common-knowledge that such and such normative attitudes hold for the interaction between agents. The executive-judicial function is defined by the specification of rights and other jural positions out of the validity claims. This account of the separation of powers has the double advantage that it works at a conceptual, pre-institutional level, and that it is able to distinguish between the functions in a non-arbitrary manner. In developing this account, I also consider its practical implications. I argue that the conceptual distinction between the legislative and the executive-judicial functions is expressive of rule-of-law values, and that this might render it a sufficient but not necessary condition for the institutional separation of powers. (shrink)

A double delayed hybrid stochastic prey-predator bioeconomic system with Lévy jumps is established and analyzed, where commercial harvesting on prey and environmental stochasticity on population dynamics are considered. Two discrete time delays are utilized to represent the maturation delay of prey and gestation delay of predator, respectively. For a deterministic system, positivity of solutions and uniform persistence of system are discussed. Some sufficient conditions associated with double time delays are derived to discuss asymptotic stability of interior equilibrium. For (...) a stochastic system, existence and uniqueness of a global positive solution are studied. By using the invariant measure theory and singular boundary theory of diffusion process, existence of stochastic Hopf bifurcation and stochastic stability are investigated. By constructing appropriate Lyapunov functions, asymptotic dynamic behavior of the proposed hybrid stochastic system with double time delays and Lévy jumps is discussed. Numerical simulations are provided to show consistency with theoretical analysis. (shrink)

BackgroundFrontal brain dysfunction is a major challenge in neurorehabilitation. Neurofeedback (NF), as an EEG-based brain training method, is currently applied in a wide spectrum of mental health conditions, including traumatic brain injury.ObjectiveThis study aimed to explore the capacity of Infra-Low Frequency Neurofeedback (ILF-NF) to promote the recovery of brain function in patients with frontal brain injury.Materials and methodsTwenty patients hospitalized at a neurorehabilitation clinic in Switzerland with recently acquired, frontal and optionally other brain lesions were randomized to either receive (...) NF or sham-NF. Cognitive improvement was assessed using the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) and the Test of Attentional Performance (TAP) tasks regarding intrinsic alertness, phasic alertness and impulse control.ResultsWith respect to cognitive improvements, there was no significant difference between the two groups after 20 sessions of either NF or sham-NF. However, in a subgroup of patients with predominantly frontal brain lesions, the improvements measured by the FAB and intrinsic alertness were significantly higher in the NF-group.ConclusionThis is the first double-blind controlled study using NF in recovery from brain injury, and thus also the first such study of ILF NF. Although the result of the subgroup has limited significance because of the small number of participants, it accentuates the trend seen in the whole group regarding the FAB and intrinsic alertness (p = 0.068, p = 0.079, respectively). We therefore conclude that NF could be a promising candidate promoting the recoveryfrom frontal brain lesions. Further studies with larger numbers of patients and less lesion heterogeneity are needed to verify the usefulness of NF in the neurorehabilitation of patients with frontal brain injury (NCT02957695 ClinicalTrials.gov). (shrink)

Most philosophers endorse our epistemic practice of evaluating beliefs and methods of inquiry as justified or unjustified, rational or irrational; far fewer, though, think our practice of moral evaluation is viable. I contend that this difference in attitude toward epistemic and moral practice reveals an underlying double standard. I argue that the standards set by influential moral anti-realist arguments are not met by our practices of epistemic justification, and that the adoption of these standards would therefore force us to (...) abandon such things as the distinction between rational and irrational arguments, science and pseudoscience, and the like; hence, these standards are too stringent, and ought not be adopted. In addressing J. L. Mackie's charge that moral properties would have to be queer things in virtue of their "to-be-doneness", I argue that epistemological properties are no less queer, and give a positive account of the connection between moral judgment and moral motivation that avoids the worry. I then turn to Gilbert Harman's argument that moral facts neither figure in the best causal explanations, nor are reducible to causally efficacious facts. I concede this, but argue that the same is true of epistemic and social facts, and that pragmatic reasons justify our continued participation in such discourse. I next address the contention that the constitutive role of emotion in moral discourse renders morality problematically local. I argue that emotion plays no constitutive role in morality, serving only evidential and epistemological functions which entail no incommensurability. Finally, I borrow from recent accounts of normativity to suggest that all normative discourse is of a piece, and that there is no in principle distinction between moral, epistemological, semantic, and other types of normative discourse. This suggests that these sorts of discourse all stand and fall together, and that morality is therefore just as hardy as epistemology and the like. (shrink)

In replying to my article ‘An Error about the Doctrine of Double Effect’, Kaufman claims that the permission given by the four-condition Doctrine for certain mixed actions is merely complementary to an absolute prohibition—which he claims is the DDE's primary function. I point out again that in many cases this makes an appeal to the DDE's fourth condition not merely redundant but incoherent. Furthermore, his claim that I am a utilitarian maximizer, frustrated by a doctrine prohibiting (...) intentional harms, however great the net overall benefit, is based on a misrepresentation. I did not object to a candidate for justification under the DDE being rejected before reaching the fourth condition, only to its being accepted. (shrink)

There seem to be two distinct aspects to the role played by the Interpretant in Peirce’s account of the sign relation. On the one hand, the Interpretant is said to establish the relation between the Sign and Object. That is, the Sign can “stand for” its Object, and thereby actually function as a Sign, only by virtue of its being interpreted as such by an Interpretant. On the other hand, the Interpretant is said to be “determined” by the Sign (...) in such a way that it is thereby mediately determined by the Sign’s Object. How can we understand the relation between these two aspects of the Interpretant? This is the question with which this paper is concerned. I begin by drawing a distinction between what I call the first-order function and second-order function of the Interpretant, and illustrating this distinction using Peirce’s example of comparing the letters p and b in § 9 of the 1867 “On a New List of Categories.” I then show that this same distinction can be discerned in a significant passage in the second section of Peirce’s 1903 “A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic,” as well as in his early definition of the Interpretant in the “New List.” This double function of the Interpretant has been noted in the Peircean literature, specifically by Joseph Ransdell in his 1966 dissertation, and more recently by André De Tienne. However, an important aspect of what I call the second-order function of the Interpretant remains unclarified in Ransdell and De Tienne’s approaches, namely, its relation to the logical operation of hypostatic abstraction. I will show that the Interpretant, in its second-order function, plays a role formally identical in the sign process to the role played by hypostatic abstraction in Peirce’s demonstrations of the Reduction Thesis. This formal identity will afford us with a way of understanding the relation between the two aspects of the Interpretant in terms of hypostatic abstraction. (shrink)

In this paper, a discrete-time dynamic duopoly model, with nonlinear demand and cost functions, is established. The properties of existence and local stability of equilibrium points have been verified and analyzed. The stability conditions are also given with the help of the Jury criterion. With changing of the values of parameters, the system shows some new and interesting phenomena in terms to stability and multistability, such as V-shaped stable structures and different shape basins of attraction of coexisting attractors. The eye-shaped (...) structures appear where the period-doubling and period-halving bifurcations occur. Finally, by utilizing critical curves, the changes in the topological structure of basin of attraction and the reason of “holes” formation are analyzed. As a result, the generation of global bifurcation, such as contact bifurcation or final bifurcation, is usually accompanied by the contact of critical curves and boundary. (shrink)

All sciences have epistemic assumptions, a language for expressing their theories or models, and symbols that reference observables that can be measured. In most sciences the language in which their models are expressed are not the focus of their attention, although the choice of language is often crucial for the model. On the contrary, biosemiotics, by definition, cannot escape focusing on the symbol–matter relationship. Symbol systems first controlled material construction at the origin of life. At this molecular level it is (...) only in the context of open-ended evolvability that symbol–matter systems and their functions can be objectively defined. Symbols are energy-degenerate structures not determined by laws that act locally as special boundary conditions or constraints on law-based energy-dependent matter in living systems. While this partial description holds for all symbol systems, cultural languages are much too complex to be adequately described only at the molecular level. Genetic language and cultural languages have common basic requirements, but there are many significant differences in their structures and functions. (shrink)

Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/.

The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish whether or not (...) arguments involving conditionals are valid. I also demonstrate that the Paradox of Indicative Conditionals does not actually involve a paradox, but instead contains some paralogistic elements that make it appear to be a paradox. The discussion of the paradox in this paper further reveals that the material interpretation of conditionals adversely affects the treatment of disjunctions. -/- Much has been said about these matters in the literature that point in the same direction. However, there seems to be some reluctance against fully complying with the arguments against the truth functional account of conditionals, since many of the alternative accounts rely on the material conditional, or at least on an understanding of the conditional as a function of antecedent and consequent in a similar sense as the material conditional. My argument against truth functionality indicates that it may in general involve similar problems to treat conditionals as such functions, whether one deals with theories of truth, assertability or probability. (shrink)

Early philosophical accounts of explanation mistook the function of boundary conditions for that of contingent facts. I diagnose where this misunderstanding arose and establish that it persists. I...

In recent years, policymakers have begun to problematize how legislation stands in the way of the digitalization of the public sector. We are witnessing the emergence of a new phenomenon, digital-ready legislation, which implies that, whenever possible, new legislation should build on simple rules and unambiguous terminology to reduce the need for professional discretion and allow for the extended use of automated case processing in public-sector organizations. Digital-ready legislation has potentially wide-ranging consequences because it creates the conditions for how public (...) organizations are digitalized. The processes, practices, choices, and responsibilities for drafting digital-ready legislation, however, are not well-described or debated. Digital-ready legislation is a dormant issue. This paper develops the notion of the “double darkness” of digitalization to account for this. Based on a qualitative study, the paper investigates how digital-ready legislation as a sociotechnical arrangement is shaped by policy tools and by a complex, collaborative process where responsibility for legislation is fragmented. It argues that although the policy tools are aimed at making actors responsible for digitalization and creating clarity about the process, actors seem to be reluctant to take on the responsibility for making political decisions related to digitalization. (shrink)

Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/.

It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step (...) of revision. The paper discusses and rejects two solutions within the confines of AGM theory. It then introduces ranking functions (as I prefer to call them now; in the paper they are still called ordinal conditional functions) as the proper (and, I find, still the best) solution of the problem, proves that conditional independence w.r.t. ranking functions satisfies the so-called graphoid axioms, and proposes general rules of belief change (in close analogy to Jeffrey's generalized probabilistic conditionalization) that encompass revision and contraction as conceived in AGM theory. Indeed, the parallel to probability theory is amazing. Probability theory can profit from ranking theory as well since it is also plagued by the problem of iterated belief revision even if probability measures are conceived as Popper measures (see No. 11). Finally, the theory is compared with predecessors which are numerous and impressive, but somehow failed to explain the all-important conditional ranks in the appropriate way. (shrink)

Peirce's example puts another nail in the coffin of the truth-functionality thesis. Conditionals are not truth-functional.

I consider embeddings of one subjunctive conditional in the consequent of another, and argue that (if A then (if B then C)) is not equivalent to (if (A & B) then C ), given the meanings we usually give to the outer and the inner 'if'.

This paper shows that the semantics of shenme ‘what’ in Chinese bare conditionals may exhibit a phenomenon of double quantification. I argue that such double quantification can be nicely accounted for if one adopts Carlson's (1977a, b) semantics of bare plurals and verb meanings as well as the following two assumptions: (i) shenme ‘what’ can be a proform of bare NPs and hence has the same kind of denotation as bare NPs, and (ii) Chinese bare NPs are names (...) of kinds of things. This analysis of Chinese bare conditionals lends support to Carlson's approach to bare plurals despite Wilkinson's (1991) criticisms. I also show that an extension of Heim's (1987) analysis of what as ‘something of kind x’ to Chinese shenme ‘what’ encounters problems when shenme ‘what’ is a shared constituent of a predicate which applies to kinds and another predicate which applies to objects. (shrink)

This paper shows that the semantics of shenme ‘what’ in Chinese bare conditionals may exhibit a phenomenon of double quantification. I argue that such double quantification can be nicely accounted for if one adopts Carlson's (1977a, b) semantics of bare plurals and verb meanings as well as the following two assumptions: (i) shenme ‘what’ can be a proform of bare NPs and hence has the same kind of denotation as bare NPs, and (ii) Chinese bare NPs are names (...) of kinds of things. This analysis of Chinese bare conditionals lends support to Carlson's approach to bare plurals despite Wilkinson's (1991) criticisms. I also show that an extension of Heim's (1987) analysis of what as ‘something of kind x’ to Chinese shenme ‘what’ encounters problems when shenme ‘what’ is a shared constituent of a predicate which applies to kinds and another predicate which applies to objects. (shrink)

Dicer is a key player in microRNA (miRNA) and RNA interference (RNAi) pathways, processing miRNA precursors and doublestranded RNA into ~21-nt-long products ultimately triggering sequence-dependent gene silencing. Although processing of substrates in vertebrate cells occurs in the cytoplasm, there is growing evidence suggesting Dicer is also present and functional in the nucleus. To address this possibility, we searched for a nuclear localization signal (NLS) in human Dicer and identified its C-terminal double-stranded RNA binding domain (dsRBD) as harboring NLS activity. (...) We show that the dsRBD-NLS can mediate nuclear import of a reporter protein via interaction with importins β, 7, and 8. In the context of full-length Dicer, the dsRBD-NLS is masked. However, duplication of the dsRBD localizes the full-length protein to the nucleus. Furthermore, deletion of the N-terminal helicase domain results in partial accumulation of Dicer in the nucleus upon leptomycin B treatment, indicating that CRM1 contributes to nuclear export of Dicer. Finally, we demonstrate that human Dicer has the ability to shuttle between the nucleus and the cytoplasm. We conclude that Dicer is a shuttling protein whose steady-state localization is cytoplasmic. (shrink)

It is argued that we cannot understand the notion of proper functions of artefacts independently of social notions. Functions of artefacts are related to social facts via the use of artefacts. The arguments in this article can be used to improve existing function theories that look to the causal history of artefacts to determine the function. A view that takes the intentions of designers into account to determine the proper function is both natural and often correct, but (...) it is shown that there are exceptions to this. Taking a social constitutive element into account may amend these backwards looking theories. An improved theory may either have a disjunctive form—either the history or collective intentions determine the proper function—or, as is suggested in the article, be in the form of an encompassing account that views the designers’ intentions as social, in so far as they are accepted by the users. Designers have authority, which is a social fact. The views argued for here are applied to two existing theories of artefact functions, a causal historic approach and an action theoretic approach.Keywords: Function; Artefact; Evaluative judgement; Action; Collective intentionality. (shrink)

I am deeply indebted to Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen and Matthew McGrath for their careful, constructive, and penetrating comments on The Unity of Perception and I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my view further.

Alvin Plantinga’s Warrant and Proper Function gives two major definitions of warrant. One states that reliable cognitive faculties aimed at true belief and functioning properly in the right environment are necessary and sufficient for warrant; the other definition only states that they are necessary. The latter definition is the more important one. There are different kinds of knowledge, and justification is necessary for some beliefs to be warranted. Even a belief warranted by proper function can receive a higher (...) degree of warrant by justification. This implies that natural theology has a useful role within the contours of a Plantingian epistemology. (Please note that the pagination here does not match the pagination in the published edition.). (shrink)

I shall present in this article a double negation account of the distinction between causes and background conditions. Such an account will be based on the idea that, unlike causes, background conditions allow for certain effects by way of double prevention. In Section 1 I shall introduce objective and non-objective theories of the causes-background conditions distinction and I shall discuss and reject some non-objective theories. In Section 2 I shall examine some existing objective theories and argue that they (...) need to be supplemented in two relevant respects. In Section 3 I shall present my double negation account. Background conditions will be taken to allow for their effects by acting as early double preventers, late double preventers or effect double preventers. In Section 4 I shall deal with two main problems, i.e., the possibility of interpreting background conditions as purely indirect causes and the introduction of negative entities in my account, and with further issues. (shrink)

We introduce a new and time-efficient memory-encoding paradigm for functional magnetic resonance imaging. This paradigm is optimized for mapping multiple contrasts using a mixed design, using auditory and visual stimuli. We demonstrate that the paradigm evokes robust neuronal activity in typical sensory and memory networks. We were able to detect auditory and visual sensory-specific encoding activities in auditory and visual cortices. Also, we detected stimulus-selective activation in environmental-, voice-, scene-, and face-selective brain regions. A subsequent recognition task allowed the detection (...) of sensory-specific encoding success activity in both auditory and visual cortices, as well as sensory-unspecific positive ESA in the hippocampus. Further, sensory-unspecific negative ESA was observed in the precuneus. Among others, the parallel mixed design enabled sustained and transient activity comparison in contrast to rest blocks. Sustained and transient activations showed great overlap in most sensory brain regions, whereas several regions, typically associated with the default-mode network, showed transient rather than sustained deactivation. We also show that the use of a parallel mixed model had relatively little influence on positive or negative ESA. Together, these results demonstrate a feasible, versatile, and brief memory-encoding task, which includes multiple sensory stimuli to guarantee a comprehensive measurement. This task is especially suitable for large-scale clinical or population studies, which aim to test task-evoked sensory-specific and sensory-unspecific memory-encoding performance as well as broad sensory activity across the life span within a very limited time frame. (shrink)