This article compares two versions of a story about a Tibetan Buddhist monk, Sgra tshad pa Rin chen rnam rgyal, who engages in sexual intercourse with a laywoman. The authors of these two narratives, dating from the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, each provide a different rationale for the monk’s behavior. In the earlier telling, Rin chen rnam rgyal is said to have “eased the suffering” of a “lust-crazed” woman, conducting himself virtuously, as a bodhisattva. In the (...) later telling, the monk is forcibly seduced by his patron and he adheres to a provision found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, which specifies that the usual punishment intended for a Vinaya transgression of sexual intercourse—loss of communion from the order—may be commuted if the act has not been concealed from others. This article focuses on the transformation of the story and proposes that its changes contribute to the author’s wider commentary on strict Vinaya observance as an element of Buddhist monastic exemplarity. (shrink)
Notes based on the Grub paʼi mthaʼ rnam par bźag pa rin po cheʼi ʼphreṅ ba of Dkon-mchog ʼJigs-med-dbaṅ-po on philosophical positions of Buddhism with Hinduism.
The doctrinal position of Ratnākaraśānti is a source of great controversy among modern scholars. As diversified as the modern understanding of Ratnākaraśānti’s doctrinal position is the traditional ways in which the gZhan stong view is defined in Tibet. This paper aims to argue, with special attention paid on his presentation of the three natures, that Ratnākaraśānti defines his own doctrine as Rang bzhin gsum gyi dbu ma / *Trisvabhāva- mādhyamika in his “Core Trilogy”: the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa, and the Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛttimadhyamapratipatsiddhi, (...) demonstrate, by comparing Ratnākaraśānti’s view with that of the orthodox Jo nang authors represented by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyalmtshan and Tāranātha, that Ratnākaraśānti is arguably a gZhan stong pa in its strictest sense, and problematize Brunnhölzl and Sponberg’s classification of different accounts of the three natures in Indian, Tibetan and Chinese sources. (shrink)
It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...) epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)
_The Lamp that Integrates the Practices_ is a systematic and comprehensive exposition of the most advanced yogas of the Esoteric Community Tantra as espoused by the Noble Tradition, an influential school of interpretation within the Mahayoga traditions of Indian Buddhist esoterism. Equal in authority to Nagarjuna's famous Five Stages, Aryadeva's work is perhaps the earliest prose example of the "stages of the mantra path" genre in Sanskrit. Its studied gradualism exerted immense influence on later Indian and Tibetan tradition, and it (...) is widely cited by masters from all four major lineages of Tibetan Buddhism. This volume presents the _Lamp_ in a tri-lingual format: its Sanskrit original critically-edited from recently-identified manuscripts, a critical edition of the eleventh-century Tibetan translation by Rin-chen Bzang-po, and a thoroughly-annotated English translation. Includes an introductory study discussing the history of the Guhyasamaja and its exegetical traditions, surveying the scriptural and commentarial sources of the Noble Tradition, and analyzing in detail the contents of the _Lamp_. Features a detailed, tri-lingual glossary. Published by American Institute of Buddhist Studies. (shrink)
Les études rassemblées dans cet ouvrage sont le fait de philosophes, de théoriciens des arts, d'écrivains et de plasticiens. Les auteurs ont voulu rencontrer Michel Guérin sur les chemins où il conduit sa pensée, et souhaité dialoguer avec lui à partir de leurs propres préoccupations ou présupposés. Michel Guérin s'intéresse au pouvoir des gestes de faire sens de manière intelligible et sensible d'un même tour; c'est ce qui explique sans doute pourquoi l'histoire des idées comme le regard porté sur les (...) ouvres d'art, et la conceptualisation des outils propres à l'aiguiser, ont sous sa plume un air de famille dont on rencontrera les effets dans ce recueil. Les contributions y reflètent l'étendue des domaines vers lesquels la Figurologie de Michel Guérin porte bénéfice, ainsi que la multiplicité des implications théoriques et pratiques de sa pensée transversale. Le chapitre initial regroupe des commentaires et des réponses au projet global du philosophe de générer des espaces par les Figures qu'il construit. Le second réunit différents gestes et coupes de sensibilité effectués par des amis artistes aussi bien que théoriciens, dont les intentions sont avant tout plastiques (différencier, donner rythme, donner forme). Dans la dernière partie, les auteurs tentent diversement de penser l'époque au sens où Michel Guérin l'entend, sur le plan éthique autant que sur les plans historique, esthétique et sociopolitique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)
Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model of (...) knowledge. 5. Intellect and figuring out. 6. Comparing foundational holism with Quine’s holism. 7. Evaluation of Quine’s Philosophy -/- III. Substantive Theory of Truth and Relevant Issues: 1. Outline of Sher’s substantive theory of truth. 2. Criticism of deflationism and treatment of the Liar. 3. Comparing Sher’s substantive theory of truth with Tarski’s theory of truth. -/- IV. A New Philosophy of Logic and Comparison with Other Theories: 1. Foundational account of logic. 2. Standard of logicality, set theory and logic. 3. Psychologism, Hanna’s and Maddy’s conceptions of logic. 4. Quine’s theses about the revisability of logic. -/- V. Epilogue. (shrink)
