Fictionalism is supposed to be motivated, at least in part, by its ability to undermine our ordinary grounds for believing in numbers and other contested entities. Eklund argues that a weaker and less controversial view, which he calls indifferentism, can do the job just as effectively. I will show that whether he’s right about this depends upon how we think about “our ordinary grounds”. If we think about our ordinary grounds as consisting in what people are pre-theoretically inclined to (...) say or believe, then he is exactly right. But if we think about our ordinary grounds as consisting in how things seem, then (contra Eklund) fictionalism does outperform indifferentism. (shrink)

Neo-Republicans claim that Hobbes’s constitutional indifferentism (the view that we have no profound reason to prefer one constitutional form over another) is driven exclusively by a reductive understanding of liberty as non-interference. This paper argues that constitutional indifferentism is grounded in an analysis of the institutional presuppositions of well-functioning government that does not depend on a conception of liberty as mere non-interference. Hence, indifferentism cannot be refuted simply by pointing out that non-domination is a distinctive ideal of (...) freedom. This result does not suffice to defend the strong version of indifferentism put forward by Hobbes. But it does point to an important limitation of neo-republican constitutional theory: Neo-republicanism will amount to a distinctive paradigm of constitutional thought only if it is understood in a way that conflicts with Hobbes’s understanding of the institutional presuppositions of well-functioning government. It is doubtful that we have good reason to embrace neo-republicanism, so understood. (shrink)

In his examination of the concepts of evil and impermanence, entitled “Evil and the Problem of Impermanence in Medieval Japanese Philosophy”, Yujin Nagasawa addresses four responses to the problem of impermanence, arguing that the only satisfactory response to the problem leads to an implication about supernaturalism. As Nagasawa puts it, “the problem of impermanence can be construed as a partial argument for supernaturalism and against naturalism”. In response to Nagasawa, I will take up the challenge of naturalism by trying to (...) deconstruct the arguments against indifferentism in order to reformulate and thus strengthen Nagasawa’s response to the problem of impermanence. I will then turn to the radicalization of this thesis by drawing out implications through a comparison with Dōgen’s thought. (shrink)

In contemporary liberal thought, "tolerance" has come to be redefined as a synonym for ethical neutrality: refusal to judge among competing views of goods and evils. The result of this extreme relativism has been a foundations crisis in law, politics, education, and other areas of social life. In this lucidly written and brilliantly argued volume, J. Budziszewski attempts to reserve the self-destruction of modern liberalism by showing that true tolerance is not only consistent with taking stands about objective goods and (...) evils, but actually requires doing so. Tolerance, falsely understood as ethical neutrality, has the paradoxical effect of crippling policy choice by divesting it of the moral and practical framework on which it depends. By painstakingly and exhaustively dissecting each of the many neutralist arguments, Budziszewski demonstrates that real neutrality is logically impossible. Confronted by alternative views, the neutralist at best obscures his own underlying judgments, and at worst abandons all possible defense against fanatics who oppose both true equality and true tolerance. True Tolerance is both a rigorous critique, and a polemic undertaken in the name of a positive, twenty-first century vision of liberalism. Budziszewsky outlines a view of true tolerance that assumes a relationship with an older liberal tradition and a codependence with other virtues, including humility, mercy, charity, respect, and courtesy. This vision is rooted in historical experience and rational conviction about what is good. In the spirit of liberal and classical theorists of virtue from Aristotle to John Locke to Alasdair MacIntyre, the virtue of true tolerance is much more than a readiness to follow known rules; it includes a developed ability to distinguish good rules from bad, and to choose rightly even where there are no rules or where rules seem to contradict each other. Accessibly written and intended for a wide readership, True Tolerance will be of special interest to political theorists and activists, and to sociologists and philosophers. J. Budziszewski is associate professor of government at the University of Texas in Austin. His books include The Resurrection of Nature: Political theory and the Human Character and The Nearest Coast of Darkness: A Vindication of the Politics of Virtues. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this (...) is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply non-committal – or indifferent – with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances. (shrink)

The murder of six million Jewish men, women, and children during World War II was an act of such barbarity as to constitute one of the central events of our time; yet a list of the major concerns of professional philosophers since 1945 would exclude the Holocaust. This collection of twenty-three essays, most of which were written expressly for this volume, is the first book to focus comprehensively on the profound issues and philosophical significance of the Holocaust.The essays, written for (...) general as well as professional readers, convey an extraordinary range of factual information and philosophical reflection in seeking to identify the haunting meanings of the Holocaust. Among the questions addressed are: How should philosophy approach the Holocaust? What part did the philosophical climate play in allowing Hitlerism its temporary triumph? What is the philosophical climate today and what are its probable cultural effects? Can philosophy help our culture to become a bulwark against future agents of evil? The multiple dimensions of the Holocaust-historical, sociological, psychological, religious, moral, and literary-are collected here for concentrated philosophical interpretations. Author note: Alan Rosenberg is a Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at Queens College of the City University of New York. Gerald E. Myers is Professor of Philosophy at Queens College and CUNY Graduate Center. (shrink)

The disagreement of philosophers is notorious. In this book, Rescher develops a theory that accounts for this conflict and shows how the basis for philosophical disagreement roots in divergent 'cognitive values'-values regarding matters such as importance, centrality, and priority. In light of this analysis, Rescher maintains that, despite this inevitable discord, a skeptical or indifferentist reaction to traditional philosophy is not warranted, seeing that genuine value-conflicts are at issue. He argues that philosophy is an important and worthwhile enterprise, notwithstanding its (...) inability to achieve rationally constrained consensus on the issues. Given the nature of the enterprise, consensus is not a realistic goal, and failure to achieve it is not a defect. Accordingly, Rescher argues against the revisionist views proposed by Richard Rorty and Robert Nozick. His discussions are devoted to providing a clear view of why philosophical problems arise and how philosophers address them. (shrink)

In his unpublished freewill manuscripts, Ralph Cudworth seeks to complete the project that he begins in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) by arguing for an account of human liberty that avoids the opposing poles of necessitarianism and indifferency. I argue that Cudworth’s account rests upon a crucial distinction between the will and the power of freewill. Whereas we necessarily will the greater apparent good, freewill is a more fundamental power by which we endeavour to discern the greater (...) good before willing to pursue it. Cudworth thus opposes necessitarianism by arguing for a libertarian account of freewill while nonetheless rejecting the indifferentist claim that we can will contrary to the greater apparent good. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sozzini’s Ghost: Pierre Bayle and Socinian TolerationBarbara Sher TinsleyPierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary (1686–87), a Huguenot exile’s response to the Revocation of Nantes, established its author as a defender of free conscience for pagans, Muslims, Jews, atheists, Catholics, Protestants, Anabaptists, and Socinians. 1 The virtues of Pagans and Atheists are most fully treated in Bayle’s work on the comet. 2 In this work pagans, Catholics (whom Bayle equated with pagan (...) idolators), and atheists were compared to the advantage of the latter, a conclusion that caused widespread scandal and for which Bayle was obliged by his church to write an apology or clarification found in his Dictionary. 3 In toleration there was no juste milieu. 4 Everyone must act according to conscience no matter how errant. Bayle reiterated a position taken in his criticism of the Jesuit Louis Maimbourg’s History of Calvinism. 5 In it Bayle first enunciated the principle that he noted frightened readers and caused a scandal, namely, that error disguised as truth must be allowed all the privileges of truth, i.e., must be permitted to be believed by those convinced they had found truth. This doctrine of errant conscience was basic to Bayle’s understanding of God and man’s search for Him; and after his death it became basic to concepts of individualism, free [End Page 609] inquiry, free speech, and inalienable rights, concepts which were all made concrete during the Enlightenment. Forcing conscience was wrong. 6Bayle’s lack of partisanship in treating religious history invited criticism from Calvinists in Holland. He wrote to Mr. Pecher, a minister at Emmerick, that in his Dictionary he had avoided passionate prejudice with respect to Jesuits or to any other subject. 7 But had he also avoided an indifference to dogma? Not according to his chief critic who was his erstwhile patron turned enemy, Pierre Jurieu, Pastor of the Reformed church of Rotterdam and theologian in the Ecole Illustre. This school, founded expressly for Bayle and Jurieu by the city council of Rotterdam, 8 allowed Bayle to teach philosophy and history. Since Jurieu thought Bayle “indifferent” to dogma, he believed him to be a covert Socinian or atheist. In 1693 he managed to have Bayle dismissed from his teaching post.Indifference was a concept that started with the ancients, particularly Stoics, Skeptics, and Cynics, who regarded everything except virtue as matters of indifference, a posture with which many of Bayle’s writings, though not all, seemed to agree. In scholastic logic indifferentism meant that things were neither particular nor universal but indifferently so according to the viewpoint from which they were regarded. Jurieu made the charge of indifferentism in 1687. 9 He remarked then of Bayle’s concept of the erring conscience that it was “developed with a view to establishing tolerance and a general indifference of all sects and even of all religions.” 10 Bayle was not indifferent to doctrine. He remained loyal to the Reformed faith, defended orthodoxy, and in a letter to his cousin protested that he was ready to show that his work on comets contained nothing that was contrary to right reason, Scripture, or the Confession of faith of the Reformed Church. 11 Paul Dibon noted that Bayle was especially consistent in his concern for divine transcendance rather than indifference. 12 Henry Kamen wrote that Bayle wrote in “complete theological indifference,” 13 a statement ignoring Bayle’s disapproval of much theological heterodoxy, the orthodoxy of others. While Bayle was usually non-partisan, he was never indifferent. Kamen’s remark contrasts [End Page 610] with Theodore Rabb’s, who wrote that Jean Bodin and Bayle took their stand on “the equality of all beliefs” 14 a statement suggesting indifference, but in a positive rather than negative way.Bodin’s own religion was particularly problematic. Tolerant for his age, a whole century before Bayle, Bodin, a Carmelite friar for several years, had already repudiated forcing conscience. In his book on the state he warned that those who do so merely create more intransigence among their already alienated subjects. 15 He also insinuated that a multiplicity of religions—“all the religions of all people”—including natural religion, Jupiter’s... (shrink)

Passed away in the early summer of 2021, Virgilio Mura practiced political philosophy following the method of conceptual analysis, in the wake of the tradition generated by neo-empiricism and far from “analytical philosophy” that become dominant in the last half century. In Mura’s thought, seriousness as rigor in the application of the analytical method is combined with the defence of secularism, expressed in his stance in favour of a form of relativism that should not be confused with indifferentism.

The fact that a society treats equally the different social movements and the opinions which they propound, constitutes the soul of pluralism. Pluralism is characteristic of the Western contemporary world and marks a break from previous societies, notably from those of the Middle Ages. It is certain that pluralism made it possible to overcome the religious, and later the philosophical divisions which have divided Europe since the Renaissance. But it also led to the diffusion of religious indifferentism and to (...) secularisation. The author asks what future is in store for pluralism. For him, it is a question of a method which, supposing certain conditions, makes it possible to establish contact between different social systems; international institutions and the universal religions, Catholicism in particular, have a special responsibility in this matter. (shrink)

In Sept. 1798, eight years after the publication of his three famous critiques, the oíd Kant complains, in a letter to his friend Christian Gane, that he is tortured by a "tantalic pain", because he had not found yet any insight of the "whole of philosophy". The aim of this - study is to "diagnose" this pain and to reveal an efficacious "therapy". It is explicated that Kant's project of an "a priori judging reason" suffers from Ihe unsolvable difficulty of (...) application, caused by the total abstrac tion of empirical contents. ln order to break up this difficulty, the rehabi litation of sentiments seems to be necessary. Thus it becomes possible to comprehend the processua.l wholeness of the kantian critiques: the - mutual relationship of feeling ("Critique of judgement"), thinking ("Critique of pure reason") and willing ("Ctitique of practical reason"). By means of Uds onto-logo-ellzi cal dimension the basic desire of kantian criticism becomes apparent in its positivity: the "renovation of metaphy sics by refutation of scepticism and indifferentism". (shrink)

The aim is to examine Alois Riehl’s contribution to the “culture war” (Kulturkampf) in the second half of the nineteenth century. We show that he used Kant’s autonomy principle to argue against the idea that religious dogmatism is a fundament of morality. We prove this thesis by focusing on the forgotten historical background, which is important for an understanding of Morals und Dogma. Originally this essay was an expert opinion for the court case of the socialist H. Tauschinski who was (...) accused of blasphemy. Tauschinski wrote an article in which he doubted the immortality of the soul and the existence of a personal God. These two dogmas of the Catholic Church were considered bу the Austrian authorities to be the foundations of public order. Riehl questioned not only the charge but also the validity of religious dogmas for morality. Based on Kant’s ethics, he argued for a moral indifferentism of religious dogmas. His career was significantly influenced by this essay, because of its anti-clerical content. During the culture war, Riehl repeatedly had problems with the authorities, especially in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The “Neurath-Haller Thesis” argues that in Austria the appointment of professorships was controlled and monitored by the state, with the goal of installing a philosophy which was beneficial to the interests of the state, and a strong anti-Kantianism in Austrian Philosophy as a consequence. We can agree with this thesis insofar as Riehl in the period of the “Catholic Renaissance” in Austria was not allowed to succeed Ernst Mach. The analysis of Riehl’s arguments allows us furthermore to understand Riehl as a neo-Kantian as early as 1871/1872, which has been questioned by many authors who think the early Riehl was no Kantian. (shrink)

While Epictetus’Diatribaiare not an ethical treatise, but aim chiefly at urging and training pupils to practice philosophy, they can also be used to reconstruct Epictetus’ positions about some of the questions raised within the Stoa after Zeno. This paper focuses on the problem of the contribution of indifferent (external or bodily) things to happiness and of the relationship between virtue and these indifferents. Against scholars claiming that Epictetus shared Aristo of Chios’ heterodox indifferentism, it is shown that Epictetus upholds (...) Chrysippus’ ethical doctrine of thetelosand acknowledges that some indifferents are natural or have ‘value’ (axia) and should not be despised or ignored. In making this point, Epictetus uses the concept of ‘good reasonning’ about value which can be traced back to Diogenes of Seleucia (and Antipater of Tarsus). Moreover, when he describes how we can reach the goal of life through our natural faculties, Epictetus might also borrow Panetius’ explanation of thetelos. (shrink)

Leibniz, in order to avoid both determinism and indifferentism, says that knowledge inclines the agent towards the best action without necessitating it. According to his modal theory, an action is contingent if the opposite is (logically) possible. The article examines the coherence of Leibniz’s notion of «inclining but not necessitating» in the context of contemporary philosophy of action, profiting from the distinction between reasons and causes. The kind of freedom which is possible according to Leibniz philosophy depends on this (...) question. (shrink)

This paper is focused, firstly, on the status of Christianity (as a whole) after a long period of secularization—examining in particular its “protective mechanisms”— and, secondly, on the modern tendencies that are transforming the present into an age of desecularization. The central interest here is the interaction between the civil and Christian values in the context of the two historical periods. The article provides a comparison between the aggressive use of reason during the Enlightenment and postmodern religious indifferentism in (...) an attempt to illuminate the present status of Christianity. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a pervasive “religion as tyranny” view has its roots in a philosophical misunderstanding about human freedom. The established liberal view, which is a kind of “empty Protestantism,” conceives of freedom primarily in negative terms as freedom of choice or amoral autonomy. I argue that this approach, which originates in Puritan theology, leads inevitably to a wide‐ranging indifferentism and that indifferentism is incompatible with Christianity. Christians need to elaborate in response a positive definition (...) of freedom as moral autonomy or good rebellion. Insomuch as religion is an essential aspect of human flourishing, it liberates rather than enslaves the individual. (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva refletir sobre os impactos da globalização econômica na cultura contemporânea. O processo acelerado de transformação da cultura e das relações sociais distingue-se de outros processos de mudança estrutural porque as mudanças no campo da economia desde a década de 1980 provocaram uma grave crise cultural. O que mais caracteriza os novos tempos é a expansão do mercado que se torna omniabrangente e omnipresente, transformando as relações humanas em relações de mercado. Globalização neoliberal e a expansão do (...) mercado se articulam e isso gera profunda crise da cultura. A racionalização produzida pela modernidade reduziu o ser humano e a natureza aos interesses produtivos. A crise na primeira modernidade faz emergir outra redução: a razão substituida pela sensação. Daí caminha-se para um radical individualismo, até ao indiferentismo e a recusa de se buscar um sentido ou significado para a experiência e a vida humana. Essa realidade oferece riscos para o Cristianismo e as religiões. Elas podem ceder à tentação do mercado, à satisfação do desejo, do gozo superegóico, com dupla conseqüência: ou oferecendo uma religião de consumo e da prosperidade econômica, ou o fundamentalismo que leva os fiéis à renunciarem à sua autonomia e se submeterem às lideranças religiosas da “Ordem Simbólica”. Na conclusão o artigo apresenta as mais recentes críticas do cristianismo a essa realidade, retomando o pensamento de João XXIII, Paulo VI e João Paulo II. Palavras-chave : Cristianismo; Globalização; Economia; Cultura Contemporânea, Ensino Social da IgrejaThis article aims to reflect on the impacts of globalization economy in contemporary culture. The accelerated transformation of culture and of social relations differs from other processes of structural changes because change in the field of economy have caused serious cultural crisis since the 1980s. What best characterizes the new era is the expansion of market that has increasingly been “all embracing” and “omnipresent”, thus transforming human relations in market relations. Neoliberal globalization and the expansion of market articulate themselves thus producing a deep crisis of culture. Rationalization produced by modernity has reduced human being and nature to productive interests. Crisis in early modernity brings out another reduction: the one of reason replaced by sensation. In this way one can say that it has emerged a radical individualism and even a kind of indifferentism as well as the refusal to look for a sense or a meaning to the experience and human life. This reality presents some risks to Christianity and religions. They may succumb to the temptation of the market, satisfaction of desire and hiper egoic enjoyment, with double consequence: or by offering a religion based on consumerism and on economic prosperity, or by offering a fundamentalistic perspective that leads believers to renounce their autonomy and submit themselves to the religious leaders of the "Symbolic Order ". This articles ends up by presenting the most recent criticism of Christianity to this reality, returning to the thought of the popes John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II.] Key words : Christianity; Globalizing; Economics; Contemporary culture, Church’s Social Teaching. (shrink)

Franco’s book is meticulous and objective, but it does underline two points. The first is that Oakeshott cannot be portrayed simply as a “conservative”; thus T. S. Eliot was a more typical conservative than Oakeshott, the latter being rather a conservative Whig, in the tradition of Edmund Burke and Sir Robert Peel. The second is that throughout his life, Oakeshott, far from being an agnostic and religious indifferentist, interacted with religious theories and responded to them, even though this is not (...) always visible in his published writings. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to give a general and accessible overview of the so called “post-secular” turn in the contemporary humanities. The main idea behind it is that it constitutes an answer to the crisis of the secular grand narratives of modernity: the Hegelian narrative of the immanent progress of the Spirit, as well as the enlightenmental narrative of universal emancipation. The post-secularist thinkers come in three variations which this essay names as Enlightenmental, Traditional, and Revolutionary. The first (...) camp wishes to reconceptualize the place of religion in the seemingly secularized modern paradigm and see if revelation can cooperate with enlightenment, that is, if it can support the modern emancipatory values in the dangerous moment of their “crisis of legitimation.” The second one emphasizes the need to recover the institutional aspect of Christian theology which must be reinstated once again as the “queen of the sciences,” or as the true “invisible hand” operating behind social theories. And the third party, which simultaneously opposes both, enlightenment and tradition, revolves mostly around the “revolutionary figure” of Saint Paul and constitutes a radically leftist answer to the crisis of Marxism with its scientific insight into the objective laws of history. (shrink)