_The Foundations of Arithmetic_ is undoubtedly the best introduction to Frege's thought; it is here that Frege expounds the central notions of his philosophy, subjecting the views of his predecessors and contemporaries to devastating analysis. The book represents the first philosophically sound discussion of the concept of number in Western civilization. It profoundly influenced developments in the philosophy of mathematics and in general ontology.

Austin takes on the problem of other minds, of how to respond to the question ‘how do you know?’, if this question is raised with regard to the thoughts, feelings, sensations, minds of other creatures. This problem has traditionally been understood as the problem of justifying our belief in the existence of other minds. Austin argues that believing in other persons, in authority and testimony, is an essential part of the act of communicating, and as such is an irreducible part (...) of our experience. While we can state certain advantages of communicative performances, there is no justification for our doing them as such. (shrink)

On the meta-level, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, sometimes regarded as the manifesto of ordinary language philosophy, illustrates Austin’s method of approaching philosophical issues, by patiently analysing the subtleties of ordinary language, by example. On the object level, the key distinction with regard to human actions that appear to be worthy of blame, Austin holds to be between a justification, which denies that the performed action was wrong, and an excuse, which instead denies that the agent was responsible for performing it. (...) Austin gives careful attention to particular cases of exculpatory speech, including precise word order and varying emphasis, etymological studies, and the special function of adverbial qualifying phrases, and shows how legal precedents and abnormal psychology may also be helpful in understanding why some efforts to excuse fail. In the final analysis, excuses are properly seen as setting limits to the ascription of moral responsibility, by stating explicitly how they differ from the more usual cases. (shrink)

Austin attacks the view that language is referential, based on the simplistic division of utterances into the ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’, using his notion of performative utterances. Such utterances, in the appropriate circumstances, are neither descriptive nor evaluative, but count as actions, i.e., create the situation rather than describing or reporting on it. In saying ‘I promise to go’ one is making a promise, not stating that one is making it. A performative promise is not, and does not involve, the statement (...) that one is promising. It is an act of a distinctive sort, the very sort named by the performative verb. And, according to Austin, making explicit what one is doing is not describing what one is doing or stating that one is doing it. (shrink)

Criticises G. E. Moore’s highly influential proposal that ascriptions of agent ability implying freedom of choice or action, what the agent could do, are analyzable as conditional statements regarding what the agent would do under certain circumstances. Austin objects against Moore that some uses of ‘if’ are non-conditional and goes on to examine the uses of these non-conditional cases. Moore’s proposal also lies at the heart of some compatibilist theories of free will and determinism. Austin argues determinism to be a (...) pseudo-problem, so long as it remains a notion that is not itself clear cut. (shrink)

Deals with the question of whether there is a use of ‘is true’ that is the primary or generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying ‘is true’. Austin discusses the views that truth is primarily a property of beliefs and of true statements. He goes on to argue that the word ‘true’ denotes the validity of an intended correspondence between a representation and what it represents, and dismantles confusions about the meaning of the words that underlie (...) such a view, such as ‘fact that’ and ‘corresponds’. (shrink)

‘The Meaning of a Word’ is a polemic against the view that philosophy can be done by way of pinning down the meaning of words used in philosophising. Its argument is threefold: the first part argues that ‘the meaning of a word’ is, in general, if not always, a dangerous nonsensephrase, in the sense that there is no simple and handy appendage of a word called ‘the meaning of “x”’. The second part applies this conclusion to problems that rely on (...) the assumption that phrases like ‘the meaning of a word’ or ‘part of the meaning of the word’ are not completely undefined, proposing that we are using a working-model for philosophical problems which fails to fit the facts that we really wish to talk about. The third part addresses the problem of universals, which, according to Austin, boils down to the question of why we call different things, say two chairs in your living room, by the same name, that is, ‘chair’. Austin examines the phrase ‘having the same meaning’ in order to reveal the different reasons we have for calling different things by the same name. (shrink)

‘Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle’ is a response to an article on the meaning of Agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, published by H. A. Pritchard in 1935. In this paper, Pritchard argued that Aristotle regarded Agathon to mean ‘conducive to our happiness’ and, consequently, that he maintained that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire to become happy. Austin finds fault with this view: first, Agathon in Aristotle does not have a single meaning, and a (...) fortiori not the one Pritchard suggested; secondly, if one had to summarise the meaning of ‘being agathon’ in one phrase, then ‘being desired’ cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides τό άγαθόν. (shrink)

Austin discusses the existence, origin, and resemblance of concepts, primarily by discussing the meaning of ‘concept’ and ‘universal’. He argues that, although sometimes it may not be harmful to talk about concepts, we neither understand the meaning of ‘concept’, nor the meaning of ‘acquiring and possessing concepts’, nor a view of concept resemblance as non-sensuous acquaintance or awareness, challenging philosophers who couch their theories in such terms to illuminating them first.

Addresses Bedford’s attack on appeals to introspection in the identification of emotions, which lead him to raise the question of how to draw the line between genuine and pretended anger. Austin demonstrates, through a close examination of the speech acts of ‘pretending’ and ‘really being’, that none of the supposed conditional relations between these two notions actually holds. The essay further introduces Austin’s distinction between ‘pretending to do’ and ‘pretending to be’ and emphasises the complex and diverse forms speech acts (...) involving ‘pretending’ can take. (shrink)

A reconstruction based on previously unpublished notes, of Austin’s views of the Line and Cave allegories in Plato’s Republic. In these drafts, Austin discusses the prominent issues that arise in the context of Plato’s Line allegory, e.g. the questions of division and continuity, and shows how the different stages in the Cave allegory correspond to individual sections of the Line.

Concerned with the question of whether descriptions of identity, i.e. describing X as Y, amount to the same as statements of identity, i.e. stating that X equals Y. Austin characteristically tackles this question by investigating into the nature of a number of relevant speech acts, such as ‘calling’, ‘describing’, and ‘stating’. He concludes negatively that none of the speech acts discussed can be safely used in philosophy in a general way. However, the construction of models of speech situations reveals their (...) underlying complexity: such models are plainly too complicated to accommodate the standard subject-predicate or class-membership models that a straightforward answer to the question raised in this paper would depend on. (shrink)