My subject is the arguments brought by Ramsey in his paper “ Universals ” ’ against the generally held distinction between particulars and universals. This paper is provocative, suggestive, and radical, and it is humbling to reflect that its author was just 22 years old when it was published in Mind. As so often with Ramsey, the paper is superficially very easy to follow and hardly requires any introduction other than the imperative, “Read it through”, but underneath the surface are (...) many assumptions which make the paper difficult to interpret, and its argument structure is quite tortuous. Whereas the debate between nominalists and realists has been about whether there are just particulars or whether there are universals as well, Ramsey wants to step back behind the debate and question the basis on which it is made. His aims are primarily destructive: he wants to argue that there is no good reason to believe there is such a distinction. He does not offer much in the way of a positive theory of his own to replace those he considers he is demolishing. It is characteristic of Ramsey’s Cambridge perspective that he puts the debate in terms of the way such questions were considered in Cambridge in his day. His terms of comparison hardly extend beyond Cambridge, which in those days was quite a reasonable stance, since Cambridge provided sufficiently many great philosophers with differing theories for extramural excursions to be an unnecessary luxury. Ramsey accordingly focusses on the supposedly different roles of words for particulars and words for universals in atomic propositions, on the assumption that there will be some fairly straightforward kind of isomorphism between at least atomic propositions and the atomic facts to which they correspond if true. The alert reader will notice that he frequently switches between calling Socrates and ‘Socrates’ the subject of the same proposition. (shrink)

Review of Maria Carla Galavotti (ed), Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics, 1991, Bibliopolis. Notes are selected from manuscripts by Frank Plumpton Ramsey at the University of Pittsburgh's Hillman Library.

Part of the obvious revival of pragmatism, at least in Europe is linked with the present success or "boom" of moral philosophy and the increasing tendency to identify the classical pragmatists as a common group of writers who, much better than any philosophers from other traditions, knew how to define scientific inquiry as an inquiry submitted to norms and principels, and realized that "what applies to investigation in general equally applies to ethical investigation ". The paper examines such claims and (...) focuses, in particular on Peirce's arguments against any form of moral rationalism and in favor of a normative conception of rationality, closer to a conception of the possible objectivity of ethics as may appear at first sight. (shrink)

The aim of the text is to evaluate Peirce's evolutionary cosmology and to try to make sense of the mixture of idealistic and naturalistic elements that may be found in it, especially by focusing on Peirce's conception of logical norms and rationality, and on the links that may be drawn between such views and some evolutionary themes in the contemporary debates on norms, belief and knowledge.