Introduit à certains aspects de la pensée de Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), le philosophe américain fondateur du pragmatisme et de la sémiotique, avec, notamment, une analyse des liens que Peirce établit entre la logique (ou sémiotique), la psychologie et la philosophie de la connaissance.

After recalling the progress made in the diagnosis of the post-truth phenomenon, thanks to recent experimental findings (from cognitive and social psychology) and theoretical work (post-truth versus half-lies and propaganda, degrees in epistemic vice and scale of responsibility), we indicate four other ways to improve our awareness of the scope and mechanisms of post-truth: we introduce some qualifications so as to distinguish between a post-truth world and an Orwellian universe, the negative and positive sides of emotions, an utter contempt for (...) facts, and the sharp dichotomy between facts and values, and between science denialism and blind scientism. Finally, objective truth being taken for granted, we make some suggestions for a “way out”: we should be aware of our cognitive biases and of possible sources of manipulation, cultivate our epistemic virtues, and keep evidence as a prior demand. We should also work in a “scientific spirit,” i.e., refuse any compromise with society, morality, or practice so as to ensure freedom of conscience within an academic and democratic “space of reasons.” But even more urgently, we should avoid some still too frequent misunderstandings about truth itself and about knowledge (which we identify), and remember that post-truth is serious because it is a threat to reality itself: hence we should also take care of our metaphysical prejudices and work to find better ways of ensuring metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

While Peirce presented himself as a "scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe", merely adapting the virtues involved in Scotism to the requirements of modern science to erect a plain scientific realistic metaphysics, he was also eager to emphasize that "everybody ought to be a nominalist at first" because such an hypothesis is "simpler than realism" and because "the economy of research prescribes to try the simpler one first, and to continue in that opinion", until one "is driven out of (...) it by the force majeure of irreconciliable facts". Even if, at first, he had been "blinded by nominalistic preconceptions", he also confessed that he had "never been able to think differently on that question of realism" and... (shrink)

For most early pragmatists, including the founder C.S. Peirce and L. Wittgenstein, vagueness was a real and universal principle and not a mere defect of our knowledge or thought. This volume begins by exploring this pragmatist notion of vagueness and the way it was tied to their basic opposition to various kinds of reductionism and nominalism. It then develops towards an analysis of Peirce's original and wide views on vagueness, as seen through the angles of logic, semiotics, epistemology and metaphysics. (...) In the final part of this book, the reader is presented with a case for the contemporary relevance of such a realistic pragmaticism for the ongoing debate on semantic, epistemic and ontic vagueness. (shrink)

The aim of the text is to evaluate Peirce's evolutionary cosmology and to try to make sense of the mixture of idealistic and naturalistic elements that may be found in it, especially by focusing on Peirce's conception of logical norms and rationality, and on the links that may be drawn between such views and some evolutionary themes in the contemporary debates on norms, belief and knowledge.

This symposium contribution discusses some issues of ontology involved in the metaethics of Hilary Putnam's book Ethics without Ontology.

Le pragmatisme est souvent associé au nominalisme. Pourtant, dans l’esprit de son fondateur, C. S. Peirce, le pragmatisme va de pair avec le réalisme. Après avoir examiné les ressorts de ce paradoxe et noté plusieurs points communs aux divers pragmatistes, on présente les grands traits de ce que pourrait être un réalisme pragmatiste bien compris. On suggère qu’un tel réalisme dispositionnel, qui s’inscrit dans une démarche métaphysique et éthique résolue, constitue une voie prometteuse pour qui veut pouvoir donner sens au (...) projet d’une « connaissance » métaphysique et apporter de possibles réponses au cynisme relativiste ambiant. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present some important insights of C. Hookway's pragmatist analysis of knowledge viewed less in the standard way, as justified true belief, than as a dynamic natural and normative question-answer process of inquiry, a reliable and successful agent-based enterprise, consisting in virtuous dispositions explaining how we can be held responsible for our beliefs and investigations. Despite the merits of such an approach, the paper shows that it may be inefficient in accounting for some challenges (...) posed by scepticism or by the nature of epistemic normativity. In which case it might be premature to propose it as a new conception of knowledge against the standard one and worth considering a different, though still pragmatist, strategy, in which inquiry would aim at the fixation of knowledge, still viewed as justified true beliefs, i.e critical commonsensical, warrantedly assertible, intellectual and sentimental dispositions for which the epistemic agent, viewed less as an individual person than as a scientific community of inquirers, should be taken as a knowing and reliable agent, both answerable and responsible for her assertions. (shrink)

Part of the obvious revival of pragmatism, at least in Europe is linked with the present success or "boom" of moral philosophy and the increasing tendency to identify the classical pragmatists as a common group of writers who, much better than any philosophers from other traditions, knew how to define scientific inquiry as an inquiry submitted to norms and principels, and realized that "what applies to investigation in general equally applies to ethical investigation ". The paper examines such claims and (...) focuses, in particular on Peirce's arguments against any form of moral rationalism and in favor of a normative conception of rationality, closer to a conception of the possible objectivity of ethics as may appear at first sight. (shrink)

Peirce's realism is a sophisticated realism inherited from the Avicennian Scotistic tradition, which may be briefly characterized by its opposition to metaphysical realism (Platonism) and various forms of nominalism. In this chapter, I consider how Peirce's realism fits his approach to mathematics, which is often presented as a somewhat incoherent mixture of Platonistic and conceptualistic elements. Without denying these, I claim that Peirce's subtle position not only helps to clear up some of these so-called inconsistencies but offers many insights for (...) contemporary ways of dealing with the mathematical aspects of the problem of universals. (shrink)

Le but de l’article est de proposer de suivre en métaphysique la voie de l’analyse conceptuelle par intuition de cas possibles. Pour une part empirique et a posteriori, reposant sur des intuitions dont elle exploite autant les contradictions que les points communs, avant de les tester dans une perspective faillibiliste, l’analyse conceptuelle comporte aussi une partie a priori qu’elle élabore en recourant à la méthode des cas possibles, permettant ainsi de repenser les liens entre nécessité conceptuelle et nécessité métaphysique. Ainsi (...) entendue, la démarche renoue avec l’inspiration propre à la méthode scotiste des possibles-réels qui fut à l’origine de la constitution de la métaphysique comme science. (shrink)

"La métaphysique de tradition analytique ou continentale est florissante. Elle n'est plus seulement travaillée comme objet de l'histoire de la philosophie, elle est redevenue sujet de l'activité philosophique et productrice d'oeuvres nouvelles - qu'il s'agisse de la tradition dite continentale ou de celle dite analytique. Du côté "continental", hérité de Heidegger, c'est estimer que la métaphysique, en tant qu'enquête rationnelle sur l'être, doit être dépassée au profit d'un questionnement poétique. Du côté analytique, hérité du Cercle de Vienne, et notamment de (...) Carnap, c'est prolonger l'oeuvre de philosophes qui estimaient que la logique symbolique nouvellement façonnée devait permettre d'établir le fait que tous les énoncés métaphysiques étaient dénués de sens. L'apologiste de la science que fut Carnap, tout comme son pourfendeur que fut Heidegger, ont l'un et l'autre convergé sur un même mot d'ordre :"le dépassement de la métaphysique". Ce renouveau actuel est donc d'autant plus étonnant que ces deux courants se réclamaient l'un et l'autre de l'héritage de Kant, lequel récusait déjà la triple ambition de la métaphysique théorique à connaître rationnellement la surnature, les choses en soi et les faits ultimes constituant la nature. Cet ouvrage, qui réunit d'éminents spécialistes de la question, propose ainsi un état des lieux de la réflexion métaphysique contemporaine."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Après avoir dégagé quelques incarnations du rationalisme dont Bouveresse se démarque, j’indique quelques aspects qui ancrent son œuvre dans la tradition de l’Aufklärung (mais en la renouvelant), avant d’insister sur ce qui me semble plus distinctif de ce rationalisme dans lequel parviennent miraculeusement à cohabiter des sources philosophiques, littéraires et scientifiques : Cournot, Vuillemin, Carnap, Peirce, Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege, Sellars, Bolzano, Boltzmann ou Helmholtz, mais aussi Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Husserl, Cavaillès, Canguilhem, les pragmatistes James, Putnam, ou encore des écrivains (...) comme Valéry, T.S. Eliot, et, plus que tout peut-être, Lichtenberg, Kraus et Musil. Puis je me concentre particulièrement sur l’examen de ce rationalisme à l’aune des liens de Bouveresse avec la tradition « analytique », et avec Wittgenstein en particulier. (shrink)

After a few historical reminders about the tense links that have always existed between metaphysics and the sciences, one suggests a few rules of mutual good conduct in order to avoid the ever present risks of scientism and apriorism, before stating the majors issues both metaphyscians and scientists have to face, if they wish to pay attention to some crucial problems surrounding language, knowledge or ethics, and to avoid idealism. Such issues are based on betting on two possibilities : of (...) scientific realism as such, on the one hand, and the possibility, on the other hand, of some scientific metaphysics, capable of telling us, just as well as the sciences, what is true, indeed, of what we think about reality, but also and mostly, of reality as such. (shrink)

À l'heure des fake news et des sciences alternatives, on pourrait facilement croire que tout est relatif. Cet essai voudrait pourtant suggérer le contraire. De nombreux malentendus circulent sur les concepts de vérité, de connaissance ou de réalité, déformés par l'idée-même de post-vérité. En nous proposant de nous méfier de nos préjugés métaphysiques les plus ancrés et d'œuvrer à une authentique connaissance métaphysique, cet essai de philosophie engagée nous invite à nous installer dans un espace académique et démocratique des raisons, (...) seul à même de garantir la liberté de conscience. Il démontre ainsi que les idéaux de vérité et de connaissance constituent moins un rempart ou un déni de la vie qu'ils ne sont les meilleurs alliés de nos idéaux de solidarité et de justice sociale"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce shares with many pragmatists, both classical and contemporary, a certain distrust of metaphysics, the nature and importance of which have been constantly questioned at the turn of the 20th century. It is however him who, after having decried it, claimed the possibility and the necessity of metaphysics. It is shown that this pragmaticist metaphysical project, which emphasizes logic, semiotics, inquiry and science (but without scientism), against the background of a very specific realist approach, is a source of (...) inspiration for any enterprise concerned with responding to the “Integration Challenge”, and thus to think the links between metaphysics and epistemology, an objective which the metaphysician is held to tackle, if he wants to be able to establish the conditions of possibility of a genuine metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of the text is not so much to stress the importance of Peirce's formal contributions to the semantic view in formal logic as to argue that Peirce's semantic trend is part and parcel of his semiotic treatment of a general theory of meaning, understanding, and interpretation, a theory of how signs function which enables him to classify different sorts of signs in a natural way.

For C.S. Peirce, who had a well‐known influence on many aspects of Ramsey's thought, pragmatism was viewed as inseparable from realism. The aim of this paper is to challenge the view according to which Ramsey's reflexions on universals are of a mere linguistic and logical nature. Not only is this view controversial, but it may be argued that some elements in Ramsey's analyses suggest a possibly realist answer to the problem of universals. By drawing comparisons with Peirce's own position, it (...) is suggested that Ramsey's views might not be inconsistent with many aspects of Peirce's scholastic and even Scotistic version of realism. (shrink)

For C.S. Peirce, who had a well‐known influence on many aspects of Ramsey's thought, pragmatism was viewed as inseparable from realism. The aim of this paper is to challenge the view according to which Ramsey's reflexions on universals are of a mere linguistic and logical nature. Not only is this view controversial, but it may be argued that some elements in Ramsey's analyses suggest a possibly realist answer to the problem of universals. By drawing comparisons with Peirce's own position, it (...) is suggested that Ramsey's views might not be inconsistent with many aspects of Peirce's scholastic and even Scotistic version of realism. (shrink)

The aim of the text is to present Peirce's relevance for cognitive science,especially in terms of his views in semiotic, logical machines, and the psychology of iconic reasoning.

The aim of the paper is to try and make one’s ideas clearer about such concepts as “logic,” “psychology,” “mind,” “normativity,” rationality,” as they were conceived by Peirce, in order to elucidate his genuine position as far as the relationship between logic and pychology is concerned, whether he was or was not a straightforward “anti psychologist” in logic, and from such analyses, to make some suggestions about the contemporary relevance of Peirce’s original views on such isues.