Abstract
When we evaluate moral agents, we consider many factors, including whether the agent acted
freely, or under duress or coercion. In turn, moral evaluations have been shown to influence our
(non-moral) evaluations of these same factors. For example, when we judge an agent to have
acted immorally, we are subsequently more likely to judge the agent to have acted freely, not
under force. Here, we investigate the cognitive signatures of this effect in interpersonal
situations, in which one agent (“forcer”) forces another agent (“forcee”) to act either immorally
or morally. The structure of this relationship allowed us to ask questions about both the “forcer”
and the “forcee.” Paradoxically, participants judged that the “forcer” forced the “forcee” to act
immorally (i.e. X forced Y), but that the “forcee” was not forced to act immorally (i.e. Y was not
forced by X). This pattern obtained only for human agents who acted intentionally. Directly
changing participants’ focus from one agent to another (forcer vs. forcee) also changed the target
of moral evaluation and therefore force attributions. The full pattern of judgments may provide a
window into motivated moral reasoning and focusing bias more generally; participants may have
been motivated to attribute greater force to the immoral forcer and greater freedom to the
immoral forcee.