Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness

Abstract

This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement. Furthermore, I argue that given that an act’s deontic status of both moral and non-moral reasons, the consequentialist must adopt dual-ranking act-consequentialism. I then defend dual-ranking act-consequentialism against a number of objections.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-30

Downloads
188 (#108,027)

6 months
24 (#121,471)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references