Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions

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Noûs 41 (4):663–685 (2007)
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Abstract

An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way.

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10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x

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reprint Nichols, Shaun; Knobe, Joshua (2008) "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions". In Knobe, Joshua, Nichols, Shaun, Experimental Philosophy, pp. : Oxford University Press (2008)

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Author Profiles

Shaun Nichols
Cornell University
Joshua Knobe
Yale University

Citations of this work

Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

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References found in this work

A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1963 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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