Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions

Noûs 41 (4):663–685 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,971

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
977 (#8,577)

6 months
29 (#56,151)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?