Much of the philosophical discussion of punishment has focused on its justification. Consequentialists argue that punishment must be justified by its future consequences. Retributivists argue that punishment must be justified by the ill-desert of the one punished. And there are several philosophical positions on the justification of punishment in between these two: for example, weak or teleological retributivism, which justifies particular instances of punishment by both their consequences and the desert of the offenders, and positions which distinguish between the institution (...) of punishment and specific instances of punishment. (shrink)

This book is comprised of essays previously published in Philosophy & Public Affairs and also an extended excerpt from Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars.

In this paper I describe cases of moral blackmail as cases where A is told by B that if A does not commit an otherwise immoral act, B will commit an immoral act of equal or greater gravity. I describe cases of moral dilemma as cases where A must commit an otherwise immoral act to avert a natural disaster of equal or greater gravity. I then argue that cases of moral blackmail are structurally identical to cases of moral dilemma in (...) all respects but one: In cases of moral blackmail, A is predicting the free actions of a moral agent (B), whereas in cases of moral dilemma, A is predicting natural events. I conclude that cases of moral blackmail are more problematic than otherwise similar cases of moral dilemma for this reason alone. (shrink)

This two-volume collection of essays brings together major contemporary theoretical works on freedom of speech. Volume I, begins with a theoretical overview of freedom of speech and then turns to the topics of what justifies freedom of speech and what kinds of acts raise free speech concerns. Volume II, examines the distinctions among content regulations and between content and content-neutral regulations. It also analyses the concept of the public forum, inciting and hateful speech and lastly the tension between the subsidizing (...) activities of the affirmative state and the negative liberty of freedom of speech. (shrink)

John Rawls’ Difference Principle, which requires that primary goods--income, wealth, and opportunities--be distributed so as to maximize the primary goods of the least advantaged class, has both a libertarian and a welfarist interpretation. The welfarist interpretation, which fits somewhat more easily with Rawls’ method for deriving principles of justice--rational contractors choosing principles behind the veil of ignorance--and with Rawls’ contention that there is a natural affirmative duty to aid others and to help establish and maintain just institutions, is the orthodox (...) interpretation. But there is scattered, fragmentary evidence for the libertarian interpretation as well. In this article I examine a recent version of the libertarian interpretation put forward by Jeffrey Reiman and discuss its implications as a standard for justice in cooperative arrangements. (shrink)

In this chapter, I embrace Jeff Goldsworthy’s conclusion that Ronald Dworkin was an originalist regarding the meaning of canonical legal texts. I briefly examine the evidence for that claim, and I ask how its truth affects Dworkin’s fit-acceptability account of the nature of law. In a brief digression, I present a broad-brush view of the jurisprudential debate between legal positivists and natural lawyers. I then explain why the natural law view must fail and why legal positivists must make an unpalatable (...) choice between a gunman model and a model based on deception. Finally, I situate and explain Dworkin’s third-way jurisprudence and its fatal flaws. I conclude by explaining how devastating Dworkin’s originalism is for his third-way jurisprudential view that law consists of those principles that best justify the community’s past and present coercive political decisions. (shrink)