Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": the use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

Social Neuroscience 6 (3):302-315 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind, reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction, and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent's intent. These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,678

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Passing judgment: praise and blame in everyday life.Terri Apter - 2018 - New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Independent Publishers Since 1923.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-26

Downloads
16 (#927,817)

6 months
4 (#1,053,478)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rebecca Saxe
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references