Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination

Kantian Review 21 (2):211-235 (2016)
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Abstract

Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much sharper distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. In the process of explaining these differences, I argue that Kant’s own view is in some respects philosophically superior to Schapiro’s.

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Eric Wilson
Georgia State University

References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality.Eric Watkins - 2005 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3):624-626.

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