Abstract

The aim of this essay is to defend a Humean view of motivation---which I call the Humean view* ---against the Kantian view. The central idea of the Humean* view consists of the following claims. An agent's antecedent desire constitutes a part of the original source of any motivation. There is not pure practical rationality but only instrumental practical rationality. On the other hand, the central idea of the Kantian view consists of the following claims. The original source of certain kinds of motivations such as prudential and moral motivations consists of beliefs alone. There is pure practical rationality. ;The Humean* view can be defended against the Kantian view on the basis of three concepts; direction of fit, conformity to our intuitions, and discardibility. commits Kantians to the idea that beliefs alone can motivate a desire. But beliefs involve a direction of fit which is converse to the direction of fit desires involve. Therefore, Kantians must show how beliefs can motivate a desire in spite of this difference. Humeans* do not shoulder this burden of proof, since implies that any motivated desire is motivated by antecedent desires and beliefs. But makes Humeans* face the problem of how they can explain our intuitions about rationality and authority of prudential and moral motivations. But they can solve it by appealing to our inclination to take intelligibility/unintelligibility to be a matter of rationality/irrationality and our inclination to attach authority to what we would choose if we take an objective point of view. Finally, discardibility gives the Humean* view one more edge. If we can discard a mental state or ability by repeating to try to suppress it whenever it is about to arise, it is discardible. Kantian pure practical rationality is discardible. It is a problem for Kantians how they can explain this. Humeans* can explain this. What Kantians allege to be pure practical rationality is really a complex constituted by instrumental practical rationality, certain desires and beliefs. Since those desires are discardible, what Kantians allege to be pure practical rationality is discardible.