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  1. Bad Habits: The Nature and Origin of Kantian Passions.Eric Entrican Wilson - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (4):371-390.
    According to Kant, passions are a distinct type of inclination. Unlike normal inclinations, however, they are inherently destructive—much like addictions. Recent scholarship on Kant's view has left two important questions unanswered. First, what is the key trouble-making difference between passions and normal inclinations? Second, what mental processes give rise to passions in the first place? My article answers both questions. I argue that passions involve a form of tunnel vision or hyperfocus that corrupts practical reason by hijacking attention. This problem (...)
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  • Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will. TamarSchapiro. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021, 192 pp. ISBN‐13:9780198862932 hb £55.00. [REVIEW]Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1208-1212.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Kant and Stoic Affections.Melissa Merritt - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):329-350.
    I examine the significance of the Stoic theory of pathē for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and nonrational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult human being to (...)
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  • Can we Modify our Pleasures? A New Look at Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable.Erica A. Holberg - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (3):365-388.
    Many of us are all too familiar with the experience of taking pleasure in things we feel we ought not, and of finding it frustratingly hard to bring our pleasures into line with our moral judgements. As a value dualist, Kant draws a sharp contrast between the two sources of practical motivation: pleasure in the agreeable and respect for the moral law. His ethics might thus seem to be an unpromising source for help in thinking about how we can bring (...)
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  • Which Emotions Should Kantians Cultivate (and Which Ones Should they Discipline)?Uri Eran - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):53-76.
    Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose to rational deliberation. Although I read Kant as recommending that we cultivate certain (...)
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  • Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):623-641.
    We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may thereby come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of cases you could not have fully appreciated that value merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to establish that it is valuable. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a (...)
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