Mechanizmy „staczania się” po równi pochyłej

Filozofia Nauki 19 (2) (2011)

The empirical slippery slope arguments are arguments of the following form: if we take a first step A, as a result of a sequence of events, step N will necessarily or very likely follow; N is clearly not acceptable; therefore we must not take step A. Such arguments are often used in the discussions concerning abortion, assisted suicide, human gene therapy, free speech, decriminalizing marijuana, gun control and other ethical or social issues. In this article, I am trying to argue that although slippery slope arguments are not deductive, they need not to be considered as fallacies. There are some mechanisms that make the realization of the scenarios sketched in the slippery slope arguments much more probable than one could think. I analyze three different examples of such mechanisms. The first one originates in the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. The second is connected with the use of precedents. The third mechanism depends on so-called multi-peaked preferences which some people might have when they make their decisions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,464
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Slippery Slope Arguments.Douglas N. Walton - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Arguing Along the Slippery Slope of Human Embryo Research.Jeanne Salmon Freeman - 1996 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21 (1):61-81.
Debunking the Slippery Slope Argument Against Human Germ-Line Gene Therapy.David Resnik - 1994 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (1):23-40.
Human Gene Therapy and the Slippery Slope Argument.Veikko Launis - 2002 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (2):169-179.
Human Gene Therapy and Slippery Slope Arguments.T. McGleenan - 1995 - Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (6):350-355.
Consequentialism and the Slippery Slope: A Response to Clark.Jonathan Hughes - 2000 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):213–220.
Consequentialism, Complacency, and Slippery Slope Arguments.Justin Oakley & Dean Cocking - 2005 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (3):227-239.


Added to PP index

Total views

Recent downloads (6 months)

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes