The plausibility of satisficing and the role of good in ordinary thought

In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press (2004)

Authors
Mark van Roojen
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
Satisficing without thereby maximizing is rational provided that non-consequentialism is rational and provided that the preferred characterization of non-consequentialism is not one in which right action is justified in virtue of maximizing agent-relative value. Rather, the non-consequentialism which can serve to defend satisficing should be one in which the best characterization of certain reasons to act does not involve maximization of value of any sort, whether agent-relative or agent neutral. I argue there are reasons to prefer this sort of non-consequentialism to theories which defend non-consequentialism by construing value as agent-relative. An upshot is that satisficing cannot be well-defended within an overall consequentialist framework.
Keywords satisficing  consequentialism  rational choice  agent neutrality
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How to Think About Satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.

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