1.  69
    What Makes a Good Decision? Robust Satisficing as a Normative Standard of Rational Decision Making.Barry Schwartz, Yakov Ben-Haim & Cliff Dacso - 2011 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41 (2):209-227.
    Most decisions in life involve ambiguity, where probabilities can not be meaningfully specified, as much as they involve probabilistic uncertainty. In such conditions, the aspiration to utility maximization may be self-deceptive. We propose “robust satisficing” as an alternative to utility maximizing as the normative standard for rational decision making in such circumstances. Instead of seeking to maximize the expected value, or utility, of a decision outcome, robust satisficing aims to maximize the robustness to uncertainty of a satisfactory outcome. That is, (...)
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    Convex models of uncertainty: Applications and implications. [REVIEW]Yakov Ben-Haim - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (2):139 - 156.
    Modern engineering has included the basic sciences and their accompanying mathematical theories among its primary tools. The theory of probability is one of the more recent entries into standard engineering practice in various technological disciplines. Probability and statistics serve useful functions in the solution of many engineering problems. However, not all technological manifestations of uncertainty are amenable to probabilistic representation. In this paper we identify the conceptual limitations of probabilistic and related theories as they occur in a wide range of (...)
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  3. Peirce, Haack, and info-gaps.Yakov Ben-Haim - 2007 - In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books.
    Surprise and change are the way of the world. Philosophers have known this at least since Thales, and practical men knew it long before. Variety and the continual flux of one thing into another is, for Peirce, a central notion. A very similar conception underlies the information-gap theory of uncertainty and its application to decisions with severely deficient understanding which I have argued for earlier. For Haack, whose treatment of warrant is strongly non-probabilistic, info-gap theory is a natural context. The (...)
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