Willpower Satisficing

Noûs 53 (2):251-265 (2019)
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Abstract

Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as "good enough". I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as "good enough".

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Richard Y. Chappell
University of Miami

Citations of this work

How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost vs. Difficulty and Restriction.Marcel van Ackeren - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):315-334.
How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents?Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):815-831.
Limitarianism, Institutionalism, and Justice.Brian Berkey - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (5):721-735.
A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification.Raimund Pils - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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