Noûs 53 (2):251-265 (2019)
AbstractSatisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as "good enough". I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as "good enough".
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Citations of this work
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How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents?Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):815-831.
Limitarianism, Institutionalism, and Justice.Brian Berkey - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (5):721-735.
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References found in this work
The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Harvard University Press.
Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.