A new defense of satisficing

In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77--106 (2004)
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Michael Weber
Bowling Green State University

Citations of this work

Can God Satisfice?Klass Kraay - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):399-410.
How to think about satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.
Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?Edmund Henden - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):339-352.
Acting and Satisficing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 31-51.

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