Freedom and Belief

Oxford University Press (1986)

Abstract

On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,879

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
333 (#32,513)

6 months
12 (#63,870)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Similar books and articles

Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology.John R. Searle - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (298):491-514.
Belief and Freedom of Mind.Christopher Hookway - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):195 – 204.
Believing Autonomously.Mark Leon - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Kant on Transcendental Freedom.Derk Pereboom - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):537-567.
The Experience of Freedom.Jean-Luc Nancy - 1993 - Stanford University Press.