Belief and freedom of mind

Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):195 – 204 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There are concepts of freedom of mind and freedom of belief which do not depend on the freedom of agency. After discussing some impediments to such freedom of mind, the paper explores some arguments of Dennett, Michael Smith and Philip Pettit, and Josefa Toribio. Borrowing ideas from Schiller, the paper concludes that such freedom has an emotional or aesthetic dimension

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,026

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-05-07

Downloads
107 (#208,542)

6 months
14 (#220,939)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Hookway
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Inquiry, Questions, and Actions.Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Dialogue 63 (2):339-356.
Enquête, questions et actions.Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Dialogue 63 (2):319-338.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mind and world: with a new introduction.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

View all 19 references / Add more references