Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):195 – 204 (2009)
AbstractThere are concepts of freedom of mind and freedom of belief which do not depend on the freedom of agency. After discussing some impediments to such freedom of mind, the paper explores some arguments of Dennett, Michael Smith and Philip Pettit, and Josefa Toribio. Borrowing ideas from Schiller, the paper concludes that such freedom has an emotional or aesthetic dimension
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Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1984 - MIT Press.