The liar paradox in new clothes

Analysis 72 (2):319-322 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Next SectionCharlie Pelling presents an impropriety paradox for the truth account of assertion. After solving his paradox I show that it is a version of the liar paradox. I then show that for any account of truth there is a strengthened liar-like paradox, and that for any solution to the strengthened liar paradox, there is a parallel solution to each of these “new” paradoxes

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/analys/ans040

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Contextual Approaches to Truth and the Strengthened Liar Paradox.Christine Schurz - 2013 - De Gruyter.
Truth, the Liar, and Tarski's Semantics.Gila Sher - 2006 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 143–163.
Truth Gaps, Truth Gluts, and the Liar Paradox.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - 2020 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 21 (2):241-251.
The Liar Paradox - A Case of Mistaken Truth Attribution.Jasper Doomen - 2023 - Axiomathes 33 (1):1-11.
Unity, truth and the liar: the modern relevance of medieval solutions to the liar paradox.Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) - 2008 - New York: Springer.
Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.
Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-306.
Semantyczna teoria prawdy a antynomie semantyczne [Semantic Theory of Truth vs. Semantic Antinomies].Jakub Pruś - 2021 - Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum 1 (27):341–363.
Liar paradox.Bradley Dowden - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Trouble no more: how non-truth-functionality makes the alethic indeterminacy solution to the Liar Paradox viable.Jay Newhard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-02-21

Downloads
232 (#90,204)

6 months
13 (#220,039)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeff Snapper
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

Add more references