A self-referential paradox for the truth account of assertion

Analysis 71 (4):688-688 (2011)
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10.1093/analys/anr093

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Charlie Pelling
University of Reading (PhD)

Citations of this work

Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
In Defense of the (Moderate) Disunity of Grounding.Jon Erling Litland - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):97-108.

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References found in this work

Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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