“Is every definition persuasive?” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive? To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness (...) lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research. (shrink)

“Is every definition persuasive?” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive? To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness (...) lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and compare two concepts which tend to be treated as synonymous, and to show the difference between them: these are critical thinking and logical culture. Firstly, we try to show that these cannot be considered identical or strictly equivalent: i.e. that the concept of logical culture includes more than just critical thinking skills. Secondly, we try to show that Christian philosophers, when arguing about philosophical matters and teaching philosophy to students, should not (...) focus only on critical thinking skills, but rather also consider logical culture. This, as we argue, may help to improve debate both within and outside of Christian philosophy. (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss a well-known concept from argumentation theory, namely the principle of charity. It will show that this principle, especially in its contemporary version as formulated by Donald Davidson, meets with some serious problems. Since we need the principle of charity in any kind of critical discussion, we propose the way of modifying it according to the presupponendum—the rule written in the sixteenth century by Ignatius Loyola. While also corresponding with pragma-dialectical rules, it also provides additional content. (...) This will be termed the dialectical principle of charity, and it offers a few steps to be performed during an argument in order to make sure that the participants understand each other well and are not deceived by any cognitive bias. The meaning of these results could be of great significance for argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics and the practice of public discourse as it enhances the principle of charity and makes it easier to apply in argumentation. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show how modifications of meaning can influence argumentation. I present the basic concept of so-called ‘semantic argumentation,’ its definition, and its different variants. I analyse the various kinds of argument in which meanings of terms are modified in support of a persuasive goal. The analysis of different semantic arguments reveals certain structures and patterns that are needed to construct a typology of such arguments. I thus outline a basic concept of argumentation based on (...) modifications of meaning, before presenting various examples of such arguments together with an analysis of their structures, and then, finally, constructing a typology for them. (shrink)

Few years ago Krzysztof Czerniawski has published a book „Three Versions of Epistemic Theory of Truth: Dummett, Putnam, Wright”. It drew my attention, for there are many works which are concerned with the philosophical problem of truth, but only few comparative studies between different ideas concerning theory of truth. Author focuses on so-called Epistemic Theory of Truth, which assumes—according to the characteristics of Wolfgang Künne—that being true depends to some extent on our judgement. It is clear that there were far (...) more philosophers, who understood truth in similar way, e. g. Pierce, Brentano, Neurath, however, Czerniawski concentrates on the most recent history of Epistemic Theory of Truth. He also takes no account of philosophy of Habermas and Gadamer, whose ideas on truth can also be classified as „epistemic”, for they are built out of analytical tradition of philosophising. Thus, he chooses Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—three analytical philosophers who significantly contributed to the development of „epistemic” approaches to the problem of truth. (shrink)

Pośród wielu teorii prawdy tę najdłużej i najbardziej eksplorowaną stanowi niewątpliwie jej klasyczne ujęcie. W jego obrębie powstały również, podobne klasycznej, teorie korespondencyjna i semantyczna. Dla wielu filozofów terminy te wydają się synonimiczne, co stanowi rację powstania niniejszego artykułu. Analiza rodzajów związku pomiędzy językiem a światem, które wprowadzają różne teorie uznawane za klasyczne, ma służyć wyeksponowaniu różnic pomiędzy tymi teoriami. Przedstawiona zostaje również propozycja ustanowienia podziału, który w sposób ścisły i prosty usystematyzuje rozumienie klasycznej, korespondencyjnej i semantycznej teorii prawdy.

Few years ago Krzysztof Czerniawski has published a book „Three Versions of Epistemic Theory of Truth: Dummett, Putnam, Wright”. It drew my attention, for there are many works which are concerned with the philosophical problem of truth, but only few comparative studies between different ideas concerning theory of truth. Author focuses on so-called Epistemic Theory of Truth, which assumes—according to the characteristics of Wolfgang Künne—that being true depends to some extent on our judgement. It is clear that there were far (...) more philosophers, who understood truth in similar way, e. g. Pierce, Brentano, Neurath, however, Czerniawski concentrates on the most recent history of Epistemic Theory of Truth. He also takes no account of philosophy of Habermas and Gadamer, whose ideas on truth can also be classified as „epistemic”, for they are built out of analytical tradition of philosophising. Thus, he chooses Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—three analytical philosophers who significantly contributed to the development of „epistemic” approaches to the problem of truth. (shrink)