Rehabilitating theory: refusal of the 'bottom-up' construction of scientific phenomena

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):160-184 (2007)
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Abstract

In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward’s data/phenomena distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright’s construal of the model of superconductivity —although in a different domain—argues for a ‘bottom-up’ construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing their melting point of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser’s case study of the plate tectonic revolution, the most extensive case study that has been put forth to support the bottom-up construction of phenomena. On the basis of new historical evidence, which has been overlooked not only by Kaiser but also by the entire historical literature on the plate tectonic revolution, I demonstrate that phenomena are not constructed from the bottom-up but rather, admittedly counter-intuitively, from the top-down.Keywords: Data; Phenomena; Bottom-up; Theory-ladenness; Plate tectonic revolution

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Samuel Schindler
Aarhus University

References found in this work

The aim and structure of physical theory.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1954 - Princeton,: Princeton University Press.
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Duhem & Philip P. Wiener - 1955 - Science and Society 19 (1):85-87.
Saving the phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.
The tool box of science: Tools for the building of models with a superconductivity example.Nancy Cartwright, Towfic Shomar & Mauricio Suárez - 1995 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44:137-149.

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