Data and phenomena: a restatement and defense

Synthese 182 (1):165-179 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.

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James Woodward
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Evidence Enriched.Nora Mills Boyd - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (3):403-421.
Models, Mechanisms, and Coherence.Matteo Colombo, Stephan Hartmann & Robert van Iersel - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):181-212.
Theory and observation in science.Jim Bogen - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):381-390.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
Saving the phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.

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