Flux and Openness

Process Studies 41 (1):150-170 (2012)
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Abstract

In his various lectures and writings, Whitehead articulates an evolving metaphysical vision in which process and relationship, rather than stasis and independent fixity, are primary. In so doing he performs a valuable philosophical service, pointing the way towards liberation from certain constraining assumptions and habits of thought. However, there are components of his vision that retain elements of fixity and separateness. I find these to be the aspects of his philosophy that are the most problematic, both in respect to internal con­ceptual coherency and in relation to my own philosophical and spiritual vision. My intention is to elucidate some of the ways in which these components of his philosophy are problematic, and to present an alternative vision in which these elements of fixity and ontological separateness dissolve into a dynamic openness of flux and interrelationship.

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