Six ontological topics: a Dialogue with D. M. Armstrong

Análisis Filosófico 23 (1):5-12 (2003)
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Abstract

Este texto surge de un intercambio epistolar mantenido con David Armstrong a propósito de su libro Universals. An Opinionated lntroduction. Se presenta en forma de diálogo y ha sido dividido en seis temas. El primero trata el problema de si las diferentes teorías ontológicas, al postular diferentes relaciones básicas, se hallan también en diferentes condiciones para afrontar el argumento del regreso infinito planteado por Bradley. El segundo presenta una duda. Los universales que postula Armstrong, tales como masa, carga electromagnética, etc., son "agregativos": admiten la categoría de cantidad. Pero se supone que los universales no admiten dicha categoría. Pareciera, pues, que los "universales" postulados por Armstrong no constituyen auténticos universales. El tercer tema concierne a la relación entre la teoría del haz y el Principio de identidad de los indiscernibles. El cuarto trata la opinión de Armstrong según la cual la teoría del haz se vería obligada a postular el carácter autosubsistente de los universales. El quinto consiste en la discusión acerca de si la teoría del haz debe admitir la existencia de hechos. Finalmente, el sexto concierne a la naturaleza de los tropos. This text originates in an exchange of letters I held with David Armstrong when his book Universals. An Opinionated Introduction was published. It is offered as a dialogue and has been divided into six topics. The first one deals with the problem of whether different ontological theories, which posit different basic relations, are also differently prepared to deal with Bradley's infinito regress argument. The second one raises a doubt. Those universals posited by Armstrong, such as mass, electric charge, etc., are "aggregative", which means they are subject to the category of quantity. But universals are not supposed to differ quantitatively. Thus, those "universals" favored by Armstrong become suspect of not being real universals. The third one addresses the relation between the Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles. The fourth one deals with Armstrong's opinion according to which the bundle theorist is forced to conceive of universals as self subsistant entities. The fifth one discusses whether the Bundle Theory has to accept the existence of facts. Finally, the sixth one deals with tropes

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Universals, Particulars, and Predication.Herbert Hochberg - 1965 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):87 - 102.

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