This is a collective study, in nine new essays, of the close connection between theology and cosmology in Stoic philosophy.

The basis of stoic determinism (a) : everything has a cause -- The basis of stoic determinism (b) : causation is necessitating -- The threat of external determination -- Reflection and responsibility -- The three compatibilist theories of Chrysippus -- Epictetus on responsibility for unreflective action.

In this paper, I explore the Presocratic antecedents of the Stoic theory of conflagration and argue that, even though three central theses of this theory have solid antecedents in Presocratic physics, the logical connection between them is a Stoic innovation. I label the Presocratics who hold these theses ‘Anaximandreans’ and include in this group Anaximander himself, Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, and reveal that Anaximenes, Democritus and Antiphon share with them central meteorological and cosmological assumptions.

It is agreed by most scholars that the Stoics were compatibilists regarding the relation between responsibility and determinism. On this view, the Stoics depart from two other positions. Unlike some eliminative determinists — labelled in modern discussions “hard-determinists”, but already active in Antiquity — they assert that, despite determinism, there are things that “depend on us”, or are : things for which we are genuinely responsible and for which, therefore, we may justifiably be praised or blamed. But the Stoics also (...) depart from the libertarian or “anti-determinist” 2 a position championed by the Epicureans in the early Hellenistic period and by Alexander of Aphrodisias on behalf of the Peripatetics, towards the end of the second century AD. Unlike the libertarian, who agrees on the incompatibility alleged by the hard-determinist, but preserves responsibility by rejectin necessitation, the Stoics preserve both responsibility and necessitation. (shrink)

The ἐκπύρωσις, or world's conflagration, followed by the restoration of an identical world seems to go against the rationality of the Stoic god. The aim of this paper is to show that Cleanthes, the second head of the School, can avoid this paradox. According to Cleanthes, the conflagration is an inevitable side-effect of the necessary means used by god to sustain the world. Given that this side-effect is contrary to god's sustaining activity, but unavoidable, god's rationality requires the restoration of (...) an identical world once the conflagration subsides. The paper also deals with the relation between Cleanthes and other early Stoics on the topic of conflagration. In particular, Cleanthes' position seems to differ from Chrysippus'. For in contrast with the Cleanthean god, who causes the conflagration as a side-effect only, the Chrysippean god, according to an influential interpretation put forward by Jaap Mansfeld, causes the conflagration as his ultimate cosmological goal. (shrink)

The ´, or world's con flagration, followed by the restoration of an identical world seems to go against the rationality of the Stoic god. The aim of this paper is to show that Cleanthes, the second head of the School, can avoid this paradox. According to Cleanthes, the con flagration is an inevitable side-effect of the necessary means used by god to sustain the world. Given that this side-effect is contrary to god's sustaining activity, but unavoidable, god's rationality requires the (...) restoration of an identical world once the con flagration subsides. The paper also deals with the relation between Cleanthes and other early Stoics on the topic of con flagration. In particular, Cleanthes' position seems to diff er from Chrysippus'. For in contrast with the Cleanthean god, who causes the con flagration as a side-effect only, the Chrysippean god, according to an in fluential interpretation put forward by Jaap Mansfeld, causes the con flagration as his ultimate cosmological goal. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es, por una parte, ofrecer una nueva interpretación de la teoría estoica de los universales a la luz del debate entre nominalismo, conceptualismo y realismo, y, por otra, desentrañar un paralelismo entre el análisis propuesto por los estoicos de enunciados cuyo sujeto gramatical son términos genéricos, y el análisis propuesto por Russell de enunciados como "El actual rey de Francia es calvo". Al final del trabajo se estudian las bases metafísicas de la teoría estoica de (...) los universales y se señala una posible tensión en su interior. The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the Stoic theory of universals in the light of the debate between nominalism, conceptualism and realism, and to bring out a parallel between the analysis proposed by the Stoic Chrysippus of statements whose grammatical subject is a generic term, and the analysis developed by Russell of statements such as "The current King of France is bald". At the end of the paper, the metaphysical basis of the Stoic theory of universals is examined and a possible contradiction in it is brought out. (shrink)

Este ensayo ofrece un análisis del argumento de Crisipo a favor de que todo tiene una causa en Cicerón, De Fato 20. Para ello, se discute en qué sentido el argumento es fatalista y si el tipo de fatalismo que implica alienta la inacción. Asimismo, se presenta una nueva interpretación de la réplica de Crisipo al Argumento Perezoso en Eusebio, Praep. ev. 6.8.28. En particular se sostiene que, para Crisipo, la relación entre sucesos codestinados es analítica: a fin de determinar (...) qué sucesos futuros están codestinados con sucesos presentes, basta analizar los conceptos que se emplean para describir los primeros. /// In this paper I undertake an examination of Chrysippus' argument in Cicero's De Fato 20 for the view that everything has a cause, by discussing in what sense it is fatalist and whether the kind of fatalism it implies encourages idleness. A novel interpretation is offered of Chrysippus' refutation of the Idle Argument at Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8.28. In particular, I argue that for Chrysippus the connection between co-fated events is analytic: to determine which future events are co-fated with present ones, it is sufficient to analyse the concepts that are used to describe the former. (shrink)

The present paper studies a family of Stoic proofs of the intelligence of the cosmos, i. e. of the thesis that the cosmos is intelligent in the strong sense that it is, as a whole, something that thinks. This family, ‘F2’, goes back to a proof, ‘XP’, found in Philebus 29a9–30 a8 and Xenophon Mem. 1.4.8. F2 infers the intelligence of the cosmos, as XP does, from the general idea that our intelligence proceeds from the cosmos, which is the ultimate (...) cause of why we are intelligent, and the further claim that, since this is so, the cosmos itself must be intelligent. They differ from one another, however, in how they account for. In this paper, I present a new reason for why the accounts are different, that complements those given by David Sedley in a recent and important study of Stoic cosmology. Based on the analogy between intelligence and the four elements, XP puts forward the idea that the intelligence currently present in us is a portion of cosmic intelligence that has separated from it at some point in the past, and that has travelled from the outside cosmos to us. In contrast, the theory used by F2 to explain the generation of human intelligence is grounded not in the notions of separation and locomotion, but in that of transmission of a state. As I argue in some detail, the separation-locomotion model and the transmission model are not only different from each other, but also logically independent from one another: in general terms, neither entails the other. This transmission model used by the Stoics in a proof of the intelligence of the cosmos, I submit, is a major innovation in ancient cosmological and metaphysical thinking. (shrink)

Leading figures in ancient philosophy present nineteen original papers on three key themes in the work of Richard Sorabji. The papers dealing with Metaphysics range from Democritus to Numenius on basic questions about the structure and nature of reality: necessitation, properties, and time. The section on Soul includes one paper on the individuation of souls in Plato and five papers on Aristotle's and Aristotelian theories of cognition, with a special emphasis on perception. The section devoted to Ethics concentrates upon Stoicism (...) and the complex views the Stoics held on such topics as motivation, akrasia, oikeitsis, and the emotions. It also includes one paper on the influence of Greek ethics in Modern Philosophy. The volume also contains a fascinating "intellectual autobiography" by Sorabji himself, and a full Bibliography of his works. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the theory of determinism put forward by the ancient Stoics and its theory for rational action and moral responsibility. The Stoic argument for determinism is presented in Section 1. Stoic determinism implies fatalism. The first problem, studied in Section 2, is whether it is rational to be motivated to do anything if one believes in fatalism. A second problem is that determinism seems to imply that everything people do is fully determined by external causes alone. This problem, (...) and the solution proposed by the Stoics, are studied in Section 3. A third problem, discussed in Section 4, is whether moral responsibility is compatible or incompatible with the possibility of alternate actions. The chapter discusses two objections raised by incompatibilists, which relate to the notion of agency and freedom from external force. The chapter briefly considers one possible counter‐objection to Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school. (shrink)

En este trabajo discuto el argumento de Crisipo a favor de la indestructibilidad del cosmos que aparece en Eusebio, Praeparatio Evangelica 15.18.1-3. Este argumento complementa al que aparece en Plutarco, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis1052C, pero descansa sobre una base distinta, a saber, la teoría de la disolución de los cuerpos complejos en los cuatro elementos y la teoría sobre cómo estos últimos se transforman los unos en los otros. Según veremos, existen antecedentes importantes de estas teorías en Anaxímenes y su teoría (...) del cambio. Al final, me ocupo de dos objeciones que los propios estoicos formularon en contra del argumento de Crisipo. (shrink)

La contribución de Ricardo Salles se centra en la interpretación peripatética de Alejandro en contra de la tesis estoica de que la lógica no es “instrumento”, sino “parte” de la filosofía. Según Alejandro, si la lógica fuera parte de la filosofía, como pretenden los estoicos, la filosofía no podría ocupar el lugar más elevado en la jerarquía del conocimiento; pero esto sería, en cierto modo, paradójico, argumenta Salles, pues todos –tanto estoicos como peripatéticos– consideran, por diversas razones, que la filosofía (...) es, por su objeto, la disciplina más elevada. De acuerdo con Salles, sin embargo, esta aguda crítica no es lo suficientemente penetrante para poner de manifiesto una verdadera inconsistencia en el estoicismo. Salles cree que esto sería paradójico, pues todos –tanto estoicos como peripatéticos– consideran, por diversas razones, que la filosofía es, por su objeto, la disciplina más elevada. De acuerdo con Salles, sin embargo, la aguda crítica de Alejandro no es lo suficientemente penetrante para poner de manifiesto una verdadera inconsistencia en el estoicismo. Su principal debilidad, en su opinión, radica en el hecho de que el razonamiento sobre el cual descansa depende de supuestos aristotélicos que los estoicos rechazan. (shrink)

Este trabajo intenta resolver una tensión que existe en el modo en que Aristóteles concibe el apeiron de Anaximandro, la substancia a partir de la cual se genera el cosmos. En algunas partes del corpus, Aristóteles la presenta como un cuerpo básico que genera el cosmos por medio de un cambio de sus cualidades, pero en otras como un cuerpo compuesto de substancias básicas que el cual generaría el cosmos cuando éstas se separan la una de la otra. Como veremos, (...) sin embargo, sólo este segundo modelo es el que Aristóteles realmente le atribuye a Anaximandro. Al final, se propone una hipótesis respecto de quién podría ser entonces la persona, o grupo de personas, que Aristóteles tiene en mente cuando se refiere al primer modelo. (shrink)

In antiquity living beings are inextricably linked to the cosmos as a whole. Ancient biology and cosmology depend upon one another and therefore a complete understanding of one requires a full account of the other. This volume addresses many philosophical issues that arise from this double relation. Does the cosmos have a soul of its own? Why? Is either of these two disciplines more basic than the other, or are they at the same explanatory level? What is the relationship between (...) living things and the cosmos as a whole? If the cosmos is an animate intelligent being, what is the nature of its thoughts and actions? How do these relate to our own thoughts and actions? Do they pose a threat to our autonomy as subjects and agents? And what is the place of zoogony in cosmogony? A distinguished international team of contributors provides original essays discussing these questions. (shrink)

En este trabajo, propongo una reconstrucción del argumento de Aristótelesen el capítulo 5 de Metafísica Z y defiendo una nueva lectura de cómo lasobjeciones desarrolladas en 1030b14-36 en contra de la posibilidad dedefinir predicados no-substanciales se relacionan entre sí.

Este artículo ofrece un análisis tentativo de los argumentos estoicos a favor de la racionalidad del cosmos agrupándolos en cuatro familias distintas e intentado rastrear sus antecedentes en Platón. La diferencia entre las familias radica en que los argumentos de cada una son lógicamente independientes de los de las otras. Los de las dos primeras descansan en la teleología estoica y en su teoría embriológica. Los de las otras dos, en cambio, recurren a ideas acerca de los componentes básicos del (...) cosmos y acerca de su estructura orgánica. Los antecedentes platónicos de estas familias de argumentos no se limitan a la cosmología de Platón, sino que se encuentran también en principios clave de su metafísica. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute la interpretación de Marcelo Boeri sobre el compatibilismo estoico; esto es, la tesis de que es compatible con el determinismo que rige al mundo natural el que podamos ser genuinamente responsables de nuestras acciones. Según Boeri, los estoicos intentaron conciliar las dos cosas abriendo un margen de indeterminación gracias al cual nuestras acciones no están sujetas a la necesidad que domina los demás fenómenos naturales. La discusión que se ofrece aquí se basa en un análisis del concepto (...) antiguo de lo que depende de nosotros y de los conceptos estoicos de determinismo y modalidad. /// This paper discusses Marcelo Boeri's interpretation of Stoic compatibilism, the thesis that natural determinism does not rule out that we can genuinely be responsible for our actions. According to Boeri, the Stoic hold that this is so because our actions are to a great extent free from determination. The discussion of this interpretation is based on an analysis of the ancient concept of what depends on us and of Stoic concepts of determinism and modality. (shrink)

En este artículo se atiende un problema fundamental de la filosofía de la naturaleza: ¿puede fluir el tiempo sin que existan los cambios que de hecho le acompañan? Las dos posturas antiguas más reconocidas, la de Aristóteles y la de los estoicos, se analizan en este ensayo. Por un lado, Aristóteles define al tiempo en función del cambio, de manera que su respuesta a la pregunta arriba planteada tendría que ser negativa; por otro lado, los estoicos sostienen que existen momentos (...) en los que de hecho el tiempo fluye sin que haya cambios,, y, por tanto, el tiempo no presupone la noción de cambio. Presento aquí la siguiente hipótesis: los estoicos heterodoxos aceptaron la idea aristotélica del tiempo que presupone cambio, idea que conocen a través de Eudemo, y que les lleva a proponer cambios transcíclicos para solucionar los problemas que causa la discusión sobre la individuación, la identidad y el cambio a través del tiempo. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece un análisis de la teoría estoica de la acción con el objetivo de solucionar un problema que la teoría aristotélica no tiene, a saber, cómo se adquiere el conocimiento práctico mínimo que un agente debe tener para llevar a cabo una acción. Se estudian nociones estoicas como phantasía, ormée y kathéekontos desde las perspectivas epistemológica, práctica e incluso psicológica.

The paper addresses two questions regarding the interpretation of akrasia among the Stoics, offered by Marcelo Boeri in his book Appearance and Reality in Greek Thought: On the one hand, can Chrysippus’s monistic adaptation of the Platonic model of the divided soul set forth in Book iv of the Republic provide a philosophically satisfactory explanation of the classical phenomenon of akrasia? On the other hand, is this phenomenon the true explanandum of this adaptation? The paper shows that the answer to (...) both these questions could be negative and thus different from the answer provided by Boeri in his book. The argument is based on the analysis of Plutarch vm 446f-447b and on the analysis of the classical problem of akrasia. (shrink)

Why does the Stoic demiurge cause the conflagration? In this paper, I revisit some issues addressed in Salles 2005 and argue that the conflagration is the result of an incapacity in the demiurge for creating an everlasting and uninterrupted cosmic order. Also, I bring out in more detail the parallel between the Stoics and Plato at Tim. 75a‑c, why cosmic order is the ultimate end pursued by the demiurge, what is the physical mechanism that leads up to the conflagration, and (...) why the conflagration is contrary to the cosmic order. (shrink)

El principal objetivo de este artículo es estudiar la respuesta de Aristóteles y del estoico Crisipo a un problema metafísico que ha sido descuidado en estudios recientes de la filosofía natural antigua. El problema se refiere a la generación de los llamados cuerpos homogéneos complejos. Si, como so..

Se formulan dos preguntas en torno a la interpretación que ofrece Marcelo Boeri en Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego acerca del problema de la akrasía en el estoicismo: ¿puede la adaptación monista que hizo Crisipo del modelo platónico del alma dividida en República iv ofrecer una expli..