I will consider Armstrong's problems in trying to account for structural universals, i.e., a kind of complex universal whose instantiation by particulars involves different parts of those particulars instantiating several basic properties and relations, such as the property of being a molecule of methane. I present and criticise Armstrong's most recent attempt to explain structural properties by means of the identification of universals with types of states of affairs and I state my own solution to the problem by appealing to (...) formal relations holding between particulars. (shrink)

In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar’s way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen’s specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach.

This paper advances a criticism of Parsons' notion of truthmaker grounded on the notion of supervenience. I argue that none of the two naturalinterpretations of Parsons' definition succeeds in accomplishing the several tasks intended by Parsons.

Armstrong (1983) poses two requirements that law-statements must satisfy in order to support the corresponding counterfactuals. He also argues that law-statements can not satisfy one of these requirements if they merely express regularities, although both requirements are satisfied if law-statements are interpreted as expressing relations between universals. I try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be raised against Armstrong’s own solution by adding three premisses to it: the inference thesis, the contingency thesis and a principle whose rationality I also argue (...) for. Finally, I offer a more reasonable alternative condition for nomic counterfactual supporting which is satisfied by law-statements if they are interpreted as expressing relations between universals, but not so if we interpret them as mere regularities. (shrink)

Armstrong poses two requirements that law-statements must satisfy in order to support the corresponding counterfactuals. He also argues that law-statements can not satisfy one of these requirements if they merely express regularities, although both requirements are satisfied if law-statements are interpreted as expressing relations between universals. I try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be raised against Armstrong’s own solution by adding three premisses to it: the inference thesis, the contingency thesis and a principle whose rationality I also argue for. (...) Finally, I offer a more reasonable alternative condition for nomic counterfactual supporting which is satisfied by law-statements if they are interpreted as expressing relations between universals, but not so if we interpret them as mere regularities. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical overview of Lewis’ theory of singular causation running from his origins to his last words on the issue . In sections 1 and 2, I characterize Lewis’ original theory of causation backed in terms of counterfactual dependence as opposed to regularity theories and also his two 1986a proposals of modification, prompted by cases of late preemption. In section 4, I examine the main problems of the 1986a proposals which lead Lewis to his last analysis of (...) causation in terms of influence . In section 5, I discuss the merits of Lewis last proposal as to the problems of late preemption and spurious causation. I also argue against Lewis’ idea that his theory of influence can deal with trumping preemption cases. Besides, a general and severe problem of the overall counterfactual conception of causality is highlighted: the status of backtracking counterfactuals. (shrink)

EI desarrollo de su teoría de las leyes como relaciones entre universales condujo a Armstrong a establecer un marco metafísico general mas complejo que el que sus anteriores trabajos presentaban. En este artículo se exponen los aspectos principales de la metafísica de particulares y universales exigida por la identificación original de Armstrong de las leyes con estados de cosas universales. Además, se presentan diversas dificultades que pueden hallarse en su propuesta, y algunas soluciones para las mismas. Los temas principales que (...) se discuten son las leyes con excepciones, las leyes con restriccionesespacio-temporales, las leyes probabilísticas y las leyes no ejemplificadas.The development of his theory of laws as relations between universals led Armstrong to set up a more complex general metaphysical framework than that advanced in his previous works. In this paper I present the main traits of the metaphysics of properties and particulars required by Armstrongsoriginal identification of laws with universal states of affairs. Besides, I advance some serious drawbacks that can be found in his proposal and I also offer some solutions to them. The main subjects to be discussed here will be laws with exceptions, laws with spatio-temporal limitations, probabilistic laws and uninstantiated laws. (shrink)

EI desarrollo de su teoría de las leyes como relaciones entre universales condujo a Armstrong a establecer un marco metafísico general mas complejo que el que sus anteriores trabajos presentaban. En este artículo se exponen los aspectos principales de la metafísica de particulares y universales exigida por la identificación original de Armstrong de las leyes con estados de cosas universales. Además, se presentan diversas dificultades que pueden hallarse en su propuesta, y algunas soluciones para las mismas. Los temas principales que (...) se discuten son las leyes con excepciones, las leyes con restriccionesespacio-temporales, las leyes probabilísticas y las leyes no ejemplificadas.The development of his theory of laws as relations between universals led Armstrong to set up a more complex general metaphysical framework than that advanced in his previous works. In this paper I present the main traits of the metaphysics of properties and particulars required by Armstrongsoriginal identification of laws with universal states of affairs. Besides, I advance some serious drawbacks that can be found in his proposal and I also offer some solutions to them. The main subjects to be discussed here will be laws with exceptions, laws with spatio-temporal limitations, probabilistic laws and uninstantiated laws. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with Armstrong's last theory of states of affairs and its relation to truthmakers for sentences and the problem of uní versáis. More specifically, I discuss his truthmaker principie, rejecting some of the objections that has been raised against it. However, I also try to show that Armstrong's answer to the problem of the negative existencial sentences in terms of totality states of affairs is mistaken. Finally, I rebut Oliver's slinghot argument against truthmakers and also discuss (...) Armstrong theory of states of affairs as truthmakers. /// Este artículo trata de la última teoría de los estados de cosas de Armstrong, así como de su relación con los hacedores de verdad de los enunciados y con el problema de los universales. En particular, se discute su principio del hacedor de verdad, y se rechazan algunas de las objeciones que se han presentado al mismo. Por otra parte, se intenta mostrar también que la respuesta de Armstrong al problema de los enunciados existenciales negativos en términos de estados de cosas de totalidad es errónea. Finalmente, también se objeta la versión de Oliver del argumento de la honda y se discute la teoría de los hacedores de verdad como los estados de cosas. (shrink)

The general aim of this paper is to defend a theory of properties grounded on universals and the notion of substratum. We offer first a brief survey of some problems concerning the attribution of properties to objects and the similarity of objects. We next characterize the notion of universal by contrasting universals against other entities that have often been postulated in order to account for the mentioned problems. Besides, we distinguish two different theories of properties, both based on the notion (...) of universal: the bundle theory of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to some of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to some of the serious objections that have been posed against the substratum theory. Firstly, we argue that the theory of temporal stages can solve some problems deriving from the substantial change and the accidental change; moreover, we give a reply to some objections advanced against this substratum as a bare particular. Thirdly, we discuss some objections to the use that the substratum theory makes of these bare particulars as individuators. Our reply is based on a distinction between three different roles that can be ascribed to an entity: a particularizer role and two kinds of individuatory roles . We argue that a substratum can perfectly play a rol as a particularizer and also as an intraworld individuator. Finally, we offer a solution to the well known Bradley´s regressum. (shrink)