Seis cuestiones ontológicas: Un diálogo con D.M. Armstrong
Abstract
This text originates in an exchange of letters I held with David Armstrong when his book Universals: an opinionated introduction was published. It is offered as a dialogue and has been divided into six topics. The first one deals with the problem of whether different ontological theories, which posit different basic relations , are also differently prepared to deal with Bradley’s infinito regress argument. The second one raiser a doubt. Those universals posited by Armstrong, such as mass, electric charge, etc, are “aggregative”, which means they are subject to the category of quantity. But universals are not supposed to differ quantitatively. Thus, those “universals” favored by Armstrong become suspect of not being real universals. The third one adresses the relation between the Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles. The fourth one deals with Armstrong’s opinion according to which the bundle theorist is forced to conceive of universals as self subsistant entities. The fifth one discusses whether the Bundle Theory has to accept the existence of facts. Finally, the sixth one deals with tropes