Philosophical Studies 176 (1):141-159 (2019)

Authors
Indrek Reiland
University of Vienna
Abstract
Several philosophers have recently appealed to predication in developing their theories of cognitive representation and propositions. One central point of difference between them is whether they take predication to be forceful or neutral and whether they take the most basic cognitive representational act to be judging or entertaining. Both views are supported by powerful reasons and both face problems. Many think that predication must be forceful if it is to explain representation. However, the standard ways of implementing the idea give rise to the Frege-Geach problem. Others think that predication must be neutral, if we’re to avoid the Frege-Geach problem. However, it looks like nothing neutral can explain representation. In this paper I present a third view, one which respects the powerful reasons while avoiding the problems. On this view predication is forceful and can thus explain representation, but the idea is implemented in a novel way, avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. The key is to make sense of the notion of grasping a proposition as an objectual act where the object is a proposition.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-1009-z
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
Act‐Type Theories of Propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).
Reference, Predication, Judgment and Their Relations.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Neutral Predication.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1381-1389.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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