The Frege–Geach problem and Kalderon's moral fictionalism

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712 (2009)

Abstract

Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.

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Matti Eklund
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Fictionalism in Metaphysics.Frederick Kroon - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.
Are All Normative Judgments Desire-Like?Alex Gregory - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):29-55.
Pragmatic Antirealism: A New Antirealist Strategy.Michael Scott & Philip Brown - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):349-366.
Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 32:68-91.

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